SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF GATES' DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003973 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD EMBASSY DJIBOUTI PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF DEL VIA CAPT SCOTT SMITH E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF GATES' DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN KABUL 00003973 001.2 OF 004 ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR PLEASE CANCEL THIS TELEGRAM. THANK YOU. ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR REF: A. (A) KABUL 3800 ¶B. (B) KABUL 3765 Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NOFORN) SUMMARY: Your visit, coming at the end of this year,s fighting season, is an opportunity to assess 2007,s military, political and development progress. ISAF was the clear winner this year on the battlefield, which has pushed the enemy to resort increasingly to asymmetric attacks. At least in the U.S.-controlled RC-E, good progress on key development and governance indicators has been achieved. Elections during the 2009-10 window have President Karzai focused on the need to deliver services and security to the population. Northern-based opposition groups are increasingly critical of Karzai's leadership, including his idea of a national unity government led by a strong president. Earlier this month the costliest suicide bombing in recent Afghan history took place n Baghlan Province, fueling partisan sniping between opposition members of Parliament and Karzai. In your meetings with President Karzai and Defense Minister Wardak, you may wish to focus on the importance of improving domestic governance and strategic communications as part of an effective COIN strategy, the need to deal effectively with Iran as well as Pakistan, and our continuing concern over counternarcotics. Both Karzai and Wardak may press you for a significant increase in USG support for a larger but unsustainable Army Air Corps. END SUMMARY. -------------- SECURITY -------------- ¶2. (C/NOFORN) Under GEN McNeill, NATO-ISAF has worked closely with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to maintain pressure on insurgents, inflicting regular defeats on the battlefield. Recent intelligence indicates that senior Taliban leaders are exhibiting clear signs of stress as a result of ISAF operations, particularly the heavy casualties inflicted on mid-level commanders. Nonetheless, the Taliban remain a determined and resilient foe, as evidenced by their ability to mass forces and seize at least temporarily territory in Farah, Helmand and Kandahar. Overall attacks in 2007 are up from 2006, especially via asymmetric means (improvised explosive devices (IEDs),suicide bombings, and kidnappings). That up-tick also reflects greater engagement by ISAF troops with the insurgents as they sought from the first snow-melt this spring to take the fight to the enemy. The Taliban,s indiscriminate use of violence is bitterly resented by the people, but at the same time it shakes public confidence in the ability of Karzai,s government and ISAF forces to protect non-combatants. We need to reassure President Karzai that ISAF will continue to work closely with expanded ANA units to pursue stability operations in 2008, so that the government has more time and space to improve local governance and development. ISAF analysts believe that while Pakistani military operations in Swat may be distracting Taliban attention away from Afghanistan for now, ISAF may find itself facing an emboldened enemy in spring 2008 if the extremists are successful in resisting the Pakistani campaign. ¶3. (S/NOFORN) ISAF is holding together, despite Allied governments having to manage shaky domestic public support for NATO,s role in Afghanistan. While the Canadins and Dutch are shouldering heavy burdens, the south is certain to KABUL 00003973 002.2 OF 004 ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR PLEASE CANCEL THIS TELEGRAM. THANK YOU. ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR become more unstable if they impose artificial timelines, reduce their involvement or depart. Your strong statement to this effect at the NATO Noordwijk Defense Ministerial was most welcome, and we continue to press Allies stationed in the north and west to do more. In this regard, German Chancellor Merkel,s October visit to Afghanistan has been followed closely by a tripling (from 12 million to 35.7 million euros) of German assistance to the Afghan police in 2008. European political wrangling has not, so far, harmed operations on the ground, but could if recriminations fly or Allies announce plans to depart. The Dutch cabinet has moved to extend their mandate. Also, Canada,s Manley Panel departed Afghanistan on November 28 after a week-long visit in which they met with senior IRoA, ISAF and international community representatives (including Karzai and Wardak) and visited Canadian troops and development projects in Kandahar, Bamyan province and RC-North. Although they did not tip their hand on possible recommendations, one Panel member close to PM Harper did focus on the desirability of another Ally sharing the Canadian burden in Kandahar. -------------- GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY -------------- ¶4. (C/NOFORN) President Karzai faces elections sometime during 2009-10, and the campaign season has already begun. Opposition groups, including the United Front (whose core leadership comes from the old Tajik-based Northern Alliance) are encouraging the population to focus on what the government is not delivering in terms of security and services, while the central government is focusing on demonstrating it can deliver. Initiatives include a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) within the Palace to encourage greater coordination and effectiveness in the areas of security, service delivery and governance at the local level. The challenges, including resource shortages, are significant. As the opposition increases the pressure, Karzai must fight the temptation to give up on his vision of national unity and fall back on his ethnic-Pashtun base, which is troubled by a counter-insurgency strategy that targets a largely Pashtun insurgency. He needs to be reminded that his credibility and power comes from strong leadership of Afghanistan as a whole. ¶5. (C/NOFORN) With the licit economy improving (albeit from a low starting point) and terrorist attacks increasing, polls show that the people,s number-one concern has shifted from employment to security. Karzai has only a short window to demonstrate that the government is meeting people,s needs. U.S. forces under ISAF command in RC-East, working in close collaboration with State, USAID and USDA officers through the PRTs and local officials, have achieved significant progress on development and governance goals, including reductions in infant mortality, enrollment of 96 percent of school-age boys and 68 percent of girls in school, construction of 85 district center facilities (starting from zero) with 53 more under construction, major progress in road construction and canal repair, and significant improvements in access to health care. We are starting to see signs of growing economic activity, a key to long-term prosperity and satisfaction with the government. This work has been done in partnership with provincial and district authorities, with credit going to Afghan government entities. In order for ordinary Afghans to see the government as a credible alternative to parallel structures, including shadow Taliban governments operating in some provinces, the IRoA KABUL 00003973 003.2 OF 004 ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR PLEASE CANCEL THIS TELEGRAM. THANK YOU. ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR needs to do more to empower provincial and district officials to take the lead on (and be held accountable for) providing services. -------------- ISSUES TO RAISE -------------- ¶6. (C) You may want to be prepared to address the following topics: - Governance: The IRoA increasingly recognizes that good governance is central to an effective COIN strategy, but it is struggling to in place the reforms and initiatives that would convince the population that the government is here to stay and prepared to deliver. You should underline U.S. support for the new Independent Directorate for Local Governance, and encourage Karzai to give ministers, governors and district officials more authority and resources to deliver the services that will connect the people to the government. Governors, in particular, are too often shuffled. Picking good people, investing in them and giving them resources and authority, and holding them accountable is the key to good governance. The Afghan government needs to do a better job against corruption and in the effective formulation and execution of policy. - Strategic Communications: We must react faster to tactical events, good and bad, and use our technological edge to advance our offensive messaging agenda both domestically and abroad. Both the Afghans and the international community need to do a better job in publicizing successes. All recognize the need for a strong and visible Afghan lead in the messaging effort. A new Government Media Center will provide opportunity for Afghans and the IC better to coordinate communications strategy. Essential Taliban weaknesses include the damage they do to the reconstruction effort and their role in civilian casualties, both of which reinforce poll results showing that Afghans do not want a return to Taliban rule. We must keep reminding Afghans of the progress which has been achieved, notably in transportation, health and education, but also in new areas like the availability of cell phones and a free and independent media. - The Neighbors: Karzai will be interested in your assessment of the political situation in Pakistan. On Iran, Karzai has shown increasing concern since the Edelman visit (REF A) regarding Iranian meddling, especially regarding evidence of Iranian support for Karzai,s political opponents in the United Front party. His advisors highlight the risks of "a second front" and the utility of Iran as a bulwark against radical (Wahabist) influence in the region. They hope to manage the Iranian threat, including by encouraging expanded U.S. presence in Western Afghanistan as counterpoint. We are prepared to deepen our presence; this will provide an opportunity for you to reinforce with Karzai the need for him to speak out against Iranian mischief-making. - Counternarcotics: At the moment, Karzai remains opposed to both aerial and ground-based spraying. Poppy cultivation and opium trafficking grew at an alarming rate in 2007, feeding the insurgency and undercutting development and good governance efforts. You should emphasize that Karzai needs to take personal responsibility for improving the narcotics situation, including pushing governors for progress. Defense Minister Wardak is resisting providing force protection to Afghan eradication KABUL 00003973 004.2 OF 004 ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR PLEASE CANCEL THIS TELEGRAM. THANK YOU. ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR -------------- ZFR teams. You should strongly urge Karzai to persuade the minister to reverse that position. -------------- TOPICS TO ANTICIPATE -------------- ¶7. (S) It can be difficult to predict what issues the mentally peripatetic Karzai will raise. Among the issues that could come up include: -- Senior UN Special Representative: Karzai may ask you for an update on the status of this appointment. Karzai has resigned himself to the appointment of a senior UN Special Representative to coordinate the international community,s civilian efforts, but he has made clear his sensitivity to any IC infringement on Afghan government sovereignty. To the contrary, voices within IRoA increasingly call for the "Afghanization" of policy formulation and execution. -- Afghan Army Air Corps: During the November 29 visit of Senator Bennett and his delegation, President Karzai protested our refusal to agree to the insistent requests by MOD Wardak to support an Army Air Corps far beyond the means of the IRoA to sustain in the long run. This has been a pet gripe of Defense Minister Wardak, who has managed to get the subject on the President's mind. ADM Fallon has endorsed the Combined Air Power Transition Force,s plan for an appropriately-sized and effects-capable Afghan National Army Air Corps focused on air mobility, Presidential/DV lift, casualty evacuation, and close air support. -- Reconciliation: There is growing recognition that the reconciliation program (PTS) established in 2005, under Karzai's personal mentor, former Afghan President Mojaddidi, to receive individual reconcilees, is not up to the task of dealing with current challenge of larger groups or organized elements of the Taliban looking for guarantees before committing to reconciliation. Karzai has expressed a willingness to talk to Taliban who are willing to commit to the authority of the government; it will be useful to hear his views on the scope and methods for the process he envisions. We are prepared to support an expanded PTS/reconciliation program, beginning with a statement of principles to guide efforts by international partners as the process moves forward. ¶8. (SBU) - Condolences over Baghlan Bombing Victims: Your visit comes three weeks after Afghanistan's deadliest suicide attack to date. Both President Karzai and Parliament Speaker Qanooni declared three days of national mourning. Six parliamentarians died in the November 6 attack, of whom all but one were buried in a memorial ceremony at the site of the new Parliament building still under construction. Some 59 children, along with teachers and factory workers, also perished in the blast. The Taliban and HIG denied responsibility for the bombing. It remains unclear who is actually responsible; public speculation has centered on Hekmatyar-allied forces having carried out the attack. DELL