PRT LASHKAR GAH: MUSA QALA ELDERS DEFY THE TALIBAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000368 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV MOPS MCAPARR MARR PHUM AF SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: MUSA QALA ELDERS DEFY THE TALIBAN AND ARE NOW AT A CROSSROAD REF: REF: KABUL 236 Classified By: DCM RNORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (SBU/NF) SUMMARY: The death of a local Taliban commander,s brother in an air strike in Helmand province was the catalyst for a series of events that shattered the relative quiet of Musa Qala district, culminating in the Taliban,s seizure of the district center on February 1. In retaliation for the air strike, Mullah Abdul Ghafar, whose brother had been killed, and Taliban forces occupied the district center and detained three Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP). District elders and shura members opposed this action en masse, forcing the Taliban to release the ANAP and withdraw. In the ensuing negotiations, the Taliban demanded that the elders remove the Afghan national flag, then flying over the administration building. The elders again refused, with local mullahs giving the refusal the force of a fatwah, or &Islamic obligation.8 The two sides agreed to meet on February 5 to negotiate further, but on February 1 the Taliban attacked the district center, beat and disarmed ANAP, damaged or destroyed the administration building, finally succeeded in removing the Afghan flag and confined shura members to their homes. Afghan officials publicly threatened action, with the support of ISAF, to retake the town. Governor Wafa has strongly advocated a robust response to the Taliban's actions. He released a statement denouncing the Taliban and urging support for the elders (as did ISAF). On the afternoon of February 4 word spread that an ISAF air strike in Musa Qala had killed Ghafar and unknown others. ¶2. (SBU/NF) Summary Continued: The controversial agreement reached last fall with Musa Qala district elders was in tatters before the February 1 attack; it is now inoperative. What will emerge from the wreckage of the agreement, and of the district center, will have impact across Helmand. Musa Qala residents had been willing to live with hovering Taliban presence as the price of six months of relative calm. With that peace shattered by the violence brought on the town by the Taliban, attitudes and loyalties appear up for grabs, though reporting indicates locals are unhappy with the insurgents' actions. Swift reinstatement of the ousted elders and offers of assistance could draw what was an anti-government enclave towards the GOA,s sphere. An important step would be acceptance of Wafa,s &protocols.8 Musa Qala remaining under Taliban control would undermine the centerpiece of Wafa,s tribal outreach in Helmand. END SUMMARY. Taliban Retaliates for Deadly Air Strike -------------- ¶3. (SBU/NF) According to Afghan sources, an ISAF air strike last week in Helmand province,s Musa Qala district (outside the 5 km zone around the district center) killed the brother of a local Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghafar (or Ghafoor). In retaliation, Ghafar and Taliban supporters attacked the Musa Qala district center, disarming the guards (possibly members of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)) and forcing the shura to leave the district compound. After Ghafar displaced the elders, a separate group of Taliban (the "local" or "moderate" Taliban who apparently supported the shura) interceded. Lengthy negotiations between the two Taliban groups followed. There were also reports of a large group of elders confronting Ghafar and demanding the release of the three men and the withdrawal of Ghafar and his men from the district center. Ghafar and his men complied, withdrawing, releasing the three, and returning their uniforms and weapons. (Note: The two versions of the confrontation with Ghafar may be one and the same. Given the looseness of the term &Taliban8 among Afghans, and the fact that locals have acknowledged that &local Taliban8 are members of the shura, the accounts are substantially similar. End Note) KABUL 00000368 002 OF 003 Taliban Commander Demands Removal of Afghan Flag -------------- --- ¶4. (SBU/NF) On January 31, a member of the Musa Qala shura told PRTOff that, while Ghafar had left the district center, the situation had not returned to normal. Negotiations continued with Ghafar demanding that the shura remove the flag of Afghanistan from the atop the district center. He insisted it was not the flag of an Islamic state. This angered shura members, who told Ghafar that it had been the country,s flag before Ghafar was born and refused his demand. The shura member told PRTOff at that point that the shura expected to prevail as "all the people" in the center supported the shura,s existing agreement with the Government of Afghanistan (GOA),and that Ghafar had no support. Shura Rejects Taliban Demands, Again -------------- ¶5. (SBU/NF) The same shura member reported to PRTOff that on February 1 a large group of elders, mullahs and shura members (estimated as 2000) gathered in the district center. They met to address a demand to remove the Afghan flag, this time by Mullah Manan (Taliban district chief of Sangin). (Note: It is not clear but appears likely that Mullah Manan was simply echoing Ghafar's demand. End Note) The assembled group agreed to reject the demand, concluding that words of the mullahs, shura and elders had the force of an "Islamic obligation" (fatwa) that must be obeyed. The shura member stressed the importance of such an obligation, especially undertaken by so many. He described the group as being angry, having concluded that the Taliban are the "slaves of Pakistan." (Note: A separate source provided an additional motivation for the shura members insisting that the flag remain flying. He said the villagers believed it was a symbol that would protect the district center from bombings and raids by NATO. End Note) The group,s decision was conveyed to unspecified Taliban members, who responded that they would depart to discuss the matter with their "top commanders in Pakistan," and they would a meeting with the elders on February 5. Taliban Takes over District Center -------------- ¶6. (SBU/NF) On February 1 the Taliban attacked the DC, beat and disarmed ANAP, damaged or destroyed the DC administration building and surrounding wall, removed the Afghan flag and confined shura members to their homes. A shura member claimed that locals were refusing to cooperate with the Taliban, e.g., refusing to provide food and shelter. He added that fear of NATO air strikes fed the ill-will towards the Taliban, whose recent actions have put an end to six months of relative quiet. There have been reports of locals fleeing the district center. ¶7. (SBU/NF) Afghan government officials publicly threatened action, in concert with ISAF, to retake the town. Governor Wafa has strongly advocated a robust response to the Taliban's actions. He released a statement denouncing the Taliban and urging support for the elders (as did ISAF). On the afternoon of February 4 reports indicated that an ISAF air strike in Musa Qala killed Ghafar and unknown others. Frayed Relations with Taliban are Broken -------------- ¶8. (SBU/NF) According to various sources, relations between the shura and &active Taliban8 in the area had been deteriorating even before the air strike. Before the occupation of the district center, and probably before the air strike, members of the shura approached Ghafar in order to convince him leave the insurgency and abandon a checkpoint that he and his militias used to search people and extract money from them. Governor Wafa had made it clear that, pursuant to the existing agreement with the GOA, hr expected KABUL 00000368 003 OF 003 the shura to turn over tax revenues. This apparently led to the shura deciding that closing the Taliban checkpoint would leave more money in the pockets of locals for the shura to tax. Ghafar reportedly apparently scoffed at the shura's request and insulted the elders, calling them useless. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU/NF) COMMENT: The controversial agreement with Musa Qala district elders, reached last fall, was, at best, in suspension while the elders negotiated with the Taliban. The seizure of the district center by the Taliban destroyed the agreement and upset the existing fragile balance between the local shura and the Taliban. The shura is at a crossroad, and what happens next will have an impact far beyond the small district. Governor Wafa,s call for a robust response on the part of the GOA and the international community, including public expressions of support and material assistance, does not mean he expects the elders to embrace the GOA. He understands the elders are constantly weighing their options, comparing the costs and benefits of different alliances. The Taliban has been damaged physically by recent ISAF and GOA operations in Helmand and politically by its own operations against Musa Qala. Wafa understands an opening exists for convincing the shura that the GOA ) with ISAF standing behind it ) is both a credible threat and a potential partner. Relatively swift reinstatement of the ousted elders, coupled with assurances of assistance, could draw a heretofore largely anti-government enclave towards the GOA,s sphere. A critical first step on the part of the shura would be acceptance of Wafa,s pro-GOA conditions ("protocols8) which he says have received a positive response from other districts, elders (REFTEL). END COMMENT. NEUMANN