PRT KHOST - GOVERNOR JAMAL: FUNDING DELAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000359 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: PRT KHOST - GOVERNOR JAMAL: FUNDING DELAY THREATENS SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE GAINS REF: A. 06 KABUL 5632 ¶B. 06 KABUL 5853 ¶C. KABUL 255 Classified By: PolCounselor SRosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During mid-December meeting with PRT, Khost Governor Arsala Jamal expressed concern that, due to funds from the Ministery of Interior into his Governor's Discretionary Fund drying up at the end of the fiscal year, he would not be able to pay the governor's militia that he was relying on to augment the ANP. The Governor argued that, until the PAG-approved Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) in Khost is up and running and able to absorb the existing militia force, or the flow of discretionary funds is resumed, districts that rely heavily on the milita paid by the governor are vulnerable to Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM). While the governor may be exaggerating the likely consequences of the gap in security funds, the situation does point to the need to address problems with relying on the Governor's Discretionary Fund to cover security requirements (Septel). The GOA recognizes there is a problem, and it is not clear, at this point, whether there will be provision for the Governor's Discretionary Fund in the next year's budget. END SUMMARY. -------------- Governor Says Funding Gap Threatens Security -------------- ¶2. (C) During mid-December meeting with PRT, Khost Governor Jamal said his priority for the province remained the build-up and support of militia paid directly by the governor himself. Until the Afghan National Auxiliary Police had been approved for use in Khost, allowing these militia to be absorbed into the ANAP, the Governor would need to continue to pay these militia out of his Discretionay Fund, which has been provided by the Ministry of Interior to governors in several provinces since 2005 to help with extraordinary security requirements. Since payments from Kabul into the governor's Discretionary Fund ceased in November until the new fiscal year, he was concerned that he would not be able to pay salaries to the militia and might lose some to anti-coalition militia. (Embassy Note: There are different 
explanations regarding why the discretionary funds dried up before the end of the fiscal year, but we are told the funds available from the current year's budget were exhausted in December. There are reports the Minister of Interior is developing a proposal to secure 50 million afghanis (USD 1 million) to continue resourcing the Discretionary Funds, but this of course would be at the expense of other obligations. The willingness/ability of the GOA to support the MOI request is not clear. In fact there are indications that the GOA may not include monies for the Governor's Discretionary Fund in next year's budget, which is currently being negotiated - Septel. End Note) ¶3. (C) The Governor said he feared that existing militia would abandon their positions before a new infusion of discretionary funds became available or the ANAP was able to absorb and pay those currently serving in the militia. He warned that districts like Spera, with only eight regular Afghan National Police (ANP) and 30 militia, would be vulnerable and could fall to anti-coalition militia. (Embassy Note: ANAP training for Khost was approved by the January 11 PAG (ref C). It is expected to being March 1, but it will take time to train the full complement of 460 authorized ANAP, given constraints on facilities and personnel. End Note) -------------- Also Threatens Tribal Security Agreement -------------- KABUL 00000359 002 OF 003 ¶4. (U) Jamal warned that the recently-brokered Tribal Security Resolution (ref A) could also be at risk. The agreement obliges tribes to secure their areas in cooperation with District Administrators and requires to come to the aid of district centers, schools, and other GOA structures. Since tribal elders signed the agreement November 23, there have been several examples of villagers coming to the aid of District Centers and checkpoints attacked by ACM. The most recent example occurred December 9, when villagers came beating drums and shooting guns within 25 minutes to help a besieged Sabari District ANP checkpoint. This effectively scared off the ACM and two ACM bodies were recovered. ¶5. (C) Despite early successes, Jamal is concerned that enthusiasm for the agreement will fade with time, so he is trying to stand up an "agreement enforcement group" to ensure that elders and mullahs follow through on their commitments. The group would consist of one or two tribal leaders from each district plus all district administrators, and a representative of the PC, ANP, NDS and ABP. The group would travel to districts where attacks are continuing and shame tribal leaders into stepping up their resistance to ACM infiltration and operations ("Our districts are safe, why isn't yours?") and possibly offer suggestions and best practices from more secure districts. Jamal described the group's purpose as enforcing the agreement "by traditional means." He said villages would also suffer if the militia continued to go unpaid, as this would further undermining the agreement and the relationship between the GOA and tribal leaders. -------------- -- Security, Anti-Corruption, Outreach Initiatives -------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) Jamal said that the gap in the Governor's Discretionary Fund would undermine progress he had made over the last three months on security, anti-corruption, and public outreach. Without funds to transport, house, feed, and organize events and shuras for elders, mullahs, GOA officials, and visiting Kabul delegations, Jamal feared important symbolic progress could be lost. He said he would have to make some difficult decisions on spending what was left of prior months funds. He claimed his initiatives were being examined by other governors as potential best practices and argued that many of the following initiatives would be threatened: --an anti-Taliban stance and issuing of fatwas from the Provincial Mullah Shura; --public events to rally support for GOA (most notable example: 3,600-man October 12 Peace Rally); --proposed establishment of cross-border, tribally based "micro-jirgas"; --three-man provincial anti-corruption team; --accountability shuras (GoA Officials meet the press/public) --Kabul delegation support, including anti-corruption investigations. ¶7. (C) PRT Comment: While Jamal has grounds to be concerned about the loss of funding for his militia, his comment about losing districts may be alarmist and was likely designed to scare us into lobbying for expedited funding. Ex-Governor Pathan went three months without paying the militia a year ago when the MOI funds ran dry at the end of the last fiscal year. The militia, are in many cases drawn from the local Arbekei or "village defenders" who serve out of loyalty to the tribal leaders that select them. Pay is not the sole or even the most important determinant of their loyalty. In fact, whether the militia that become integrated into the ANAP will bring the same loyalty to that organization remains to be seen. With regard to the other programs Jamal KABUL 00000359 003 OF 003 described, while only time will tell if his strategies bear fruit, his initiative and creativity should be applauded, supported and shared with other provincial officials as a model. ¶8. (SBU) Embassy Comment: An interagency group at post is addressing the overall issue of funding going to the provinces/governors, including the role of the Governor's Discretionary Fund. The objective is to ensure we are encouraging options that provide regular, sufficient, transparent and sustainable funding to key sectors, including security -- Septel. End Comment. NEUMANN