PRT KANDAHAR: SIX MONTH ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002379 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC PASS FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF ECON EAID CA SUBJECT: PRT KANDAHAR: SIX MONTH ASSESSMENT REF: A. KABUL 0307 ¶B. KABUL 1031 ¶C. KABUL 1691 ¶D. KABUL 1964 Classified By: PolCouns Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IROA) are taking steps to improve security, governance, and the economy in Kandahar Province, but it remains a struggle. ISAF forces are taking the fight to districts north of Kandahar City. The Taliban are responding with IED strikes and ambushes against soft targets, especially Afghan National Police (ANP) units. The Taliban have also successfully attacked remote district centers and are intimidating people inclined to support the GOA. The weakness of the police is undermining the effectiveness of ISAF and IROA efforts to improve security. Corruption by police and government officials is having a corrosive impact on government credibility while boosting that of the Taliban. Governor Khalid returned following a month-long absence and engaged immediately in the security efforts. He has voiced concern that civilian casualties will provoke a demonstration in Kandahar city that could spin out of control. Reconstruction assistance is having a positive but short-term impact on the provincial economy. Education and health services are increasing in Kandahar City but diminishing in the districts with heavy Taliban presence. END SUMMARY SECURITY -------------- ¶2. (C) The year opened with ISAF success in getting villagers internally displaced by Operation Medusa to return, particularly to Panjwayi. Security incidents were quite low through the poppy harvest in March. ISAF forces initiated operations in northern Kandahar in May, expanding the battle space beyond the districts of Panjwayi and Zharey. More robust ISAF and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces, together with special operations forces, are now taking the fight to the Taliban in Khakrez and Shah Wali Kot and interdicting key insurgent lines of communications. Coalition forces successfully degraded Taliban command and control in Kandahar and Helmand, especially with the killing of Mullah Dadullah Lang in mid-May. Hundreds of insurgents have been killed in the province in recent months. ¶3. (C) Despite ISAF successes, insurgents have increased their presence in many districts. The Taliban seek to stretch ISAF forces and threaten Kandahar city from multiple directions. They have also intensified the use of IED and ambush tactics, though these are increasingly aimed at soft targets, especially ANP units. In the first half of 2007, 16 Canadian soldiers lost their lives, and over 200 ANP personnel have been killed. An additional six Canadian soldiers were killed in an IED strike in Panjwayi on July 4. Throughout the battle space, insurgents have employed a variety of methods to intimidate the population: night letters, posters, beatings, assassinations and beheadings. Targets have included shura members, teachers, judges, prosecutors, police officials, local employees of ISAF, truckers and others believed to be somehow supporting IROA efforts. Repeated abandonment of Ghorak and Mianshin district centers by unsupported ANP garrisons in the face of Taliban attacks or threats has reduced government credibility and required ANA and ISAF intervention to regain control. ¶4. (C) The provincial police force is very weak, poorly controlled, and virtually unsupported by ISAF and/or coalition forces. Whereas every ANA Kandak has an Embedded Training Team (ETT) or Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) assigned, the ANP has no such support. There are KABUL 00002379 002 OF 004 approximately 5,000 coalition forces supporting approximately 29,000 assigned ANA. However, there are less than 1,000 coalition forces and CIVPOL supporting or mentoring approximately 70,000 ANP. It has also become clear that many of those signed up for Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) duty were only enrolled in the training to allow higher level officials to collect salaries. Governor Asadullah Khalid has estimated that there are 650 (out of 2,000) such "ghost" ANAP soldiers. ¶5. (C) Police work in the province is high risk and low reward -- USD 70 per month (the MOI also has a budget to provide "martyr pay" and monies have been delivered to the provinces). Police also lack adequate weaponry, ammunition, communications equipment, and vehicles. While acknowledging there is some leakage of ammunition, provincial ANSF leaders have highlighted the failure to equip the ANP adequately for its task. Former provincial Chief of Police Alizai estimated a casualty rate of 27-1 ANP to ANA in the province during his nine-month tenure. ANP status is characterized by a high rate of desertion and low morale. He described the Afghan Standby Police (ASP) unit as an "enemy-maker, full of thieves that would not be allowed to fight on the Taliban side." Regrettably, criminal behavior is not limited to a single unit, and many ANP checkpoints are used opportunistically to supplement the low pay. ¶6. (C) Following a month-long absence, which included a trip to Dubai for heart surgery, Governor Khalid returned to the province on June 17. His arrival was concurrent with the transfer of Chief of Police Alizai as well as other ANSF personnel changes. Khalid had been working for months to move Alizai, despite his claims that someone else had succeeded in overcoming Canadian and U.S. opposition to the change. In early April, the Governor opposed an MOI list of new district-level police chiefs, which had been drawn up with input from Alizai. Khalid wanted changes in the key districts along the two major highways. ¶7. (C) Since his return, he has stated that he will work directly with President Karzai to make any necessary personnel changes at the district level. One such change was the reinstatement of the controversial Colonel Akka as Chief of Police of Zharey. The new Kandahar ANP Chief, Colonel Sayeed Agha Saqib, served in 2005 as commander of the ASP Third Battalion, when it was banished from Kandahar to Farah because of criminal behavior. Saqib did the Governor's bidding by announcing, on one of his first days on the job, that the only initial changes to district Chiefs of Police would be in Spin Boldak, Tahktapol, and Maywand -- where the incumbents were appointed by Alizai in an effort to curb narcotics smuggling. If Saqib is indeed a compliant Chief of Police, it will reinforce the Governor's tendency to focus on security at the cost of governance and development issues. POLITICAL -------------- ¶8. (C) Corruption and institutional weakness within the ANP and provincial and district-level governments have a corrosive impact on popular support for the IROA, particularly in the more remote districts where evidence of positive IROA actions is scarcer. Civil service reform rollout has been slow in the province and there has been anecdotal evidence of purchased appointments continuing within ministries. ¶9. (C) Beyond the petty corruption of police at checkpoints, there are strong indications that some district leaders and Chiefs of Police are engaged in supporting the trafficking of narcotics. These same officials have extracted bribes from farmers to keep them off the list of fields to be targeted under the governor-led eradication program. Often these officials are perceived to be working for one of the larger power brokers in the province, such as Ahmad Wali Karzai, Chairman of the Provincial Council, or Arif Khan Noorzai, Deputy Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga. There are also strong KABUL 00002379 003 OF 004 indications that Afghan Border Police Colonel Abdul Raziq, who controls the province's entire border with Pakistan, controls large-scale narcotics trafficking. District-level appointments are often made without sufficient consideration of tribal dynamics, which can exacerbate long-standing conflict. Taliban forces are easily able to maneuver in these conditions to pose as defenders of the poor farmer or the disenfranchised tribe. ¶10. (C) In addition, the Taliban intimidation campaign and success in recent weeks in repeatedly forcing ANP detachments to abandon the peripheral district centers of Ghorak and Mianshin have weakened popular perceptions that ISAF and the IROA are winning the military campaign. A number of elders in both Panjwayi and Zharey have indicated that they do not presently want to meet with IROA or ISAF for fear of Taliban reprisals. Elders also fear that the Taliban will attack ISAF forces in their villages and the inhabitants will be killed through ISAF bombardment. Governor Khalid has argued strenuously in recent months that Special Operations Forces tactics used in searching compounds and increased civilian casualties -- whether through mistakes, attacks on ISAF convoys, or direct military actions -- are generating hostility in the population. The Governor fears that such an incident in Kandahar would quickly result in a demonstration that could rapidly spin out of control, undermining IROA influence in the city. ECONOMIC/RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) ISAF regained the initiative in Panjwayi and Zharey in early 2007 through operations combining military action with political engagement and reconstruction assistance. Tens of millions of U.S. dollars have been committed in the two districts on humanitarian assistance and small-scale reconstruction and development activities conducted through the PRT Commander's Contingency Fund, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),USAID, and the IROA. ¶12. (SBU) In the aftermath of Operation Medusa, USAID reprogrammed a total of $27.5 million of new assistance to Kandahar with a focus on Panjwayi and Zharey districts. As of mid-June, just over 20 percent of the funding had been disbursed. This includes livestock feed benefiting some 7,000 farmers and 16 National Area Based Development Program activities for over 24,000 households in Panjwayi and Maiwand districts. ¶13. (SBU) This assistance, especially in Panjwayi, has been helpful in getting the population resettled and irrigation water flowing to most of the district. However, road construction has altered water flows in some areas and generated anger from affected farmers. Minister Zia (Rural Rehabilitation and Development) made many trips to Kandahar and highlighted the IROA's role in completing hundreds of reconstruction projects in the province. The National Solidarity Program, which is now expanding in scope to cover the whole province, kicked off successfully in Khakrez and Spin Boldak. The District Development Assemblies (DDAs) under the National Area Based Development Program are up and running in all districts, and efforts are underway to provide another round of funding and improve performance. The International Organization for Migration (IOM),which administers the Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) for USAID, began monetary payments in late June to people in Panjwayi whose homes were destroyed during operation Medusa. A total of $4.5 million has been allocated for shelter reconstruction involving an estimated 1,200 households. ¶14. (SBU) Development aid continues to benefit the economy by generating jobs and circulating cash while improving access to drinking water, irrigation, and infrastructure. Much of the impact is relatively short-term. Thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are landless and lack regular KABUL 00002379 004 OF 004 employment. Industrial activity, heavily dependent on electricity, remains flat at a low level of production. Banks are cash rich, but relatively little new business lending or other forms of investment are occurring. The processing of agricultural production remains limited as is the marketing of grapes, pomegranates and other fruit products beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. Extremely unusual heavy rains in late June damaged hundreds of houses as well as crops. The grape harvest, which had looked quite promising, will be cut by as much as half. Using CIDA grants, UN agencies were able to respond with emergency aid for 400 families in the Kandahar city area. The Provincial Council asked for additional aid from KPRT and UN agencies on July 3. SOCIAL -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Education and health services are expanding in Kandahar City and the more stable districts around it. However, even in Kandahar City, many children, both male and female, do not attend school. This development is particularly strong in the newer northern portion of the city known as Loya Wala where many inhabitants have come from outside districts. A significant number of school-aged male children end up in the labor force. Peripheral districts, particularly those with high Taliban activity levels, are characterized by low and declining education and health service levels. In districts such as Maruf and Arghistan, no IROA schools are operational. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) The Taliban have been shaken but not defeated by the damage to their command and control through strikes against key field commanders. The insurgents are trying to avoid direct battle with ISAF units except in favorable terrain and will continue to wage asymmetrical warfare against ISAF targets. More must be done to reduce civilian casualties and minimize the cultural offensiveness of compound search techniques. ISAF and the IROA must improve the performance of the police and the integrity of officials who are the face of the government in the districts. We must also find more effective methods of reducing poppy cultivation. The security situation will improve if and when the IROA lifts its performance in the districts and reconstruction begins to yield growth in the economy. Canada and the U.S. are already taking steps: intensification of the focus on training and mentoring of ANA and ANP units; raising assistance to improve rule of law and governance; adding civilian capacity to KPRT; increasing development assistance with a focus on the components of economic growth; and improving the organization and administration of the border crossing at Spin Boldak as well as the infrastructure within Kandahar city. WOOD