PRT ASADABAD: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000579 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUSTRALIA/NZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON EAID MASS SOCI AF SUBJECT: PRT ASADABAD: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN KUNAR PROVINCE Classified By: Classified by PolCounselor SRosenberry for reasons 1.4 ( B) and (D). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Kunar,s security improved significantly in 2006 except in the isolated border areas. Ongoing road construction will help consolidate security gains, and will enable economic growth. Better and larger police forces will be necessary to keep Kunar,s security and economic trends positive in the face of enemy ambitions for 2007. Government leadership is hampered by internal conflicts, but is helped by strong tribal structures. In addition to smoother functioning of GOA elements here, the province needs a better way to manage its wood resources, and must attract investment in manufacturing and services to supplement agricultural employment. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Kunar, with about 500 thousand inhabitants (and an equal number of goats) is geographically one of Afghanistan,s smallest provinces. 140 km long and 80 km wide, it consists of the Kunar River Valley, running from Jalalabad in the southwest to the border with Chitral in the northeast, and the Pech River Valley, branching off to the west from the Kunar Valley at Asadabad. The rest of the province is mountainous and, in places, heavily-wooded. Many small side valleys, generally less developed and less accessible, wind among the mountains, and foot trails connect them all. The Kunar and Pech valleys provide road access to central and eastern Nuristan. The east bank of the Kunar River, a territory running along the Pakistan border, is cut off from the rest of the province due a shortage of bridges and isolated internally as a result of poor roads. -------------- Security: Improvement Enables Development -------------- ¶3. (C) Security in Kunar has improved significantly in the past year. Operation Mountain Lion (OML) in April 2006 temporarily strengthened security so that reconstruction work could advance in the Kunar and Pech Valleys. A number of major reconstruction projects have consolidated the security 
gains of OML, by improving the roads from Jalalabad through Kunar to eastern Nuristan, and from Asadabad up the Pech Valley to Wama, in Nuristan. From Jalalabad to Asadabad the road is already paved, and from Asadabad to Asmar in northern Kunar, the road is being paved this winter. The Pech Valley road from Asadabad to Nangalam is also being paved this winter, the road beyond Nangalam up into central Nuristan is being improved, and there are a number of road projects extending off the two main highways. ¶4. (C) These road projects help gain the support of Kunaris and strengthen the presence of the GOA. The PRT and other reconstruction entities have worked closely with communities along the roads to ensure their support for these projects, and have employed large numbers of Kunaris in the process. In Kunar,s two main valleys these efforts have been successful in reducing enemy activity, so that movement of ISAF and civilians along these valley roads is now much more routine. While roadside bombs still are placed, the great majority of them are reported to us by locals, and are disarmed without harm. ¶5. (C) ISAF has not, however, made much improvement in security in the Korengal Valley, despite numerous military operations there and a permanent ground presence since April ¶2006. The Korengalis are Nuristanis, speak a different language from their Pashtun neighbors, and are supported by militants from Pakistan in their efforts to resist outside influence. The southern Korengal and the neighboring areas of the Shuriac and Badel valleys continue to be areas of KABUL 00000579 002 OF 004 enemy activity in Kunar. Even in these valleys, as elsewhere, ISAF and ANA forces have kept up pressure on the enemy, forcing insurgents to restrict their movements, or to keep to isolated areas. ¶6. (C) The enemy still stages attacks on ISAF/ANSF. Most attacks are shoot-and-run nuisance incidents, although there are occasional group attacks on outposts and IED attacks along roads - usually locals report the IEDs to us before they can do any harm. Enemy forces have not occupied district centers or military outposts in Kunar, nor have they established any sort of parallel government. They have tried, through intimidation, to separate the civilian populace from ISAF and the GOA (i.e. murdering ISAF,s Afghan employees, and once attacking teachers),but have found that this tactic causes widespread anger against them. Insurgent efforts to force schools to close have been unsuccessful. Intimidation may be self-defeating, but actually stopping it from occurring will require stronger police forces. ¶7. (S) The enemy consists of a variety of groups, including Taliban, HIG, Lashkar-e-Tayeba, and Al Qaeda facilitators, and is split about 60-40 between local and foreign seasonal insurgents. These groups are involved in transitory alliances with each other. This undercuts their effectiveness, but also makes them a challenge to locate and neutralize. Money appears to be a major motivation for most individuals to participate in the insurgency. While rates vary, reportedly men receive around $12 per day while operating as insurgents, in addition to signing bonuses and large rewards for verifiably killing an ISAF soldier. The PRT and its contractors, in contrast, offers laborers $3-5 per day, more money than most could make in the local economy. ¶8. (C) Where we have been successful in improving security, our success is limited by the ability and willingness of Afghans to sustain security when ISAF are not present. Ability is constrained by the ANP,s lack of vehicles, weapons and ammunition (most carry only pistols); willingness is harder to define, but is certainly undermined by the lack of pay to Arbakai, corruption among senior police officers, and intimidation by the enemy. ¶9. (C) The Border Districts are largely untouched and unchanged by the government or Coalition Forces. Lack of bridges across the river, and the absence of good roads along the river on the east bank, means that the Transkunar remains isolated. To a greater degree than west of the river, these districts rely on tribal structures to take care of security and to resolve conflicts. This does not mean they are not loyal to the Afghan Government, and the PRT has found them quite welcoming. But their isolation has deprived them of the economic benefits coming to western Kunar, and makes it easy for the enemy to use them for transit. To engage them more effectively in cutting off enemy transit, the international community must bring them more development and stronger security. The first step must be more bridges and roads. -------------- Economy: Wood and Roads - But No Electricity -------------- ¶10. (C) The main force in Kunar,s economy is timber. Unfortunately, as the result of very profitable concessions being given to politically-connected large contractors, the population as a whole benefits very little from the extraction of timber resources. This has reinforced a sense that the government is not interested in the population and fed political discontent. As deforestation for short-term gain continues, the people of Kunar will face problems of erosion and loss of water supplies. ¶11. (C) Road development has had a more ubiquitous impact. The road projects are sharply improving transport along the two main axes of Kunar, the valley of the Kunar River, and KABUL 00000579 003 OF 004 the Pech Valley. The PRT has observed more concrete structures along these routes as the roads are paved, more businesses, and more car repair shops. Elders in Chowkay recently commented that the paved road from Jalalabad to Asadabad was a &100 percent improvement8 for their economy; a better road has meant easier shipment of goods to be sold by new businesses established closer to their customers. Kunaris don,t have to go to Jalalabad to shop; Jalalabad has come to them. One sign of this expanding economic activity is that Azizi Bank is reportedly building an office in Asadabad, the province,s first private bank branch. ¶12. (C) Despite great potential, the lack of available power represents the next big infrastructure barrier to Kunar,s development. The PRT has installed a number of microhydro power stations around Kunar, but the potential for a large dam (or dams) on the Kunar or Pech rivers -- producing enough megawatts to power eastern Afghanistan -- is what local officials dream of. The PRT is starting to look at a smaller one megawatt dam on the Pech as a first step. ¶13. (C) One might argue that, at present, ISAF itself is Kunar,s main economic force. The PRT and other ISAF forces here employing some 2,000 people around Kunar to build or guard roads, and other projects, and pay relatively high wages. Like the expansion of retail trade from Jalalabad, this is helpful, adding to employment in agriculture. But it cannot take the place of investment in manufacturing or services which Kunar needs to ensure its long-term economic health. -------------- Governance: Weak, but the Enemy is Weaker -------------- ¶14. (C) Governor Deedar has been a generally good, but limited partner of ISAF in Kunar. He supports our security and development efforts in the public sphere, gets out of his compound to show the face of the GOA around the province, and engages Kunar,s tribal leaders in our reconstruction and security efforts. He has nevertheless been hesitant to engage tribal leaders on more difficult task, such as blocking the movement of insurgents through their districts. His preferred solution to all security issues is to hire more militia with guns, and he invariably he looks to ISAF to underwrite the effort. Deedar is also not a systematic administrator. He does not like details of development and planning, takes a simplistic view of development (&it,s a giveaway, right?8),and there is always a suspicious scent of corruption. Administrative functioning is limited somewhat by the Governor,s battles with the Ministry of Interior over pay, operations funds, and personnel appointments. ¶15. (C) The Provincial Council is largely ineffective. The Governor holds them in low regard, and the PRT,s efforts to engage them have produced little. They routinely ask for resources such as cars and office equipment, but decline offers to accompany PRT reps on trips around the province or to otherwise engage in our activities. The Provincial Council is divided. Some of its members are in jail on corruption charges, while others are closely linked to the insurgency. Line Ministry Directors seem more promising partners, and both the PRT and UNAMA have had some success in working with them on provincial development planning. The PDC process has been slow, as the Governor has not pushed it along, but it is gaining headway. Regular meetings are now scheduled, and working groups have been established. ¶16. (C) Although GOA weaknesses are manifest in Kunar, enemy groups are apparently weaker, or perhaps simply unable, due to their own internal divisions, to exploit the government's weaknesses. There are no established traditional parallel government structures in Kunar, except to some degree in the Korengal Valley. Local tribal structures do exist, but if they cannot resolve a problem, they pass it up to the GOA, KABUL 00000579 004 OF 004 not to representatives of the Taliban. The Governor recognizes the value of trying to encompass the strength and influence of tribal leaders in his provincial security and development shura, but he remains engaged with his administrators and ANP chiefs. ¶17. (C) A stronger social contract between the Government and the governed would help neutralize the insurgents. Kunaris being able to see the benefits of their acceptance of GOA authority, in the form of schools, roads, water, and power, would help. The PRT is helping the GOA begin to deliver these benefits, but major benefits will flow to Kunar only when there is a strong international NGO and commercial presence. While UNAMA has a limited presence here, the security situation still does not appear inviting enough for more groups to follow. Police presence is a key element in providing a more inviting environment, and the PRT is increasing its police training activities in Kunar. In the next three months the PRT will train 800 ANAP and 300 ABP, to supplement the existing provincial force of, nominally, 1,023 ANP troopers. -------------- Social and Cultural Factors -------------- ¶18. (SBU) The population of Kunar is overwhelmingly Pashtun-speaking, Sunni Muslim, rural, illiterate (overall 67 percent illiterate, with higher illiteracy among women),and conservative in social views. Women follow a very restricted traditional lifestyle, and are rarely seen in public. Girls in Kunar generally attend primary school, but few go on to secondary school. The PRT has not encountered hostility to girls, education, nor has there been a campaign of intimidation against the education of girls. However, in December several women teachers were killed in a single attack in southern Kunar. This incident caused several other women teachers to flee the province. The Governor shows public support for women,s rights, including the activities of the Women,s Affairs Ministry, but this does not much change the basic traditional nature of life in Kunar. ¶19. (SBU) Tribal identity is felt strongly throughout Kunar, and below the level of District Administrator, tribal structures are the prevailing form of authority. The Governor has tried to engage the people through their tribal leaders to support development projects and security operations. The only ethnic division of note is that between Korengalis and the rest of Kunaris. Unsuprisingly, the Korengal is also the main area of resistance to the GOA and ISAF, and there have long been tensions (and violence) between Korengalis and their Pashtun neighbors. -------------- Comment: No Complacency -------------- ¶20. (C) The bottom line is that, in Kunar, ISAF and the GOA have sharply reduced insurgent activity over the past year, and are in a position to steadily squeeze the enemy out of the province. The Kunari people generally support the GOA, and except for the Korengal valley there are no areas under enemy control. Our presence and engagement have paid off, so far. Our future efforts here will pay off to the degree that we continue to show respect for local culture, avoid making enemies through indiscriminate or heavy-handed kinetic operations, and maintain the conditions for economic development to progress. Success will also depend on the degree to which the GOA can resolve internal conflicts and provide an effective police force for Kunar. End Comment. NEUMANN