UNHCR VIEWS ON AGHANISTAN, IRANIAN DEPORTEES AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002324 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, PRM/ANE STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL AF IR PK SUBJECT: UNHCR VIEWS ON AGHANISTAN, IRANIAN DEPORTEES AND REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: In a July 5 meeting, Ambassador and UNHCR Country Representative Salvatore Lombardo discussed a wide range of issues. Chief among these were the politicization of the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan, Afghan deportees from Iran and concerns regarding President Karzai,s forthcoming selection of a new Minister for Refugees and Repatriation. END SUMMARY - -------------- Afghan Refugees in Pakistan -------------- ¶2. (C) Lombardo noted that, while repatriations of Afghan refugees were proceeding, GOP/GOA "politicization8 of the refugee issue and, particularly, the camp closings was souring the bilateral dialogue. Afghan refusal to acknowledge their lack of capacity to absorb large numbers of returns, coupled with unreasonable Pakistani return targets and the GOP,s broad brush characterization of the refugees and the camps as &security threats,8 made for a difficult working environment. Both sides, he suggested, need to reduce their rhetoric and set reasonable expectations if progress is to be achieved. Returns are going to continue to be slow. Most of the Afghans remaining in Pakistan have been there for many years and, given security and economic conditions in Afghanistan, are unlikely to return anytime soon, even with the camp closings. (NOTE: In Kachigari, the first and, to date, the only one of the four designated camps near to closing, 30,000 of the camp,s 54,000 residents have &self-relocated8 ) disappeared into the Pakistani population. END NOTE). - -------------- Deportations of Afghans from Iran -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked if there was, perhaps, more than one factor driving Iran's decision to expel undocumented Afghan workers. Lombardo,s answer was an emphatic &yes.8 First, Iran,s economy, especially in the border regions, but even in Tehran, is dependent upon cheap Afghan labor. This is not new. Iran has struggled with this problem for years. There were 400,000 deportations of illegal Afghans from Iran in 2006. Lombardo noted the degree to which the economies of a number of Afghan provinces are absolutely dependent upon the remittances, via the informal &Hawala8 system. He suggested that this traditional symbiosis was being undermined by domestic Iranian political concerns, Iran,s sputtering economy and, especially, by Afghan association with the drug trade, a growing problem in Iran and a source of much public concern. These factors have come together to make the deportation of Afghan &illegals8 a popular policy for the beleaguered Amedinejad regime. Lombardo also mentioned growing Iranian concern about incidents of political violence in Sistan Va Baluchestan province, which adjoins the Afghan province of Nimrooz and Pakistan,s Baluchistan. ¶4. (U) The UNHCR Rep observed that Iran has been more practical and responsible than Pakistan in dealing with their 920,000 Afghan refugees. He pointed out that, among the 140,000 plus deportees since April 21, there have been only 20 cases involving individuals holding valid Amayesh II cards, currently valid Afghan refugees. Iran has even proposed offering as many as 30,000 renewable working visas to refugees who return their families to Afghanistan but wish to return to Iran to work. ¶5. (C) Lombardo reported that UNHCR has urged the GOA to create a bilateral channel with the Iranians to seek a solution amenable to both governments. He noted that the number of deportees has declined in the recent weeks including noticeably fewer families. He expressed concern, however, that recent charges by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) of extensive human rights violations by Iranian authorities during the deportations may provoke the GOI. These charges are, at best, anecdotal. Lombardo indicated that he had recently told Afghanistan,s Second Vice President Mohammad Karim Khalili that such unsubstantiated charges could only make matters worse. Khalili, he thought, took the point. - -------------- New Minister for Refugee Affairs KABUL 00002324 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) Lombardo observed that, depite weaknesses within the Ministry, UNHCR had a very good working relationship with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MORR). He noted, however, that there was a &sad lack of capacity8 within the GOA to deal with refugee issues. Lombardo suggested that, in terms of effectiveness, the MORR had been consistently unfortunate in the selection of ministers and observed that the current minister ) recently ousted by the Parliament but still &acting8 ) had been a particularly weak choice. ¶7. (C) For this reason, Lombardo felt that it is imperative that Karzai select a competent manager with strong ties to the Palace. He emphasized that it should not be a regional/ethnic choice but a political "player8 with national credibility. Lombardo confided that one of the names on the President,s "short list8 is Rahmatullah Nabil, Director of Security at the Palace. UNHCR thinks highly of him ) he,s a former UNHCR employee - and has been quietly lobbying on his behalf. However, Lombardo noted that he feared the President might be reluctant to release Nabil from his present position. The Ambassador agreed and urged that UNHCR identify a second choice to avoid an all or nothing situation. The UNHCR Rep agreed and promised to share names with the Embassy as soon as possible. WOOD