Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL3054
2007-09-12 11:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT KARZAI'S NEW GOVERNANCE CZAR OUTLINES

Tags:  EAID KDEM PGOV PINR AF 
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DE RUEHBUL #3054/01 2551147
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121147Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0194
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003054 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI'S NEW GOVERNANCE CZAR OUTLINES
VISION FOR REFORM

REF: A. KABUL 2684

B. KABUL 1712

SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003054 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR AF SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI'S NEW GOVERNANCE CZAR OUTLINES VISION FOR REFORM REF: A. KABUL 2684 ¶B. KABUL 1712 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) President Karzai established the new Office of Local Administration on August 30 and appointed as its director general Ghulam Jelani Popal, a respected former deputy minister of finance. Popal outlined his vision for making the Afghan government "a reality in the lives of the people," partly by putting "maliks" -- traditional quasi-official liaisons between tribes and the government -- on the government payroll. He is considering replacing several governors. He will also urge the central government to give more support to governors and provincial councils, particularly by seeking their input on security requirements, making other ministries more responsive, and channeling funds for sub-national priorities. The JCMB "Informal Group" of Ambassadors has invited Popal to outline the support he needs to help him overcome political opposition to his reform agenda. The Embassy and USAID are also considering how to ensure that the new office, which inherits MOI staff, does not also inherit its deficiencies. END SUMMARY. LEADERSHIP FOR SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE REFORM -------------- ¶2. (SBU) President Karzai issued a decree on August 30 establishing the Office of Local Administration, a focal point for governance policy under the Presidency and a new home for the Ministry of Interior's dysfunctional Civil Administration Division (ref A). He appointed as its director general Ghulam Jelani Popal, a Pashtun close to the Karzai family and the deputy chairman of Minister of Finance Ahady's Afghan Millat Party. As a respected former Deputy Minister of Finance under Ashraf Gani, Popal centralized the collection of customs revenue, diminishing the influence of regional warlords over an important source of government revenue. He speaks fluent English and reportedly lived in the U.S. from 1998-2001. He worked on local development as head of the Afghanistan Development Association (ADA) NGO, and is thought to have credibility with tribes, especially in the South. ¶3. (SBU) Popal's deputy for policy is Barna Karimi, formerly deputy to Karzai's previo
us Chief of Staff Jawad Ludin, who has has a reputation for competence. The new deputy for administration is the out-going MOI deputy minister for civil administration Abdul Malek Sediqi, a former communist technocrat whose moribund division's inactivity led to its move to the Palace. Popal's appointment was preceded by a week of Palace intrigue in which Sediqi, reportedly backed by Parliament Speaker Qanooni, challenged Karzai's pick for the top governance job. Popal suggested to Poloff that Sediqi's appointment was a political necessity and that Sediqi may not last long in the office, saying that he can nevertheless help the new office learn routine, administrative procedures for "at least three or four months" while Popal and Karimi press forward with reform. AN AFGHAN VISION FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Popal outlined his vision for sub-national governance reform in an introductory meeting with Poloff on September 8, saying, "Legitimacy comes not just from the ballot box, but from delivering security and services." Afghans have high expectations of the international community and their government that are not being met, according to Popal, while the Taliban, from whom Afghans expect little, are in fact helping address local problems in many villages (often by taking sides in tribal disputes). Popal acknowledged the good work that has built the government at the center, but said "the government is not a reality in the lives of the people." He thinks governance policy needs a consistent approach backed by political will, saying that KABUL 00003054 002 OF 003 "Karzai is committed." ¶5. (SBU) For Popal, the key to strengthening government authority is creating a system through which formal government structures can systematically interface with tribal leaders at the local level. Historically, he explained, district administrators interfaced with the tribes through "maliks", quasi-official tribal representatives selected by local communities to solve collective problems, sometimes by convening shuras, and charging fees for facilitating access to government services. Popal said this system worked smoothly, but was undermined by three decades of war. (NOTE: The traditional malik system was replaced by elected village representatives under the 1964 Constitution and then by community based councils under the Daud regime (1973-78),which tended to function as propaganda outlets for the regime rather than as conduits from villages up to the central government. END NOTE.) Popal intends to revive a similar system of officially recognized tribal liaisons by identifying those community leaders informally playing this role and providing them with a modest government stipend. He estimated that the system would require 10,000 maliks, or 30 for each of Afghanistan's 400 districts. (NOTE: Popal did not indicate how he would fund this system, but he alluded to reforming the bloated staff of the MOI's former civil administration division. END NOTE.) ¶6. (SBU) Popal said that Afghanistan cannot yet afford -- politically or financially -- formal elections at the district and community level, as foreseen in the Constitution. For the 2009/10 election cycle, village shuras will play the role of district councils, and maliks from each district will collectively form a district shura. Popal plans to "streamline" the number of shuras currently claiming to represent communities, many of which have formed since the war to represent powerful individuals and lack legitimacy. Popal said the government should only consider extending formal democracy below the provinces once the state becomes stronger. However, he supports elections in 2009/10 for municipal councils and mayors, which -- unlike district and village councils -- have independent revenue-raising authority and a clear mandate to deliver municipal services. ¶7. (SBU) Popal acknowledged that his vision differs somewhat from that of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) established by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. He said the existence of CDCs is based on the promise of development funds, but that they are otherwise artificial, not well-rooted, and unsustainable. The existence of 17,000 CDCs nevertheless "makes our lives easier" because many local leaders who could play the role of maliks are already participating in CDCs. Popal is in the process of negotiating with MRRD the appropriate future role for CDCs. (NOTE: The World Bank told Poloff that CDCs may remain within MRRD and retain their original development role rather than evolve into formal village councils. END NOTE.) REVITALIZING SUPPORT FOR GOVERNORS AND PCS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Popal will oversee Afghanistan's 34 provincial governors, and says that President Karzai has agreed to stop receiving governors and to refer them instead to Popal's office, except for "two or three of the biggest warlords." Popal said effective provincial governance not only depends on appointing the right governors, but also on supporting them with resources and security. He intends to fill vacancies in Faryab and Jowzjan, and to replace several governors, mentioning Kunar Governor Deedar and Ghazni governor Patan. (NOTE: The Asia Foundation (TAF),which has been advising Popal on the structure of his new Office, told Poloff that Popal had insisted as a condition of accepting the job that Karzai replace several governors, possibly including Uruzgan Governor Monib, Wardak Governor Naimi, Farah Governor Balouch, and Zabul Governor Arman. END NOTE.) KABUL 00003054 003 OF 003 ¶9. (SBU) Popal confirmed that administrative authority over provincial councils will move from Faruk Wardak's Office of Administrative Affairs to his new office (ref B). He observed that PCs were established to play their Constitutional role in appointing members of the upper house of Parliament (the Meshrano Jirga),but they have otherwise been under-utilized and should be given real authority. DONOR SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN-LED GOVERNANCE REFORM -------------- - ¶10. (SBU) The JCMB "Informal Group" of Ambassadors discussed on September 4 how to support the new Office, agreeing to invite Popal to outline his plans and needs. SRSG Koenigs said, "There is a crisis of political legitimacy and a lack of belief in institutions from the President down to the provinces," and that Afghanistan needs a more "robust and connected" system of governance. He concluded on behalf of the group that the new office is a positive reform that raises high expectations and deserves support. Popal told Poloff that he plans to ask for public support from the international community to overcome political opposition to his reform agenda. He will also request technical assistance and financial support. Popal and Karimi were pleased to receive a copy of an inventory of governance programs developed by the Embassy, and requested further working-level consultations to refine their agenda. ¶11. (SBU) One issue requiring urgent attention is how to ensure that the new office, which inherits MOI staff, does not also inherit its deficiencies. If reform is to stick, the new office will need effective leadership within as well as at the top. The Asia foundation estimates that the new office will need seven core senior officials and 52 new staff in key positions as a first step in implementing serious reform. The Embassy and USAID have encouraged the Afghan Government to show that the new office is a priority by funding its transitional staffing needs as we explore how best to support the new office's reform agenda. DELL

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