CANADA'S MANLEY PANEL IN AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004005 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR MSHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR SNAR PGOV AF SUBJECT: CANADA'S MANLEY PANEL IN AFGHANISTAN REF: A. (A) OTTAWA 2134 ¶B. (B) OTTAWA 2133 ¶C. (C) 11/26/07 HARTLEY-COVINGTON AND 11/28/07 HARTLEY-MATTEI E-MAILS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) a nd (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Canadian DCM Hoffman on December 4 provided the Charge with an assessment of the 10-day visit to Afghanistan by the Panel on the Future Role of Canada in Afghanistan (Manley Panel). Hoffman emphasized repeatedly that the Panel,s report will be critical to the future of the Canadian participation in ISAF and that their upcoming visit to Washington will be critical to the outcome of the report. Although Panel members seemed to struggle in trying to sort out the mass of contradictory information they gathered during their visit, Hoffmann was persuaded that most of them favored continued Canadian engagement in Afghanistan. During a November 24 meeting with the Panel, Ambassador Wood emphasized Afghanistan,s important role in the war on terror and the U.S.,s long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Ambassador Wood also stressed that sustained military action is imperative to provide security and space for Afghan civilian authorities to extend the government to the people and push forward on reconstruction and economic development. The Panel was particularly impressed with U.S. efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces, led by the Combined Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Canadian DCM Hoffmann in a December 4 meeting with the Charge provided a read-out on the November 18-28 visit by the Manley Panel to Afghanistan and the Canadian domestic political context which led to the creation of the Panel. Hoffmann emphasized repeatedly that the Panel,s report will be critical to the future of the Canadian participation in ISAF and that their visit to Washington will be critical to the outcome of the report. ¶3. (C) Describing the current Canadian political climate as &odd,8 Hoffmann highlighted the difficulties of a minority government which is on the defensive on an issue where the public is almost evenly split, but still trying to do the right thing. The Panel,s report will condition Canadian public opinion and could neutralize the issue politically. This in turn could set the stage for extending the Canadian mandate beyond 2009. ¶4. (C) According to Hoffmann (who worked directly for Manley when he was Foreign Minister),Manley does not think highly of Karzai, perceives the Afghan government and the international community to be weak, and is not all that positive toward NATO. That said, Manley recognizes the security link to humanitarian intervention, has a personal interest in assisting Afghanistan as a result of his work with the international relief organization CARE, and has publicly made the case for sustaining a robust international commitment to Afghanistan. He described PM Harper,s success in recruiting Manley for the job as a real coup and a major disappointment for the Liberal Party, which is on record opposing a mandate extension. ¶5. (C) Hoffmann observed that the Panel membership is stacked in favor of maintaining Canadian engagement in Afghanistan, with most being known for supporting the military and international engagement. He noted that the Panel was struggling in trying to sort out the mass of contradictory information they were gathering. They agreed there are not enough troops in the South, a point of fact that Hoffmann anticipates will be highlighted in the report,s conclusions. They seemed surprised during their visit to Kandahar by the development progress that has been achieved and by the extent of other IC representatives present and working in the province, but had difficulty trying to gauge the significance KABUL 00004005 002 OF 003 of what they saw, both in Kandahar and at stops to view Canadian development projects in Bamyan and Mazar-e-Sherif in the north. ¶6. (C) While in Kabul, the Panel met with President Karzai, then-Deputy COMISAF General Robison, Director of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance Popal, and CSTC-A CG MG Cone. Hoffmann noted that the Panel was particularly impressed with MG Cone, who convinced them that the Combined Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan has a good handle on training and equipping the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. ¶7. (C) As reported REF C, in a November 24 meeting of IC representatives with the Panel, Ambassador Wood outlined the strategic parameters that he advised should guide the future of Canada,s contribution to ISAF. Ambassador Wood noted that: - The international community (IC) intervened in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks revealed a global threat that required a global response. The global dimension of the threat remains: the November 24 attack by a suicide bomber that resulted in the deaths of an Italian soldier and several Afghan civilians (including children) is suspected to be non-Afghan. - Afghanistan is a lynch-pin for regional stability in a complicated neighborhood that begins with Israel and Lebanon, extends through Iraq and Iran, and is bounded in the east by Pakistan. The interests of regional and global nuclear powers -- Russia, China, Pakistan and India -- intersect in this region. Afghanistan can be a source of regional stability or instability. Canada, as a responsible member of the IC, can contribute to regional stability. - Even six years after IC intervention, Afghanistan remains a humanitarian disaster area and will require significant outside assistance for years to come. For this support to be effective and more than a band aid, Canada and the rest of the IC need to continue efforts to establish security in the country. - Afghanistan,s role as a major opium and heroin producer is a global threat. ¶8. (C) Underscoring the U.S. long-term commitment to Afghanistan, Ambassador Wood emphasized that the purpose of military operations in Afghanistan is to give the civilian side space to advance development and governance. Last year, there was a widespread belief that ISAF and IRoA would lose against the Taliban during the fighting season. That did not happen, and the military side of the equation is doing well. The civilian side is not moving fast enough, which means that continued military action to provide security and space for civilian development remains imperative. ¶9. (C) Responding to Panel questions, Wood said Pakistani authorities are doing more than they used to in the FATA but they are distracted by the political turmoil. Contrary to the observations of some Panel members, the U.S. had pressed hard on Pakistan to put an end to al-Qaida and Taliban sanctuaries, but since Musharraf,s imposition of martial law our focus had shifted to the Pakistani political crisis. ¶10. (C) The Panel members were largely in receive mode. Panel member Derek Burney made the principal substantive point, noting that since a partner (sic) was found for the Netherlands, it would be impossible for Canada to stay in its current mandate without a partner as well. He observed that Europeans appear to be able to help one another but no one else. (Comment: Given that Burney is known to be close to PM Harper, it is possible that his comment signals Harper,s intent to seek a partner for Canada in Kandahar as a condition for extending the current mandate. End comment.) ¶11. (C) Hoffmann said the Panel expects to have its report KABUL 00004005 003 OF 003 drafted by the end of the year, and Hoffmann anticipates the report will recommend a mandate extension, saying that Canada has to do its part for international security and humanitarian relief, but it must do it better. DELL