Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL256
2007-01-25 09:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
MUSA QALA: PRESSING FOR TEST TWO
how-toVZCZCXRO8668 OO RUEHDBU DE RUEHBUL #0256 0250918 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 250918Z JAN 07 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5700 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3571
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 000256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA: PRESSING FOR TEST TWO
REF: A. KABUL 142
B. KABUL 236
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 000256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA: PRESSING FOR TEST TWO
REF: A. KABUL 142
B. KABUL 236
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Deputy MOI Minister Khalid updated the PAG January 20
on Musa Qala developments since the last meeting (ref A). He
reported that the GOA had sent a Commission to Musa Qala and
Lashkar Gah to meet with the elders and the Chief of Police.
The Commission confirmed that 40 ANAP were operating in the
district and that eight schools had opened. MOI reported
that Musa Qala elders indicated they would welcome ANSF and
ISAF forces but that Governor Wafa suggested it was better to
first lay the groundwork with the locals since the "so-called
Taliban" might react negatively if a force went in
precipitously.
2. (C) Ambassador Neumann sought clarification on the status
of Test 2. National Security Advisor Rassoul responded that
Test 2 should happen now and that Test 3 would take place
after discussions between the Governor and President Karzai.
Rassoul noted that the Governor had not yet given President
Karzai his views on the situation. COMISAF Richards urged
the GOA to decide on a date for Test 2. He said that, since
the elders had given their agreement, he would start
agitating for a target date. The Ambassador said he was
uncomfortable having the PAG totally surrender its decision
to Governor Wafa and urged an early decision on a target
date, otherwise the fundamental principle of the tests would
be lost.
3. (C) NDS and UNAMA shared different interpretations of
their meeting with the elders. NDS Chief Saleh described the
elders as "not very welcoming but rather harsh and critical"
toward the GOA's slow delivery of reconstruction and
development in the district. The elders suggested the GOA
fix corruption elsewhere in the country first before going to
Musa Qala. Saleh said his take on the meeting was that the
elders were not entirely positive and very cautious toward
testing. "It was not a smooth meeting", he remarked.
4. (C) UNAMA Deputy SRSG Alexander interpreted the criticism
from the elders as directed at the previous Governor, not at
Wafa. He thought the new Governor was being received rather
well. He noted that Governor Wafa had instituted tests of
his own in the form of protocols (ref B) to key districts in
the area, which has raised the standard of loyalty. The
Governor wanted time to consult more widely, Alexander
advised.
5. (C) The Ambassador expressed support for the Governor's
new tests and protocols and said the U.S. was willing to give
Governor Wafa more time. He referenced reports of
non-governmental administrative functions being carried out
in Musa Qala by Taliban and noted that there was
contradictory information about who was in the no-go area.
He stressed that this was not a sustainable situation and
urged the PAG not to delay a decision much longer.
NEUMANN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA: PRESSING FOR TEST TWO
REF: A. KABUL 142
B. KABUL 236
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Deputy MOI Minister Khalid updated the PAG January 20
on Musa Qala developments since the last meeting (ref A). He
reported that the GOA had sent a Commission to Musa Qala and
Lashkar Gah to meet with the elders and the Chief of Police.
The Commission confirmed that 40 ANAP were operating in the
district and that eight schools had opened. MOI reported
that Musa Qala elders indicated they would welcome ANSF and
ISAF forces but that Governor Wafa suggested it was better to
first lay the groundwork with the locals since the "so-called
Taliban" might react negatively if a force went in
precipitously.
2. (C) Ambassador Neumann sought clarification on the status
of Test 2. National Security Advisor Rassoul responded that
Test 2 should happen now and that Test 3 would take place
after discussions between the Governor and President Karzai.
Rassoul noted that the Governor had not yet given President
Karzai his views on the situation. COMISAF Richards urged
the GOA to decide on a date for Test 2. He said that, since
the elders had given their agreement, he would start
agitating for a target date. The Ambassador said he was
uncomfortable having the PAG totally surrender its decision
to Governor Wafa and urged an early decision on a target
date, otherwise the fundamental principle of the tests would
be lost.
3. (C) NDS and UNAMA shared different interpretations of
their meeting with the elders. NDS Chief Saleh described the
elders as "not very welcoming but rather harsh and critical"
toward the GOA's slow delivery of reconstruction and
development in the district. The elders suggested the GOA
fix corruption elsewhere in the country first before going to
Musa Qala. Saleh said his take on the meeting was that the
elders were not entirely positive and very cautious toward
testing. "It was not a smooth meeting", he remarked.
4. (C) UNAMA Deputy SRSG Alexander interpreted the criticism
from the elders as directed at the previous Governor, not at
Wafa. He thought the new Governor was being received rather
well. He noted that Governor Wafa had instituted tests of
his own in the form of protocols (ref B) to key districts in
the area, which has raised the standard of loyalty. The
Governor wanted time to consult more widely, Alexander
advised.
5. (C) The Ambassador expressed support for the Governor's
new tests and protocols and said the U.S. was willing to give
Governor Wafa more time. He referenced reports of
non-governmental administrative functions being carried out
in Musa Qala by Taliban and noted that there was
contradictory information about who was in the no-go area.
He stressed that this was not a sustainable situation and
urged the PAG not to delay a decision much longer.
NEUMANN