AFGHAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000435 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF SUBJECT: AFGHAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (formerly the Civil Order Maintenance and Constabulary Police) is currently being recruited and trained by the MOI in close coordination with CSTC-A and civilian police trainers at the Regional Training Centers. This element of the police, eventually totaling 5,000 personnel and scheduled to be recruited, trained and deployed over the next two years, should provide the GoA a highly trained, specialized, well led and robustly equipped police force. Composed of urban and rural patrol units, the ANCOP will respond rapidly to urban unrest, civil disorder and national emergencies, while also providing a mobile police presence in high-threat remote areas. The training for the first urban unit commenced in Mazar-e Sharif on January 27th. Training of the first patrol unit is scheduled to begin in Herat on February 10th. (Comment: The nationally recruited ANCOP will potentially provide the GoA a robust police force capable of enforcing the rule of law nationwide and enhancing security nationwide. End Comment.) End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) At a meeting conducted at Camp Eggers on January 29th, MG Durbin (Commanding General CSTC-A), CSTC-A senior staff, and Deputy Minister of Interior Khalid received a briefing on the ANCOP program. During this meeting, Khalid, expressing very strong support for the ANCOP, stated that the ANCOP was truly a joint effort between the MOI and CSTC-A. He further stated that the ANCOP would greatly enhance security and is a long-desired capability. ANCOP Composition ¶3. (SBU) The ANCOP will be comprised of two elements: urban units and patrol units. The difference between ANCOP and all other elements of the ANP is that ANCOP units will be better trained, more robustly equipped and better led. To ensure that the best possible personnel are selected to lead ANCOP units, the MoI claims to be using a deliberate process to screen and evaluate candidates, which includes a review of available personnel files by senior leaders of the MOI and the Deputy Minister for Security, before assigning these future leaders. Urban units focus on the ability to quell urban unrest, civil disorder and national emergencies, while patrol units will provide a mobile police presence in high- threat remote areas. As currently envisioned, the ANCOP force will include eight urban units, the first of which will be deployed to Kabul with future units being deployed to Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, Jalalabad, Gardez, Kandahar, and Herat. The patrol units will be deployed along the ring road and in areas where there are currently no ANP, ANA, or ISAF forces and will serve as the nation,s first police responders. Currently there are significant areas of the nation with no ANP or ANA forces and by deploying professional patrol units that are ethnically balanced, the GoA may be able to extend its reach and improve the security situation. The patrol units will differ from all other elements of the ANP in that they will not simply be a static force manning checkpoints like the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) or Afghan Border Police (ABP). ANCOP patrol units will be better equipped and more robustly manned in order to rapidly respond to emergencies that other police units are neither trained nor equipped to handle. Quoting Khalid, "unlike the standby police, ANCOP will actually deploy and respond when called KABUL 00000435 002 OF 005 upon". (Note: The standby police are the element of the ANP which are currently deployed to locations nation-wide when, due to an increased threat, there is a requirement for additional police presence. However, the standby police are generally poorly led and equipped and not effective. End Note). The ANCOP operating in areas previously void of any ANSF and providing a civilian police presence where none had previously existed will establish internal security by disrupting the linkage between the insurgents and people serving as either passive or active supporters of the insurgency. Another significant factor according to Khalid is that the ANCOP will include better screening of the recruits. Recruiting ¶4. (SBU) ANCOP will be nationally recruited from a variety of sources to include the ANP, the less corrupt members of the disbanded highway police, the standby police and the general population. The intent is to vet the recruits to form ethnically balanced units. The use of faster promotions and the increased salaries associated with them should encourage the recruits not only to complete the training but additionally resist the temptation to go AWOL. The current "tashkiel" (manning authorization document) of the standby police will be used to provide the manpower requirements of the ANCOP. Eventually, when the ANCOP is fully fielded, the standby police will be disbanded. Comprehensive Training. ¶5. (SBU) Units will undergo a 16-week training program, which is double the training provided to other elements of the ANP. Both the urban and patrol units initially complete eight weeks of basic police training followed by a two-week common core curriculum. Upon completion of the first 10 weeks of training, the units will receive an additional six weeks of specialty training. During these six weeks, the urban units will be taught by personnel from the German Police Project Office (GPPO) on crowd control techniques. The six weeks of specialty training for the patrol units, conducted by the MOI in close coordination with CSTC-A and civilian police trainers, will focus on techniques required to enforce the rule of law in remote, high-threat areas. A significant departure from training provided to other elements of the police is the effort via the ANCOP curriculum to stress Afghan values and culture. Khalid stressed the importance of including classes on Afghan culture, values, history and both Afghan and world geography. (Comment: Although the importance of this Afghan focused training was highlighted by both Khalid and MG Durbin, the courses have not yet been developed or included in the curriculum being used to train the first urban police unit. If included, this Afghan- centric training will address Khalid,s concern that ANP recruits are being taught too many western concepts and have forgotten their heritage, culture and values. The inclusion of more Afghan focused training may produce patrolmen who better represent the Afghan culture and values. Ultimately, this could help to generate greater acceptance of ANCOP by the Afghan population, if the training results in ANCOP personnel who are more broadly representative of the Afghan culture and values. End Comment.) Well Equipped KABUL 00000435 003 OF 005 ¶6. (SBU) As designed, the ANCOP will be the most robustly equipped element of the ANP. The equipment currently being procured will include armored vehicles, which will replace the unarmored Ford Ranger trucks currently deployed throughout the ANP. The equipment will offer significantly more protection from IEDs and small arms fire and greater mobility. The ANCOP will also be issued newer Eastern Bloc weapons, rather than the aging, unreliable AK-47s that are the common weapon of the ANP. CSTC-A, using FY06 supplemental funds, has already procured a significant quantity of the required vehicles and weapons and will use FY07 supplemental funds, if they are approved, to purchase the remainder of the required equipment. (Note: MG Durbin intends to coordinate with US DSCA in February to determine the feasibility of expediting delivery of several different categories of vehicles that are not scheduled to arrive in theater until Aug - Sep 07. End Note.) Increased Pay ¶7. (SBU) In an effort to recruit quality personnel and decrease the corruption prevalent throughout the rest of the ANP, a more rapid promotion system will be used for ANCOP personnel. During the first eight weeks of training, the ANCOP patrolman will receive the standard ANP salary of $70 per month. However, after completion of the eighth week of training, each patrolman will be promoted to 3rd Sergeant and will receive a salary of $115 per month. Another promotion will occur after completion of the 16th week of training, at which time the individual will become a 2nd Sergeant and receive $140 per month. The rapid increase in rank is designed to discourage corruption in the ANCOP ranks. The relatively rapid promotions may also help with ANCOP retention and reduce improper behavior and performance that would result in dismissal while also promoting future recruiting efforts. Current Status ¶8. (SBU) The first urban unit consisting of 321 patrolmen from six different provinces began training in Mazar-e Sharif on January 27. While this unit is only scheduled to be assigned 300 personnel, the additional 21 recruits will provide a reserve to backfill units as recruits are lost due to attrition. This unit is scheduled to complete training on May 19 and will deploy to Kabul. The first patrol unit, scheduled to begin training in Herat on February 10, will consist of 200 patrolmen. Upon completion of training on June 7th, it will deploy to Kandahar. Obtaining the correct ethnic balance of this force is deemed to be crucial by both Khalid and the CSTC-A Commanding General. The standard is that the ethnic balance of the first two units will be representative of the national ethnic composition plus or minus 5 percent. If this standard is not achieved, the MoI will rebalance the force using the excess pool of manpower. Geographic representation, although important, remains a future goal. (Comment: As with the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP),the verification of the ethnic balance is crucial to prevent creating a force that is not representative of the nation,s ethnic composition. Post working with the international community will verify the ethnic balance throughout the ANCOP program development. End Comment.) Germany Commits to ANCOP KABUL 00000435 004 OF 005 ¶9. (SBU) Although initially opposed to the Civil Order and Maintenance Constabulary concept (ANCOP,s predecessor) because it was envisioned to be a para- military organization and potentially another branch of the ANA, German Special Ambassador Frick and the German Police Project Office (GPPO) now completely support the need for urban and patrol units. The change occurred after it was explained that the ANCOP is a civilian police force that will be provided extensive specialty training focused on riot control and patrolling. The GPPO realized the necessity, in the midst of an active insurgency, of recruiting, training and deploying a police force capable of providing internal security to people in remote areas. The fact that German Instructors developed the training curriculum for the urban crowd control specialty training and will conduct the training in coordination with the MOI is a good sign of the German acceptance and support of the ANCOP program MOI Support of ANCOP ¶10. (SBU) Deputy Minister for Security Khalid strongly supports the ANCOP program and stated that an ANCOP type force has been long required, and that he was very pleased that Afghanistan would soon possess a national police force that would be "well led, well paid, and well equipped." Khalid stressed the importance of deploying the first unit of the ANCOP to Kabul as this would be a strong signal that ANCOP would belong to the people of Afghanistan. Other indicators of the MOI,s acceptance of ANCOP include the direction to implement a deliberate process, by the senior MOI staff, to select qualified leadership for ANCOP units. Concerns ¶11. (SBU) There remain unresolved elements that may impact the success or failure of this concept, to include: - (SBU) Leadership. The MOI has yet to identify the leaders of the ANCOP 2nd and 3rd Battalions which, on a positive note, may indicate that a deliberate process is being employed to identify the high caliber of leadership required for this force. However, this could also indicate that there is too small of a pool from which to select the quality of leaders required for this type of force. If the MOI fails to identify qualified, corruption free leaders, the ANCOP will become yet another element of a police force that performs poorly and does not have the acceptance of the citizens. CSTC-A is working closely with the MOI to monitor the selection of the ANCOP future leaders. - (SBU) Ethnic Balance. If the ANCOP units are not representative of the national ethnic balance, there is the potential the ANCOP could serve as a coercive asset, directly or indirectly furthering the ambitions of Afghan warlords or other power brokers, or even of an individual or unit intending to undermine the GoA. Based upon initial recruiting information, it is not clear that ANCOP is a nationally representative ethnically balanced police force. Enforcement of CSTC-A,s established standard and Post,s engagement with the international community to verify ethnic composition of the ANCOP will be essential factors in successful implementation. - (SBU) Funding. FY07 Supplemental funding is critical to KABUL 00000435 005 OF 005 the success of the program. If funding is not approved, the equipment package needed for the ANCOP will be unavailable and it will lose its mobility and lethality advantages. The timing of the receipt of FY07 Supplemental funds also could affect equipment delivery dates and delay ANCOP fielding. - (SBU) Impact on other programs. The ANCOP program may divert personnel and assets from other ANP initiatives. The emphasis on recruiting and equipping for the ANCOP could delay the completion of other initiatives to include the ANAP and ABP. Oversight and management of the ANCOP program and any subsequent impacts on other police programs will need to be carefully coordinated to prevent negative influence on the ANP as a whole. - (SBU) Specialization of the ANP and sustainability. The ANCOP will result in the creation of very specialized patrolmen. Lacking a recruiting system that continues to ensure only the best recruits enter the ANCOP, a merit-based promotion system that promotes only the best personnel and an ability to maintain the more advanced equipment, the MOI,s ability to sustain the quality of this force is uncertain. CSTC,s efforts to ensure that these systems are not only in place but fully operational will be essential if ANCOP is to succeed. - (SBU) Land procurement. The ANCOP proposal envisions a total of 16 permanent facilities that will be used to support day-to-day operations and training and currently there is a lack of land for eight of these sixteen future ANCOP operating locations. A failure to procure the land would subsequently impact the construction of future operating locations and would undermine the ability of the ANCOP to successfully perform its mission. Again, CSTC-A is working with the MOI to obtain the necessary land to build ANCOP operating locations. Comment ¶12. (SBU) The ANCOP may be the first national, multi- ethnic Afghan Police Force that can be relied upon to serve the people of Afghanistan and reliably quell future internal unrest, similar to what was experienced in Kabul in May 2006, while also helping to promote the rule of law throughout the entire country of Afghanistan. However, the ethnic balance of the force is critical during the initial development and training and must involve the efforts of US and international elements in country. The level of commitment of the MOI, CSTC-A and GPPO are initial positive indicators. As ANCOP is now a high priority within both MOI and CSTC-A, Post will provide oversight and diligently work with the international community to monitor this effort. How soon the ANCOP will make a difference is still unknown. The rural patrol units could have a positive impact as soon as they are fielded as they will be the first ANSF forces to operate in remote areas of the country. However, the commitment to providing rigorous training means that the deployment of these units will take longer than what was experienced for other ANP elements and consequently ANCOP,s impact on security will be delayed. Ultimately the training and resources devoted to ANCOP could lead to a force that will help to quell the insurgency but it will take time, continued effort and resources. NEUMANN