DEPUTY NSA IBRAHIM ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003767 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR MSHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: DEPUTY NSA IBRAHIM ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN'S DOMESTIC SITUATION Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) DCM used his introductory meeting with Deputy NSA Engineer Ibrahim to underline U.S. support for the new Independent Directorate for Local Governance, headed by Jelani Popal, highlighting the role it can play in ensuring the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) both addresses local needs and meets the IMF's poverty reduction benchmarks. He underlined the importance of ensuring Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) do not create a new gap between expectations and delivery capability. Ibrahim acknowledged the significant governance challenges faced by the government. He highlighted the pressures put on Afghanistan by its neighbors who he claimed see democratic initiatives as a threat. Ibrahim defended ForMin Spanta's comments discounting the Iranian Government's involvement in arms shipment to Afghanistan, saying Spanta had made clear the Taliban is the enemy. Ibrahim linked the flow of arms to "radical elements," not the Government of Iran. He underlined that Afghanistan considers Pakistan's support for the Taliban the greater threat. He highlighted Saudi flows of money to Pakistan and characterized a strong Iran as useful in keeping Saudi Arabia in check. Ibrahim raised the issue of the "uprising" led by Mullah Salam in Musa Qala against the Taliban, noting that Salam had been in contact with the Palace and asking if ISAF could provide support. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Governance: Managing Expectations and Need for Decisiveness -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The DCM began his October 23 meeting with Deputy NSA Engineer Ibrahim by underlining U.S. support for the new Independent Directorate for Local Governance, housed in the Palace. He highlighted the need to link the provincial and district-level governance initiatives coming out of that office with the activities of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) which is based on the sectoral strategies developed by the ministries. The ANDS, which is the poverty reduction strategy that must be in place and be approved by the World Bank in March 2008 in order for Afghanistan to stay on track for HIPC debt relief in March 2009, has been a driving force in the development of Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) which have raised expectations in terms of government performance, particularly in the area of service delivery. The DCM underlined the need for Popal's office to focus on this process to ensure it does not result in a gap between expectations resulting from the PDP process and the government's capacity to deliver. Ibrahim said the government is very focused on the political consequences of unmet expectations. He acknowledged there is a growing sense that the government and international community are failing to respond to what the people are identifying as priority needs. Ibrahim said the PDP process tends to reinforce this perception as projects communities ask for are not being funded. The government is already hearing "where is all the international assistance going; we aren't seeing any of it." ¶3. (C) The DCM and Ibrahim agreed that Popal's challenge will be finding ways to address critical needs (security, development) without being becoming accountable for everything the government does or does not do at the local level. Ibrahim underlined that the government's credibility depends on Popal being able to deliver over the next 24 months (before the presidential elections). Ibrahim noted that elements of the government itself -- "ministers, parliament, even the palace" -- will want to try to shape what Popal is doing or block initiatives if they are seen as intruding on established turf. Ibrahim also expressed concern that a lack of support from the Ministry of Finance might limit what Popal can do. Some people -- Ibrahim mentioned (Burhanuddin) Rabbani and (Abdul Rasul) Sayyaf by name -- are greedy and will never be happy. Ibrahim's advice KABUL 00003767 002 OF 003 to Popal had been to "be aware of the complications ahead and be decisive." He highlighted the importance of making good appointments. The DCM reiterated support for Popal's office and initiatives, underlining that the U.S. will be guided by President Karzai's instincts and decisions. -------------- - Pakistani Terror, Saudi Money, Iran's Meddling -------------- - ¶4. (C) Ibrahim turned the conversation to difficulties Afghanistan faces working within constraints imposed by its neighbors. He told the DCM that "our neighbors see democratic development in Afghanistan as a direct threat," adding "Islam and politics are an explosive mix." Ibrahim reiterated a Palace concern -- that the international community does not take into account the pressures and fissures created by pushing too far and too fast in Afghanistan. He noted that rapid change fuels the assertion made by critics that Afghanistan is willing to betray Islamic values. "To the extent that we succeed in one direction, we are fueling the radicalism that bounces back on us." Ibrahim underlined that, from Afghanistan's perspective, the greatest threat in this regard comes from Pakistan -- with the support of Saudi Arabia. ¶5. (C) Ibrahim described the madrases in Pakistan as "factories of Taliban churning out large numbers of radicals." Some become fighters and some do not. While the ANA will be dealing with the fighters for some time in the future, it is critical to have a political strategy to deal with those who are not fighting but nevertheless working to undermine the government. Ibrahim underlined the need to target "the children who inherit illiteracy," adding that "no one is born a radical." He accused Pakistan of having a policy of radicalizing the Pashtun belt, adding that Saudi Arabia is a major source of funding for the effort. He shared that Hekmatyar's son is currently "an honored guest" in Saudi Arabia. "The Saudis should have to answer for this." ¶6. (C) Ibrahim's description of regional dynamics provided the context for his explanation of Afghanistan's view of Iran. He reiterated an argument he has made in the past -- that Afghanistan cannot afford "a second front." He went further in this meeting, adding that "we like a strong Iran, as it helps keep Saudi Arabia in check." Ibrahim said that Afghanistan is concerned over Iran's meddling, but stated that there is greater concern over official support to the United Front than about arms provided by "radical (Iranian) elements." He repeated the charge made in earlier meetings -- that the Iranians had acknowledged earlier this year that they were supporting the United Front, justifying it as a necessary defense against the Taliban given the Afghan government's ineffectiveness. Ibrahim noted the irony of arms now moving from Iran to the Taliban, adding that the target in this effort seems to be the U.S. The DCM pressed on the issue of arms, highlighting U.S. concern over ForMin Spanta's statement in Herat (on the margins of the ECO conference) that there was no proof that Iran was providing arms. Ibrahim said that Afghanistan is not ignoring evidence of arms coming from Iran. The Iranian Ambassador had been called in but denied official government involvement. When the DCM said that such denials are not credible, Ibrahim underlined that the Afghans were looking to see if there is proof of official Iranian involvement. He underlined that Spanta had made clear that Afghanistan considered the Taliban to be the enemy. ¶7. (C) In response to the DCM's query, Ibrahim said the Russians are also supporting the United Front. He observed that Russia's interest in Afghanistan had been renewed during the period of the Taliban, when Moscow wanted to ensure it had a buffer protecting its interests in Central Asia. Its support the Northern Alliance during that period has continued and is channeled through individuals with old KGB ties. -------------- KABUL 00003767 003 OF 003 Palace Interest in Musa Qala's Mullah Salam -------------- ¶8. (C) Ibrahim said he wanted to alert the U.S. to Palace interest in "the uprising against the Taliban" in Musa Qala that he said was being led by Mullah Salam, who heads a faction of the Alizai tribe. According to Ibrahim, after the Taliban had taken one person from the village and other villagers somehow negotiated his release, Mullah Salam had decided "enough is enough," and challenged the Taliban. The Palace wanted to avoid a repeat of the outcome during an earlier uprising in Sangin, where the Taliban had dragged resisters behind trucks to make examples of them. He said the Palace had talked to Governor Wafa and asked him to share what he could find out with international military on the ground. He said the Palace was also reaching out to COMISAF General McNeill. ¶9. (C) Note: The details of the Palace-Mullah Salam dynamics and Mullah Salam's relationship with the Taliban are fuzzy. Ibrahim said that Mullah Salam had earlier approached President Karzai (in the context of Karzai's statement of interest in negotiating with Taliban members). These reports suggest that the Taliban got wind of Mullah Salam's effort to sound out the Palace on what kind of deal might be possible and decided to make an example of him. This triggered the appeals for help from ISAF and the U.S. There are also reports that Mullah Salam may have tribal connections to Sher Mohammed, infamous warlord, former Helmand governor, and current Senator, and relative (by marriage once removed) of Karzai. There are also suggestions that Mullah Salam's break with the Taliban also involves a split between the Alizai faction he leads and another Alizai faction. End Note. WOOD