PRT BAMYAN: POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS IN BAMYAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002191 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2017 TAGS: MCAP PGOV MOPS PREL PTER PHUM AF SUBJECT: PRT BAMYAN: POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS IN BAMYAN Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Carol Rodley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a June 21 meeting, Chief of the National Directorate for Security's Bamyan office MG Wasiq described the overall security situation in Bamyan as positive but also spoke of recent intelligence indicating a Taliban plot to attack targets in Bamyan. Wasiq said that while Bamyan remains peaceful, it can't be considered in isolation from problems in other provinces of Afghanistan. Wasiq said the province is used as a transit route for drug couriers, and underlined the importance of the PRT's military presence as back up for the NDS and ANP. End Summary. -------------- -------------- NDS Sources: Taliban Plan to Attack Bamyan Targets -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a lengthy meeting with PRT officer on June 21, Major General Sayed Zahir Wasiq, the NDS chief for Bamyan province, reviewed the current security situation in Bamyan. Wasiq said NDS had obtained information from two sources on Taliban plans to launch attacks against targets in Bamyan. According to the source, the Taliban has invested $60,000 in the plan. Likely targets include provincial governor Habiba Sarabi, foreign NGOs operating in Bamyan, and the PRT. ¶3. (C) According to Wasiq, sources told NDS that the principal organizer of this plan is Mullah Burhan, the Bamyan military commander during the Taliban regime. Mullah Burhan is from Ghandak, in the Shibar district in Bamyan, but is now living in Pakistan. Wasiq shared that the NDS has a plan in place to respond to the threat, and will provide additional protection for Governor Sarabi. (Note: PRT intelligence officer used a follow-up meeting with Wasiq and his chief of staff to discuss a coordinated response involving NDS, the ANP, and PRT Bamyan. End note.) -------------- Extent of Weapons Smuggling Not Known -------------- ¶3. (C) Wasiq shared that there have been reports from time to time of weapons being transported through Bamyan province, but asserted it is very difficult to detect weapons smugglers, and thus to get a good sense of the extent of the problem. Checkpoints can be set up on roads, but it is not possible to monitor the footpaths and donkey paths used by smugglers. ¶4. (C) Note: In recent months, PRT Bamyan has implemented a more aggressive plan of setting up vehicle checkpoints in conjunction with ANP in the Kahmard district in the northeastern part of the province. Kahmard's population is mostly Tajik and less supportive of the central and provincial governments than the population in other areas of Bamyan. Wasiq expressed doubts about their effectiveness, but said checkpoints should be continued. -------------- Transit Route for Opium -------------- ¶5. (C) Wasiq said that while Bamyan province is "99.5% free" of poppy cultivation and there is little drug use in Bamyan, the transport of opium through the province is an issue. The main route runs north-south from Sari Pul and Samangan provinces, through Bamyan, to Dai Kundi KABUL 00002191 002 OF 002 and Wardak provinces. From Dai Kundi and Wardak, Wasiq said, the opium moves into main transit routes to Iran, Pakistan and Russia. Wasiq said that the movement of opium through Bamyan is controlled by: the Taliban, warlords, and criminal gangs. ¶6. (C) There have been few seizures of narcotics in Bamyan. The most recent seizure occurred on June 16, in Yakawlang district in western Bamyan. In a joint NDS/ANP operation, a 50 kilogram opium shipment being carried on a truck was seized while the truck was parked in the Yakawlang bazaar. The truck driver was arrested, but the person believed to have organized the shipment was in a separate vehicle and escaped. The driver is from Ghazni province, and the person who organized the shipment is from Laghman province. The drugs were being transported to Ghor province. -------------- PRT Military Presence Still Needed -------------- ¶7. (C) Wasiq was asked about the progress being made by the ANP and NDS in Bamyan and invited to comment on the role of the PRT. He said that at the present time, the ANP and NDS are not yet capable of maintaining security in Bamyan without backup from the PRT's military force. (Wasiq highlighted the usefulness of PRTs very visual patrols in the province.) He cited the Ambassador's recent visit to Bamyan; while the ANP and NDS played supporting roles in providing security for the visit, an adequate level of security could not have been provided without the PRT. ¶8. (C) Information reported in this cable should not be considered separate confirmation of other NDS information. WOOD