OSCE INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002250 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC PASS FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC MARR AF OSCE ECON EAID SUBJECT: OSCE INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN Classified By: A/DCM Carol Rodley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambant briefed Ambassador July 2 on OSCE's interest in forging a partnership with Afghanistan. OSCE plans to take a step-by-step approach to Afghanistan, beginning in limited, specific areas. It is looking at a possible border management project in the northeast. The Ambassador welcomed OSCE interest, noting its value to Afghanistan could extend beyond police training and border management to regional economic integration. He cautioned against half-hearted, poorly planned adventures. OSCE could play a useful role in many areas, but getting it right in terms of planning, support, and logistics would be crucial. The Ambassador suggested OSCE observership in the September 12 JCMB meeting in Kabul as a starting point. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) During OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambant's July 2 call on Ambassador Wood, he explained that, at GOA request, OSCE will be looking at a border project in the northeast to be supported by the OSCE office in Tajikistan. OSCE will not have a permanent presence in Afghanistan. The Secretary General indicated he needs the Spanish Chair to sell it to the membership. He said he used his meeting with President Karzai to encourage him address the OSCE during a future trip to Europe. He cautioned that, beyond this initial step, OSCE involvement in Afghanistan was uncertain as the EU was already doing work in Afghanistan, through the EU police training program which de Brichambant characterized as "confused." The OSCE would work closely with the Norwegians in Afghanistan but also wanted to work with the U.S. and plug into supplemental funding from the U.S. Only the U.S. can put the OSCE in the league for middle-sized projects, he stressed. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador encouraged OSCE to look beyond police training and border management projects. He highlighted economic issues -- specifically assisting Afghanistan serve as a Central Asian land bridge -- as also deserving attention. The Ambassador cautioned against half-hearted and poorly planned adventures. He described the EU's police training program which had made no preparations to house itself or set up communications. The EU was working out of its headquarters rather than in the field. It was unclear how the program was going to be a net gain. Coherence was not just an Afghan problem, but an international community one as well. There were many useful roles the OSCE could play since Afghanistan needed everything, but getting it right in terms of planning, support, and logistics would be crucial. The Ambassador stressed the U.S. will continue to be in Afghanistan in a big way. If the OSCE wanted to be a player, it would need to prepare and think about the whole package. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the JCMB had a natural connection to OSCE issues. He suggested that the OSCE send observers to a JCMB meeting, beginning with the September 12 meeting in Kabul, which will have a regional economic focus. The Secretary General agreed. He recognized that there would be a learning curve and that the OSCE did not need to be too ambitious. The Secretary General noted it would be important to link up with other key players. For example, UNAMA had items on the table that they did not know how to address. This includes election preparations. OSCE has experience in this area, he stressed, but the issue appeared to be highly politicized. The Secretary General reiterated that OSCE's approach would be pragmatic, concrete, and step-by-step. U.S. encouragement would be needed as well as U.S. funding, he said. WOOD