PRT GHAZNI: SECURITY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002244 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82 POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF SUBJECT: PRT GHAZNI: SECURITY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ghazni province is split between the "have's" (Hazara districts in the north/west) and the "have-not's" (Pashtun districts in the south/east). In April 2007 a serious insurgent threat in the Pashtun districts brought reconstruction to a standstill in both areas, heightening anxieties that progress in governance, education and health care would similarly grind to a halt. Governor Patan, well-intentioned and pro-American, often seems overwhelmed by the challenge of governing such a diverse province. He is reluctant to travel except in the company of the PRT, leading to a widespread belief that he is out-of-touch with the local population. Accusations of corruption in the provincial government are troubling and damaging. END SUMMARY. Provincial Overview -------------- ¶2. (U) There are 18 districts plus the city of Ghazni in the province. The population is estimated at 1.7 million people, with 250,000 in Ghazni city. The Ring Road bisects the province. West of the Ring Road is predominantly Hazara and water-rich; east of the Ring Road is ethnically Pashtun and arid. The Hazara districts of Jaghuri and Kwaja Omari are generally more peaceful and prosperous, with active district administrators and large school enrollments (boys and girls). The Pashtun districts of Andar, Giro, Qarabagh, Moqur, Gelan and Ab Band are volatile, with absentee administrators, subsistence farmers and few children (and no girls) in school. Security Situation -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Following the reported capture of Giro district by the Taliban in April 2007 and in order to address a potent insurgent threat across the Pashtun districts of Ghazni, the ANA (supported by the ANP and ISAF) planned and executed Operation MAIWAND - the first ANA-led military operation in the country. This operation, which began June 2 and was centered on Andar district, was designed to separate the insurgents from the local population, regain control of Highway 1, and create space for GOA officials to offer an alternative to the Taliban. Throughout the month of June, there was little direct contact between the ANA/ANP/ISAF coalition and the insurgents, although there was a sharp increase in rocket attacks and IEDs. Several key Taliban commanders were captured, including the man believed responsible for beheading the district administrator of Giro in April. While Andar will now have a chance to experience GOA assistance, it is widely believed that the insurgents have simply moved to neighboring districts (Giro, Waghez, Ab Band and Nawa)until the ANA and the ANP have given up. An important piece of Operation MAIWAND, therefore, is the establishment of a reinforced ANA and ANP presence in Ghazni. ¶4. (SBU) The insurgent threat was able to grow in Ghazni as a result of a lack of GOA presence in key districts, and especially by the lack of effective police. The most urgent and most crucial requirement to improving security in Ghazni is an honest, effective police force. The Chief of Police gets low marks from ISAF. Ghazni has had few problems recruiting for the auxiliary police (of the 980 authorized, approximately 700 have been trained),but quality has been an issue, as has equipment. The Chief of Police has allegedly taken away weapons (AKs) meant for the ANAP and vehicles are "missing" from the inventory. The ANP office in charge of recruiting recently reported multiple cases of men re-enrolling in the ANAP (having either sold or stockpiled the weapon from the first class they attended). ANP/ANAP escorts provided to the PRT for trips outside the city KABUL 00002244 002 OF 003 regularly show up at the PRT for the mission without ammo, without food and without enough diesel to get to the destination and back. Political Situation -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Governor Patan, while well-intentioned and pro-American, has a hard time setting priorities and plans. He has surrounded himself with "advisors" who have no official status in the province, and for the most part, are not natives of Ghazni. Patan cannot resist dabbling in security matters (in part because he distrusts the Chief of Police, and in part because he likes to portray himself as a militant opponent of the Taliban). Patan also cannot resist introducing potential contractors to the PRT -- whom we later learn are close relatives. This practice calls into question Patan's much-touted incorruptibility. ¶6. (SBU) Line directors for the various ministries are rarely included in the Governor's deliberations (the Director of Education - a superior performer - is a notable exception). The Director of Agriculture is under investigation by the Attorney General for pocketing 200,000 USD of the PRT's money. Patan's unofficial inner circle and the exclusion of ministry representatives in the province from decision-making have isolated Patan from the people he claims to govern. ¶7. (SBU) At the district level, Ghazni employs (at most) four effective district administrators. For the rest of the province (14 districts),administrators are either absent altogether (Ab Band and Nawa) or corrupt (Andar and Qarabagh). A recent reshuffling of district administrators in several Pashtun districts may lead to some improvements. ¶8. (SBU) Governor Patan, who loudly promotes his love of "the people" and his willingness to confront things, will only travel outside Ghazni City with ISAF, and he prefers to travel by helicopter. Provincial Council members, for the most part, do not leave the capital city and are largely unknown in their districts. The same is true of line directors. The PRT has made a point of inviting members of the provincial government to travel with them and to urge them to travel on their own to keep in touch with the districts. This remains the exception rather than the rule. Economic Situation -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Across Ghazni, the demands for infrastructure development are consistent - water and roads. In terms of capacity building, Ghazni residents want teachers and doctors. ¶10. (SBU) The Provincial Development Council (PDC) meets monthly, but has not developed a Provincial Development Plan (PDP) and, despite the PRT's best efforts, is not focused on the upcoming ANDS sub- national consultations (scheduled in Ghazni for the last two weeks of July). The provincial director for MRRD is believed to be corrupt, and is at best incompetent. He could not tell the PRT how many projects MRRD was running or the dollar amount of funds committed last year. His own list of demands starts with a new office building for himself, and fails to mention the urgently needed refurbishment of the two largest irrigation canals in the province. Cultural/Societal Trends -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Ghazni residents of the more peaceful districts list education and health care as priorities. While schools are open in many parts of Ghazni, there is often no money to pay the teachers, KABUL 00002244 003 OF 003 no books and no desks. In some districts (such as Kwaja Omari) locals donate land for tent schools and supplement teachers' pay. Whereas in Kwaja Omari the teachers also provide some adult literacy classes, in the Pashtun district of Nawa (at the opposite end of the province in every respect),no one is in school because there are no teachers at all. In the Hazara areas, most girls attend school, up to and including high school. In Pashtun areas, security concerns are cited as the reason for keeping girls out of school, but in fact, the priority in these areas is to educate only the boys. ¶12. (SBU) The Director for the Ministry of Health has estimated that at least half of the men in Ghazni suffer from anxiety and half of the women from depression. Children, widely, suffer from malnutrition, something the Health Ministry and the PRT are working actively to address. Most districts have clinics; the principal problem appears to be the lack of staff, especially female doctors, and medical supplies. WOOD