AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003848 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT REF: KABUL 3054 Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghan National Police (ANP) development has lagged behind that of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Despite the training of over 70,000 ANP individuals and advances in equipping and recruiting, the police remain largely ineffective and corrupt. At the same time, as security conditions have deteriorated, the proportion of ANP fatalities has climbed and is now markedly higher than that of ANA in high threat areas. To enhance ANP effectiveness both in the counterinsurgency role and in traditional policing functions, Combined Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is working closely with the Ministry of Interior (MOI),Embassy, ISAF and international community (IC) donors to launch a new program that will train and develop whole police units district by district. With MOI leadership, the Focused District Development (FDD) Program is a new strategy that seeks to make the district uniformed police unit the &building block8 for developing the ANP, emulating to the extent possible the approach that has proven effective with the ANA. ¶2. (C) District police units will be removed from their district as a unit for eight weeks training, reequipped, and paired with a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) for follow-on training support. Other police units will be put in place to provide policing during the unit,s training period. Consultations are also taking place with IRoA officials, USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the delivery of governance and development assistance to the districts selected for FDD. The FDD program is scheduled to begin its initial training phase in late December, starting with seven districts in five provinces. There will be challenges to address as the program goes forward, including shortfalls in police mentoring teams, accountability, prioritization and absorptive capacity for assistance while meeting recruiting goals. But by focusing train-and-equip resources ) including limited numbers of police mentoring teams ) on a handful of districts at one time, FDD has the potential over time to provide an effective platform for security, development and governance advances throughout Afghanistan. END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION. -------------- -------------- THE FULL FDD CYCLE AND GOALS: RETRAIN, REEQUIP, RENOVATE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The FDD program envisions manning, training, equipping, and providing facilities to an entire district police unit at one time. Objectives include recruiting to full authorized levels, replacing ineffective leaders, and transferring the unit to one of INL,s Regional Training Centers (RTCs) for training. The full FDD training cycle is scheduled as follows: a) assessment and recruiting: approximately 60 days b) placement of temporary covering security force: 10 days c) training of district police force ) 8 weeks plus movement time d) reinsertion of district police force into district: one week e) close PMT overwatch: 2 to 4 months ¶4. (C) CSTC-A's goal under FDD is to train and reform all police districts in the country in three to four years, predicated in part on the expectation that the program will create its own momentum as other districts, seeing enhanced security and development benefits, will elect to improve their operations on their own initiative. KABUL 00003848 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) To allow the staff of an entire police district to be trained simultaneously, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) companies, supported as necessary in some areas by ANA units, will temporarily replace the entire district police force while the latter undergo training. ¶6. (C) Those policemen or new recruits who have not had any training would receive the basic course; policemen who have already attended the basic course would attend a newly developed advanced course; and senior officers (second lieutenant and above) within the district would go through an officers, course, also newly developed by INL-contracted civilian police mentors assigned to CSTC-A and approved by the INL/NAS office in Kabul. All courses are eight weeks in length. To enhance unit coherence, all ranks will be brought together in the final week of instruction to train and work as a single unit. PMTs will remain with the district police during their time at the Regional Training Center, supplementing the INL courses with additional and reinforcement training as required. ¶7. (C) District police units, equipment and vehicles will be assessed for usability; after the training period, their equipment will either be returned, refurbished, or replaced at the end of the course. Even as their weapons are evaluated for usability, trainees will continue to receive training with the same type of weapon. At the same time, CSTC-A and MOI will work in the trainees, home district to improve facilities, establish connectivity with other elements of the security sector, and establish both formal and informal working relationships with local leaders. ¶8. (C) Once the district police complete the eight-week training cycle, they will return to their district and reassume their duties. As police units are returned home, ANCOP units will also remain for a short transition period. CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs, composed of professional police and military experts, will remain full time for at least two to four months with the newly-trained and equipped district police units. ¶9. (C) In preparation for the initial training phase, CSTC-A is sending regional assessment teams in mid-November to all first-tranche districts. Led by an MOI general officer and the PMT, and consisting of interagency U.S., Afghan government (IRoA) and IC experts, the teams will assess the police force, the status of rule of law and governance in the districts, to determine the number of new recruits, specific training, equipment, facilities, and other supporting requirements needed, and to shape the evolution of rule of law and governance in the district, as well as the linkage to the provincial government. -------------- --- DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS TO FOLLOW ENHANCED SECURITY -------------- --- ¶10. (C) Consultations are also taking place with IRoA officials, USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the delivery of development and governance assistance to the districts selected for FDD. This will ensure that as regional security is enhanced, districts will benefit directly from energy, infrastructure, rule of law and other programs that U.S. and allied Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will help local and regional officials to coordinate. Ghulam Jelani Popal, the new Director General of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and who reports directly to President Karzai (reftel),has expressed keen interest in the FDD program. Post is seeking to facilitate consultations between IDLG and CSTC-A on how FDD can strengthen local governance in Afghanistan and how the KABUL 00003848 003 OF 004 FDD program can be linked to Popal's proposal for district-based local self-defense forces and other governance initiatives. -------------- FIRST TRANCHE DISTRICTS -------------- ¶11. (C) FDD training of the first selected district police units is scheduled to start in late December, with each full cycle taking approximately six to eight months for completion, including monitoring, reassessment, retraining, and sustainment training. CSTC-A consulted closely with ISAF HQ, the ISAF Regional Commands, MOI HQ and senior police officials in developing recommendations to present to Interior Minister Zarar for choosing the first tranche of districts. In addition to MOI input on political and policing factors, ISAF operational planning considerations will be a significant concern for the first two FDD cycles, in order to complement -- and not complicate -- other planned operations. As FDD planning extends further into the future, it will instead help shape ISAF operational planning and more readily synchronize with specific development and governance projects for identified districts. ¶12. (C) The districts chosen for the first training cycle include: (a) Qalat, Shah Joy, and Tarang wa Jaldak districts in Zabul province; (b) Zurmat in Paktia province; (c) Tag Ab in Kapisa Province; (d) Chahar Dara in Kunduz province; (e) Bala Buluk in Farah Province. With the exception of Chahar Dara in the relatively quiet north, these districts pose varying levels of security challenges, including key strategic infrastructure (e.g., the ring road running through the three Zabul districts),known Taliban transit points (Tag Ab, Zurmat),or significant political import (Bala Buluk lies adjacent to three districts recently overrun by Taliban forces in Farah). -------------- CHALLENGES AHEAD -------------- ¶13. (C) MOI officials, initially slow to warm to the FDD concept, are becoming more involved and actively welcoming the program. Interior Minister Zarar is taking an active lead, and this has translated down the ranks; however, broadening MOI and government-wide support will depend on achieving early successes in the first seven trial districts. ¶14. (C) The PMTs will play a key role in the FDD program, including the assessment and validation of the newly-trained district police units, as well as subsequent periodic reassessments and retraining. As critical as PMTs are to the success of police training, personnel resources have thus far not been available to meet CSTC-A,s request for 2,500 additional military and civilian police mentors to staff the PMTs throughout the country. These would augment the police trainers and mentors already working in Afghanistan. At present, CSTC-A covers this personnel shortfall by concentrating on approximately one third of districts, including having a single PMT conduct area coverage of several districts in some cases. FDD, however, will require KABUL 00003848 004 OF 004 concentration on specific districts since PMTs will not have the option of spreading efforts over multiple districts. ¶15. (C) CSTC-A has been consulting with IC players, in particular the EU Police mission (EUPOL),to build IC support for the concept and to tap IC resources. EU-member state embassy contacts tell us they find FDD a credible approach to putting police development back on track; however, it is unclear how much concrete support international partners are willing to lend to the plan. CSTC-A remains open to incorporating EU police trainers into CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs, but EU interlocutors have been hesitant, noting that it would require a change to the EUPOL mandate to place EU police mentors at the district level, and may have implications for broader NATO-EU relations. Some individual nations, such as Norway and Canada, have offered assistance outside of the EUPOL mandate, and CSTC-A welcomes such assistance because it is not constrained by EUPOL limitations. ¶16. (C) Corruption remains a concern. Simultaneously with FDD, CSTC-A will press ahead on separate timelines to complete in the next six months the issuance of identification cards to all ANP, ensure all police districts are using the electronic payment system, and maximize where possible the payment of salaries through electronic transfers. FDD will provide an opportunity to press forward with rank and pay reform and ANP pay parity with the ANA which, despite having been approved by the international community in September, have not yet been fully implemented -- or have been implemented inconsistently -- in many districts. Also, the presence of PMTs for 2-4 months following the group training will not only ensure sustainment training, but will also provide a crucial reinforcement of accountability requirements for U.S.-provided equipment. Following the completion of initial training in the districts, we will have to assess the priority development and governance needs, and the absorptive capacity of the districts. ¶17. (C) A critical issue identified in the CSTC-A concept of operations will be the removal or neutralization of corrupt, criminal and/or inept district police chiefs. Afghan legal constraints bar the outright removal of officers except in the case of a judicial finding, which is a slow and unreliable process. CSTC-A,s JAG team has prepared a draft MOI disciplinary instruction that is currently under review within the MOI; in it, alternative approaches are explored that could include suspension without pay, demotion by up to two ranks, and involuntary retirement. Even if new disciplinary measures are approved, it will remain a challenge to empower MOI officials to impose discipline involving rank or pay in the face of inevitable interference from outside or senior influences. In addition, district ANP patrolmen are often loyal to their chiefs on the basis of tribal and other personal relationships. When their district commanders are either removed or quit, ANP personnel have sometimes deserted or abandoned their posts as a consequence. ¶18. (C) CSTC-A is working with the MOI on other personnel issues. FDD success will depend on the ability of the MOI to recruit new personnel into the ANP. A September 2007 CSTC-A survey of about 76 percent of police districts indicated a shortfall of some 5,500 personnel from authorized billets. With advice from CSTC-A mentors, MOI recruiters are redoubling their efforts to hire additional recruits. It will also be critical to ensure that the pace of ANCOP recruitment and training is maintained, to ensure sufficient ANCOP strength to provide the back-fill police presence as district units undergo their two-month training period out of their district. WOOD