PRT LASHKAR GAH: HELMAND SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002468

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF UK
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: HELMAND SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEW

REF: A. KABUL 1055

B. KABUL 2130

C. KABUL 2131

Classified By: PolCouns Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Taliban have been hit hard in Helmand over the
past six months. Military operations in Nahri Sarraj and
Sangin disrupted the Taliban and weakened their support but
have not resulted in enduring stability. Despite this
military disruption, the expansion of reconstruction and
development (R&D),and small advances in governance,
conditions remain fragile. This is evidenced by a
deterioration of security in the central districts that
threatens R&D efforts and could undermine already weak
confidence in the government (Ref A). While Governor Wafa
increased his outreach to tribal elders, he cannot boast
great progress. Nor has he been a strong supporter of
increasing government capacity to deliver services. He can
however point to reintroducing a central government presence
in Sangin.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: As USAID and HMG pursue R&D and
alternative livelihoods in Nahri Sarraj and Sangin, they
confront worsened security in the central districts, e.g.,
monitoring projects just outside the provincial center has
become extremely difficult. Early indications suggest that
upcoming UNODC numbers for poppy cultivation in Helmand will
be huge. The 2007 poppy eradication campaign did little to
introduce risk into the opium trade, but some progress was
seen on interdiction. Overall, efforts directed at northern
districts have shown some positive results, but a potential
risk in extending security, R&D, and the government's reach
northward is that security in the center, where the IROA has
the strongest presence, will deteriorate. To counter this,
ISAF, the PRT and IROA are accelerating their efforts to beef
up police recruitment and training. END SUMMARY

Security
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3. (C) In the first half of the year ISAF/Coalition forces
and the Afghan Government struck the Taliban hard, in
particular in Nahri Sarraj and Sangin districts. The
operations resulted in numerous Taliban deaths, including a
number of commanders. This disrupted ) at least temporarily
- Taliban command and control and made local recruitment more
difficult. However, the series of operations that commenced
in March has yet to bring enduring stability. In June, two
ISAF/Coalition clashes with the Taliban in Nahri Sarraj
resulted in civilian deaths, hampering progress in R&D (Ref
B),and a spate of security incidents in Sangin increased
concerns of Taliban re-infiltration (Ref C). (NOTE: An
increase in the number of IEDs and mines in recent months
reveals a shift in Taliban tactics, largely in response to
ISAF/IROA operations. END NOTE)


4. (C) Security remains the primary concern of Afghans
living in the central districts, where the government exerts
the greatest control and where security deteriorated in the
first half of the year. While the provincial center, Lashkar
Gah, has not experienced a suicide bombing since March,
violence against and intimidation of Afghans with government
links continued. This included attacks against Afghan
National Police (ANP) and the Taliban's letter to the
Independent Election Commission head warning him to resign
his position. Increased insecurity, however, should not be
attributed solely to the insurgency, as crime levels have
risen, including an increase in violent crime (kidnappings
and shootings). Travel for the PRT's official civilians has
contracted significantly in recent months and currently
extends only to downtown Lashkar Gah. The neighboring
district of Nad Ali also has seen greater violence, as

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evidenced by an increase in IEDs (including suicide bombings
against the ANP and a roadside bomb against ISAF),the murder
of a local mayor, and a violent shootout between rival tribal
factions. Motives behind the violence likely involve a mix
of Taliban infiltration, tribal conflicts, and fights over
opium.


5. (C) The ANP did nothing to dispel a reputation for crime
and corruption, including accusations of looting after
military operations and the arrest of approximately 35
patrolmen in July for stealing fuel. The government has been
unable to effectively deploy security forces behind the ANA
to stabilize districts like Sangin. Those deployed have
largely been untrained and ill-disciplined.

Political
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6. (C) Early in the year, Governor Wafa's outreach to tribal
leaders flagged as he declared support for military
operations a prerequisite for drawing leaders into the
government's orbit. However, with the launch of operations
in Sangin and Nahri Sarraj, Wafa's engagement and enthusiasm
increased. He has since attended shuras in both districts
(with ISAF/IROA protection and just days after operations
ended) and engaged elders in Lashkar Gah. To date, however,
he can boast no success in bringing tribal leaders firmly
onto the government's side, though he has reintroduced a
government presence to Sangin by appointing an interim
District Governor and Police Chief.


7. (C) In developing local government capacity, Wafa remains
a largely obstructionist force as he hoards power and
distrusts attempts to empower others. The Governor disdains
most other provincial officials and greets Kabul visitors
with skepticism and scant support. The Provincial Council
(PC) continues to limp along, with claims of regular contacts
with constituents but little supporting evidence.
Nevertheless, there has been some progress. With PRT
facilitation, the local government established a Civil
Service Training Center, greatly needed in a province with
limited human resources. The Provincial Development Council
(PDC) now meets regularly, and members are making small moves
toward embracing a collective view of development, rather
than guarding narrow interests. The PRT effectively runs the
PDC, as currently there is no secretariat.

Economy, Reconstruction and Development
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8. (C) Insecurity continues to prevent significant progress
on R&D and alternative livelihoods (AL). Violent incidents
involving those working on R&D/AL, including the murder of a
local contractor at a project site and the kidnapping of an
NGO's local engineer, remain a worry, although motives may be
criminality and not Taliban intimidation. Polls show that
concern over R&D is on the rise among Afghans in the central
districts. Travel restrictions on PRT official civilian
staff mean that projects outside Lashkar Gah cannot be
directly monitored without military support. The security
environment in Nahri Sarraj and Sangin has slowed progress on
the Kajaki project, described by Governor Wafa as the most
important project in Helmand.


9. (C) Despite the insecurity, several R&D/AL, projects saw
progress this year. Examples of projects launched include
USAID's contract farming, with over 250 farmers contracted to
grow chili peppers, and the UK's projects on road
construction, well sinking, and micro-finance. In addition,
the government privatized marble and carpentry factories in
Lashkar Gah, which could create dozens of new jobs in the
coming months. (COMMENT: The privatization might be little
more than a money laundering operation, given the strong
narco-links attributed to at least one investor. END COMMENT)
Despite security concerns and intimidation of local workers,
R&D/AL projects are also proceeding in Nahri Sarraj and
Sangin.

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Cultural/Social
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10. (SBU) The insecure environment continues to work great
hardship on the education sector. Even in the central
districts, regular school attendance decreased during the
first half of the year. Nad Ali district had only two
schools operating. The education director reported that the
number of schools closing in Helmand increased, resulting in
an influx of students to Lashkar Gah. Also, Afghans in the
central districts reported a drop in access to medical care.


Counter-Narcotics (CN)
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11. (C) There is little evidence that CN efforts have
introduced risk into Helmand's poppy trade, and the 2007
poppy cultivation statistics will far exceed last year's
record levels in the province. The UN Office of Drug Control
has estimated that approximately 90 percent of the arable
land used for agriculture was devoted to poppy cultivation.
In a PEP survey of 124 farmers whose fields were eradicated
earlier this year, all declared the campaign "unfair" and all
intend to plant poppy next year. Government justice sector
officials in Helmand bemoan the high level of corruption in
the last eradication campaign, particularly at the district
level. Nevertheless, there was progress. The CN Police
displayed an enhanced capacity to undertake interdiction
operations, executing raids on bazaars and heroin
laboratories and impounding opium, heroin and chemicals used
in production. However, the lack of arrests associated with
those raids indicates that those efforts may have been
compromised.

Comment
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12. (C) There has been identifiable -- though at times quite
limited -- progress in all PRT lines of operation. Military
operations in the north have had a significant impact on the
Taliban, permitted the government to attempt to reassert its
influence, and provided opportunities to win local consent
through reconstruction. While consolidation of gains
achieved there has been an elusive goal, the government and
ISAF could see momentum build in their efforts on governance
and R&D/AL. There is a nevertheless a risk that directing
resources to extend security, development, and the
government's reach in the north might lead to Taliban
infiltration and deteriorating security in the center.
Diminished attention to the center could erode confidence in
the government and undermine efforts elsewhere. Compounding
this would be continued difficulty in introducing risk into
the opium trade. Stepped up police recruitment and training
could help bring stability to the north while maintaining
security in the center.

WOOD