ANA / ANP: POLICE CASUALTIES HIGHER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000460 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF SUBJECT: ANA / ANP: POLICE CASUALTIES HIGHER REF: KABUL 435 Classified By: Political Military Counselor Carol Rodley for reasons 1.4 (B) and(D). 1.(S) SUMMARY: Although the Afghan National Army (ANA) is commonly portrayed as experiencing significant casualties, the reality is that the Afghan National Police (ANP) is equally engaged and suffers even greater casualties. The greater casualty rates experienced by the ANP indicate that the effort to instill nation-wide internal security and enforce the rule of law is significantly more dangerous than may be realized and places patrolmen at greater risk than the average soldier. The historically higher casualty rates experienced by the ANP reinforces the need for increased emphasis on police development and also supports the recent request to increase ANP manning from 62,000 to 82,000. END SUMMARY. COMPARISON OF ANA / ANP CASUALTIES 2.(S) Analysis of historical data over a two-year period depicts a very different situation than what is commonly understood or depicted in the media regarding the rate of ANA and ANP casualties. During the period January - December 2006, the ANA suffered 207 personnel Killed in Action (KIA) and an additional 560 soldiers Wounded in Action (WIA) for a total of 767 casualties. During the same period of time, the ANP experienced 284 KIA and 547 WIA or 831 total casualties. Analysis of two years of data further substantiates the historical trend of higher ANP loses and depicts that ANA casualties only exceeded the ANP,s in 8 out of 24 months. Unfortunately, the trend since January 1, 2007 continues to support this theme with the ANP so far experiencing 26 KIA and 18 WIA compared to ANA losses of 5 KIA and 30 WIA. ANALYSIS 3.(S) The higher rate of ANP casualties may be partially explained by comparing the employment tactics of the ANA and ANP. Although the ANA operate in large groups and pose a significant target for the enemy, they often deploy away from their homes, operate from secure bases and generally do not follow established routines while conducting tactical operations. Conversely the ANP operate in small groups throughout the nation at the district level, often in their home province, and as such are more accessible and likely to be singled out. Additionally, the patrolmen operate in a more predictable manner: controlling traffic at intersections, manning static posts in the case of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP),or working in remote, unprotected district headquarters. Residing in their home province, the patrolmen are also more widely recognizable to the local townspeople. For all these reasons, they are somewhat easier to attack than ANA soldiers. The lack of armored vehicles within the ANP, and reliance upon thin-skinned Ford Ranger trucks, is also noteworthy and likely a contributing factor why ANP casualties due to IEDs are 162 percent greater than those experienced by the ANA. COMMENT 4.(S) The higher rate of casualties supports the recommendation for an increase in the manning authorization of the ANP from 62,000 to 82,000. The data also supports the need for more lethal and better led police forces that are able to embrace new tactics which will help to mitigate the risks encountered by the average patrolman. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) may help due to its more comprehensive training and increased mobility and lethality (reftel). Once fielded, ANCOP may possibly be more capable KABUL 00000460 002 OF 002 of rapidly deploying and defusing situations that currently exceed the capabilities of the present ANP. ANCOP,s nation-wide deployment should also lessen the chance that patrolmen will operate in their home province for any extended period of time while the employment of greater numbers of armored vehicles should help to alleviate the exposure of the individual patrolman. The single most important factor in alleviating future ANP casualties is the need for more modern equipment which depends upon the approval of the recently announced supplemental funding. However, even this approval will not be a panacea resulting in an immediate decrease in ANP casualties due to the delays in the equipment procurement and fielding process. END COMMENT. NEUMANN