PRT KANDAHAR: CANADIAN PRT GAINING CAPABILITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000307 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, EUR/RPM NSC FOR HARRIMAN CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR AF CA SUBJECT: PRT KANDAHAR: CANADIAN PRT GAINING CAPABILITIES AND MOMENTUM Classified By: Charge d'Affairs a.i., Richard Norland for reasons 1.4 ( B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Along with the deployment of ground forces in the province, Canada took over Kandahar PRT (KPRT) in August of 2005. KPRT has experienced considerable change in its size and organizational structure during the ensuing 18 months. The death of Political Director Glyn Berry in an SVBIED attack in January of 2006 struck a serious blow and significantly slowed operations, particularly civilian engagement. The sharp increase in Taliban activity and the high number of Canadian casualties in 2006 also posed a considerable challenge for KPRT as force protection requirements increased and mobility was reduced. Project design, approval, and implementation were all slow through much of 2006. In addition, the Taliban infiltration of the districts of Panjwayi and Zharey and the consequent ISAF actions in the area totally dominated the KPRT agenda. ¶2. (C) Summary (continued): Given the intense domestic focus on Canada's role in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada has placed a very high priority on success in Kandahar and has committed crucial resources to increasing the capabilities of KPRT. As a result, there has been a steady increase in KPRT's ability to engage key leaders, analyze and respond to political developments, design and carry out small-scale cash-for-work and construction projects, and move development projects forward more quickly. As the third contingent of Canadian military to run the PRT prepares to turn over the reins in February, KPRT has achieved significant momentum, is beginning to extend its efforts throughout the province, and is well positioned to support the initial tactical success of Operation Baaz Tsuka in Panjwayi and Zharey. END SUMMARY Where We Have Been -- The First Year -------------- ¶3. (C) Canada's initial KPRT contingent (Roto 0) arrived in August of 2005 and numbered approximately 250. The civilian component was small with two political officers and one official of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). (Note: The State position was unfilled but USAID was represented. End Note.) In January 2006, Political Director Glyn Berry was killed in a SVBIED attack in the city. The junior political officer was away and his tour was curtailed. The CIDA officer was pulled out. By April, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) was able to provide a series of TDY personnel until the position could be staffed again in September 2006. Civilian movement was restricted and force protection requirements for KPRT movements increased. Beginning early in 2006, Taliban activity increased sharply, and Canadian ground forces were stretched. Ottawa also decided to subordinate the new PRT contingent (Roto 1) to the battle group. In theory, the PRT had access to battle group assets, but in practice the kinetic military requirements were judged paramount, and KPRT had almost no force protection assets from February 2006. During Roto 1, KPRT numbered only 120 personnel. ¶4. (C) The decision to subordinate the PRT to the battle group was subsequently reversed in July 2006. In August 2006, the third contingent (Roto 2) of military personnel arrived. At this stage even small projects were slow in design, approval and implementation. Construction projects were floundering and CIDA programming was only through Afghan national programs. CIDA personnel arrived in August but were allowed to move only by air. The Political Director needed advance approval from Ottawa for movements outside Kandahar city. While KPRT increased in size to approximately 160 personnel, the single largest constraint remained the lack of force protection assets. Where We Are Now -------------- KABUL 00000307 002 OF 005 ¶5. (C) Force Protection and Command Structure: The arrival in November and December of a company of the Royal 22nd Regiment to provide force protection has greatly expanded the mobility of KPRT. This 148-man francophone unit consists of one light infantry platoon and two mechanized platoons plus a small support element. The light infantry platoon took over camp protection, which had previously required even officers to stand regular guard tower watches. The two mechanized platoons maintain 11 LAVs (infantry fighting vehicles) which combine fire power with armored transport capacity. In addition, KPRT now has four heavily armored RG-31 Nyala anti-mine vehicles, up from two during most of the autumn. Also in December, KPRT came under the command of the Task Force Kandahar led by a Canadian Brigadier General. This headquarters greatly simplifies KPRT reporting, cutting three military reporting lines down to one. ¶6. (C) Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC): There has been vast improvement in the crucial CIMIC operations of KPRT. Most of the assets were attached to the battle group to handle its interactions with civilians during the middle of 2006 in the months before Operation Medusa. Only two teams were deployable due to increased force protection requirements. Starting in September, two CIMIC detachments were almost constantly deployed in Panjwayi and Zharey and quickly built up knowledge of the area. With the arrival of the enhanced force protection package in December, the number of deployable CIMIC teams increased to four plus a Kandahar city team. The latter is developing a profile of Kandahar city's needs and has funded a large canal and culvert cleaning project. It is also working closely with less powerful departments (Sports, Women's Affairs, and Martyrs and Amputees) with a goal of influencing one member of every family in the city. The four detachments have been intensively involved in Operation Baaz Tsuka, working to distribute "CIMIC bombs" (sea containers filled with useful supplies for Afghans returning to their villages),engaging the tribal elders, and providing cash-for-work projects for villages. CIMIC projects can generally be completed in less than 30 days and cost less than USD 90,000. CIMIC has also run one-day village medical outreach programs in Panjwayi, Zharey, Arghandab, Dand, Shah Wali Kot and Spin Boldak. The CIMIC detachments have greatly expanded the rate at which they have harnessed the Commander's Contingency Fund (roughly equivalent to the U.S. military CERP). The vast majority of the USD 4 million committed through this fund has been spent since late October. ¶7. (C) Engineering/Construction: Enhancement of engineer support has led to greatly improved capacity to design and oversee the implementation of construction projects. Through the first year of the PRT, a single engineer and the CIMIC detachments attempted to handle these functions without great success. Beginning in September with the temporary deployment of one of Canada's three Specialist Engineer Teams and continuing with the arrival in November of the 12-person PRT Engineer detachment, early problems with project and contract management were alleviated. KPRT now has 21 construction projects in various stages. Among these are: five police substations in Kandahar city, a police checkpoint construction program, and renovations to Kandahar University and the Shrine of the Cloak of the Prophet. The engineers will oversee renovations and the installation of equipment for Kandahar's technical school. The engineers have also supervised the paving of Route Summit between Panjwayi District Center and the Arghandab River -- this stretch of road will be opened by the end of January. ¶8. (SBU) Development: (Note: This cable does not cover USAID's considerable efforts in Kandahar as they are reported in other channels. End Note.) CIDA returned to KPRT in August 2006 with a three-officer team. CIDA has also streamlined its project approval methods in Ottawa to accelerate KPRT's ability to get projects off the drawing boards and into implementation. CIDA officers have been KABUL 00000307 003 OF 005 authorized to move on the ground with prior approval since December. CIDA has pledged to spend 900 million over ten years. Roughly 70 percent of this spending is committed through the Afghan national programs. In some cases, CIDA has harnessed national programs for specific projects in Kandahar, many of which help expand KPRT's reach beyond the Kandahar ADZ. CIDA, which generally maintains a long-term focus in its projects, has also begun to increase its ability to undertake quicker, shorter-term projects. In this regard, in just six weeks from concept to contract award, CIDA initiated the Accelerated District Reconstruction Program (USD 9 million),which is designed to bridge the gap between the short-term CIMIC cash-for-work projects and the longer-term CIDA development projects. In designing its programs, CIDA seeks to maximize local buy-in by working through grass roots mechanisms for project design. A few of the larger recently announced programs include: -- Under the National Area-Based Development Program, CIDA has funded projects determined by the local District Development Assemblies at USD 180,000 for each of the 17 districts in Kandahar. Projects include secondary roads, canals, small bridges, check dams, reservoirs, and wells. An additional USD 2.7 million has been approved for larger infrastructure projects in key districts -- larger bridges, check dams, and a mountain pass. -- In addition to funding the National Solidarity Program (NSP) at the national level, CIDA has provided an additional USD 2 million to accelerate the expansion of this successful grass roots program run by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) to two more districts in the province. This brings 9 of Kandahar's 17 districts into the NSP. (Note: MRRD has just announced its intent to expand the program to the other 8 districts. CIDA will likely be approached for funds. End Note). -- CIDA has also committed USD 17 million for a 2006-2008 Integrated Alternative Livelihoods Program to provide viable alternatives to poppy production in four key narcotics-producing districts in the province -- Daman, Maywand, Maruf, and Spin Boldak. This program will also work through local District Development Assemblies. -- KPRT's ability to influence the decision of the displaced population of Panjwayi and Zharey to begin to return to the area during Operation Baaz Tsuka was enhanced by the availability of food and non-food assistance through UN agencies at the local level. This was made possible through a USD 4.5 million CIDA grant to WFP and a USD 4 million grant to UNICEF. (Note: USAID has also funded this type of relief for the two districts. End Note). ¶9. (SBU) DFAIT: The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade supplies KPRT's Political Director. In addition to his role in analysis and political engagement, the Political Director is responsible for the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF),a USD 90 million fund with USD 6 million earmarked for Kandahar. This fund was approved in October of 2006 and it has already begun its first disbursements. Projects that cost less than USD 450,000 can be approved relatively quickly in Ottawa but delegation of approval authority to the field is under consideration. GPSF spending is not intended to supplant longer-term development assistance planning. The primary focus of GPSF is the establishment of stability and security. Strategic areas of focus include: security system reform, justice system reform, support for Afghan-Pakistan dialogue, technical assistance, mine clearance, and infrastructure. Among the projects already underway are construction of police substations and procurement of non-lethal police equipment. During his January visit to Kandahar, Foreign Minister McKay announced a supplemental USD 10 million grant from GPSF to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). KABUL 00000307 004 OF 005 ¶10. (C) CivPol and MPs: KPRT's civilian police element currently consists of a five-man detachment and is slated to go up to ten by March. Together with the Military Police platoon, they have provided training to ANP at the RTC and at KPRT. The CivPol team closely monitors command and control issues within the Kandahar police force and works with the Chief of Police to address shortcomings. The CivPol team is deeply concerned that there is no mid-level training program available for long-term development of a professional and sustainable police force in the province and is working to fill that gap through training, equipping and mentoring. The MPs have played a key role in the largely paramilitary training of the ANAP. Where We Are Headed -------------- ¶11. (C) In the immediate future, the new military contingent will match the capabilities that KPRT has developed. An additional 40 personnel will be added, bringing the total size of KPRT to 350. The additions are primarily in the headquarters -- beefing up such functions as intelligence, operations, and information operations. Additionally, the new commander will hold the job for a one-year period rather than six months. Two CIMIC detachments will continue to work in Panjwayi and Zharey districts and another in the city. This will free up two CIMIC detachments to expand KPRT's operational area along highway one towards Zabul and along highway four through Spin Boldak to the border with Pakistan. This new effort will begin with a mapping/quick assessment of villages within approximately 20 kilometers of the two highways. Gradually KPRT intends to extend patrols throughout the province. ¶12. (C) The Political Director is encouraging the Governor to expand his focus beyond the security realm and to concentrate on curtailing corruption. DFAIT is seriously considering an increase from one to as many as four officers at the PRT, reflecting the increased demands that come with running spending programs and the need to expand engagement. ¶13. (C) The Government of Canada is also in the process of approving the creation of an In-Service Training Facility for police training in Kandahar. The facility would cost up to USD 3.6 million and would take advantage of the portion of the old fruit canning factory not already in use by KPRT. The focus would be professionalization of the middle ranks in the ANP. The Canadian CivPol has recognized that without a properly trained NCO corps -- a function that is not presently part of any national-level training programs -- the Kandahar ANP will not be able to develop itself beyond a paramilitary organization. If approved and funded quickly, the new facility could be in operation before the end of 2008. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C/NF) Canadian capabilities and performance have improved greatly over the past six months. Nonetheless, there are important differences between the Canadian approach to its mission and that more typically found in U.S.-led PRTs. One obvious difference is size -- Roto 3 deploys in mid-February with a total of 350 personnel. Another difference is rooted in the fact that Canada has only one PRT. Thus, all the many ranking visitors to Afghanistan want to visit KPRT and talk directly with the Commander. There is also a tendency in Ottawa to micromanage decisions that could easily and better be made on the ground. ¶15. (C/NF) More important than differences in composition or structure are underlying philosophical differences that have a profound impact on the operational style of KPRT. Some of these are rooted in Canada's analysis of the American experience in Afghanistan as negative. One key phrase is "dropping schools off the back of the truck," which is meant KABUL 00000307 005 OF 005 to describe a perceived U.S. proclivity to deliver results without sufficient regard for how things fit into the grand plan. The second phrase is "Afghan face, Afghan pace," which indicates Canadian willingness to accept a slower pace of progress as part of an Afghan-led process which builds capacity. This sometimes translates into a hands-off approach, particularly with Governor Assadullah Khalid, whom the Canadians have generally held in low regard. In fairness, KPRT's willingness to engage with Khalid has increased over time. However, because of the tendency to stay close to base, especially on the civilian side, KPRT has considerably more work to do to project the ISAF presence out beyond Kandahar city and the districts of Panjwayi and Zharey. NORLAND