SOUTHERN GOVERNORS OUTLINE MAJOR SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000581 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ (AS RECOMMENDATION) C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -PARA MARKINGS, PARA 13 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID NATO MARR AF SUBJECT: SOUTHERN GOVERNORS OUTLINE MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES KABUL 00000581 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol A. Rodley, for reason s 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (C/REL ISAF) SUMMARY: During a February 6 introductory meeting in Kandahar with COMISAF, the governors of Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul pressed for increasing police salaries and getting more police officers into the Southern provinces to provide leadership to new recruits. ANA 205th Corps Commander Major General Raoufi urged governors to replace ANA troops with ANP, so that the ANA could get the training it needed. The governors and ISAF officials agreed that close coordination was imperative to defeating the insurgency. COMISAF Gen McNeill promised the governors that ISAF would help to rebuild Afghanistan, while laying down a marker that ISAF would fight when necessary. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On February 6, RC-South Commander MG Van Loon (Dutch) hosted governors from Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul at Kandahar Air Field to discuss security, governance and development. Uruzgan Governor Monib was invited but was unable to attend. Also present for the security discussion were ANA 205 Corps Commander Major General Raoufi and new Regional Police Chief Zazai. Gen McNeill, making his first visit to KAF as COMISAF, attended briefly. (Other issues reported septel.) ¶3. (C/REL ISAF) Van Loon assured the governors that ISAF would work together with them to address problems. Cautioning that ISAF could not be everywhere, all the time, Van Loon looked to the governors to help him set priorities. It was crucial that ISAF and the governors speak frankly -- "it doesn't do us any good to be nice to each other, we must be honest," Van Loon said. While noting that the security situation in Kandahar had improved since December, Van Loon stated that it was imperative to make sure that Kandahar's problems did not simply migrate to other areas in the South. Equally, current instability in Helmand could not be allowed to affect its neighbors. ¶4. (C/REL ISAF) Addressing the capabilities of the ANA and ANP, Van Loon stressed training as the key to the future. In the short term, he warned, the new training cycle (red-amber-green) would have a negative effect on security, as fewer ANA troops would be available for operations. Nevertheless, he asked governors to support ANA training, in part by working to establish good police forces in the provinces. It was vitally important, he emphasized, to have trusted police -- they were the face of the GoA, because the people saw them on the job. The ANP represent you, Van Loon emphasized to the governors, and if they are ineffective (or corrupt),it will reflect on you. ¶5. (C/REL ISAF) ANA 205th Corps Commander Major General Raoufi echoed Van Loon's statements on the importance of training the ANA. There seemed to be "plenty of time for fighting, but not for training for the future," he said, asking the governors to support the removal of some ANA troops from the battlefield for training purposes. Raoufi asked governors to support this by replacing these ANA with ANP. ¶6. (C/REL ISAF) Speaking first for the governors, Helmand Governor Assadullah Wafa agreed that a well- trained ANA was very important. He then turned immediately to problems in Helmand, underscoring the relationship between the drug trade and the insurgency. Pointing to Helmand's 160-km border with Pakistan, Wafa warned that the town of Baram Chah was KABUL 00000581 002.2 OF 003 a major transit area for drugs and insurgents. There was no ANA, no ISAF to stop them. ¶7. (C/REL ISAF) Wafa also cited corruption as a major problem facing the ANP. He urged that the southern provinces be prioritized to receive trusted officers to lead provincial policemen. New Regional Police Chief Zazai acknowledged there were problems with police in the South, and admitted there were gaps in coverage. Like Raoufi, Zazai called for more training for the ANP, more equipment, and higher salaries, recommending also that police receive deployment pay in addition to their base salary. (Embassy/CSTC-A Note: The bulk of RC South,s remaining equipment authorization is presently arriving and is being pushed south as quickly as possible. At present, ANP in selected high risk provinces are authorized to receive USD 70/mo hazardous duty pay from the MOI,s recurring budget, however it appears that few patrolmen actually receive it. If hazardous duty pay were distributed as authorized, deployment pay would not be needed. End Embassy/CSTC-A Note.) Zazai said he was prioritizing pay equity between the ANA and the ANP. (Embassy Note: it is not clear what Zazai meant by this, since any decision would be taken in Kabul. End Embassy Note.) ¶8. (C/REL ISAF) All three governors supported strongly Zazai's call to improve police salaries. Kandahar Governor Assadullah noted the initiative to pay police directly through the banks, but pointed out that many parts of the South lacked banks. He acknowledged that there was a paymaster system in place, but still claimed some police in remote areas had to pay to travel to Kandahar and back in order to receive their pay. (Embassy/CSTC-A Note: There are provisions in the MOI recurring budget under which MoI can reimburse ANP who must travel to receive their pay, but they are generally not implemented . End Embassy/CSTC-A Note). ¶9. (C/REL ISAF) Governor Arman of Zabul stated that all of the southern provinces shared the need for a strong police force. He agreed that the police should keep the peace and serve as a bridge between the government and the people. If we had strong, well- trained police, he said, we would not have some of the problems we have. Supporting Wafa's call for more officers, Arman said he was constantly faced with the removal and replacement of district chiefs of police. The police lack leadership, as only 15 percent of abul's police force is officers. They do not get paid enough, or on time. Finally, Arman said that police equipment was often non-functioning (e.g., guns that won't fire). (CSTC-A Note: In order to fix this type of problem, a national weapons maintenance contract commenced this month in Kabul and regional centers. End CSTC-A note.) Arman pressed Van Loon to support joint ANA-ANP-ISAF patrols as a way to overcome these shortcomings. None of the three alone could turn around the security situation, but together they might make a difference. ¶10. (C/REL ISAF) Kandahar Governor Assadullah said ISAF and the GoA had worked together to pacify the Panjwayi/Zhari districts of western Kandahar, and had been successful because of good coordination. He, too, drew attention to problems with the police, but focused mainly on the need for exceptionally close coordination among NATO, the ANP and ANA and the NDS, and among the provinces -- for everything, he said -- but especially security. "We have provincial (bureaucratic) boundaries to shape the way we work," he noted, "but the enemy does not. The enemy can move from Helmand through Kandahar to Uruzgan and Zabul. KABUL 00000581 003.2 OF 003 We can only defeat the enemy together." ¶11. (U) COMISAF made brief remarks, stressing that ISAF would support the rebuilding of Afghanistan, but it would fight when necessary. He credited Van Loon with the good coordination in the South, and urged the governors to continue to work closely with RC-South. (COMISAF attended the forum briefly before traveling to Sperwan Gar (in Kandahar province) and Kajaki.) ¶12. (C/REL ISAF) Following COMISAF's departure, the governors returned to the theme of coordination, with a focus on the Provincial Coordinating Committee (PCC). Assadullah complained that his PCC was "weak," and ineffective. Kandahar's PCC often could not get answers from ISAF in a timely manner, he claimed. While in principle a good idea, Assadullah said the PCC needed higher-ranking representatives who were empowered to make decisions. Governor Arman agreed. The PCC had not turned out to be a mechanism for immediate action. As an example, he said that while he could pass to the PCC any information on the whereabouts of a group of Taliban, the PCC would not take any action. Wafa and Arman nodded in agreement when Assadullah said "We don't ever act -- we are always defensive, never offensive." Arman added, "We've lost the initiative. Getting it back (from the Taliban) is the only way to assure stability." Wafa chimed in with "Even though we have lots of forces, we still wait for the enemy to attack us." Wafa pointed again to Baram Chah -- "we know what it is (center for drugs and insurgents) -- what are we going to DO about it?" ¶13. (S/REL ISAF) COMMENT: What the governors shared during this session is reflective of the challenges faced by RC(S) due to weak governance just now getting stronger, a resilient insurgency which enjoys operational sanctuary, thin NATO force presence, and a still-developing ANSF. At the GoA policy level, the PAG continues to deal with the issues the governors outlined. The train and equip mission of CSTC-A is focused on these issues as well, and is working with ANSF leadership to increase the capabilities of both ANA and ANP in RC(S). In addition, the ANA leadership has recognized the combat capability shortfall and is planning to bolster combat power in the South. Although challenges remain, we continue to see improvement in overall ANSF leadership and operational abilities. It is to be hoped that as these changes take effect at the local level, the governors will begin to see a positive impact on the security situation. NEUMANN