Afghanistan Energy: Revisiting NEPS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 002070 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/A, SCA/FO (A/S BOUCHER, GASTRIGHT, DEUTSCH) STATE PASS USTDA FOR DSTEIN/SGREENIP STATE PASS OPIC, USAID OPIC FOR MOSBACHER/ZAHNISER/STEELE MANILA PLEASE PASS ADB/USED NSC FOR AHARRIMAN USAID FOR JKUNDER, MWARD TREASURY FOR ABAUKOL OSD FOR SHINN, SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICENT SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG ECON EPET ETRD KPWR EAID PGOV AF SUBJECT: Afghanistan Energy: Revisiting NEPS Ref: A) Kabul 1583/1206/1033/936/935/692 B) Kabul 317/274/162 C) 06 Kabul 5353 and previous ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The North East Power System (NEPS) is at the center of the GOA strategy to provide affordable and reliable electricity to the Afghan people, a high economic and political priority for the GOA and the donor community. NEPS transmission lines were designed to import 300MW of power from each of Afghanistan's three northern neighbors and to be supplemented by some domestic generations. During the last few months some of the assumptions underlying NEPS have changed. There may be less than expected electricity imports from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the timeline could be delayed beyond the end-2008 target date for completion of NEPS. Turkmenistan says it has more electricity to export but wants to transmit it over a line not compatible with NEPS. This has raised some routing and financing questions and reopened some decisions, which could delay electricity imports from Turkmenistan as well as increase the cost of construction of the transmission line. The backbone transmission line from north central Afghanistan to Kabul has capacity to carry less power than originally expected. Completion of the Sheberghan power plant has been pushed back to 2010 due to delays in gas field development and because we had to move funds to purchase generators for Kabul. With the likelihood of delays in some pieces of NEPS, the USG decision this year to go ahead with 100MW of generation capacity in Kabul appears to be even more justified and prescient. ¶2. (SBU) These shifting NEPS assumptions do not endanger the project. It remains a multi-donor, diversified power source flagship program designed to provide a major supply of power to Kabul and to communities along the way. We must, however, respond to some of these changes quickly and encourage donors to do so as well. The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy (ICE) has become a highly effective vehicle to identify these changes and respond to them by coordinating donor and GOA resources. Embassy believes that the sixth meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board in Kabul in September 2007 presents an excellent opportunity for GOA to increase awareness among donor representatives about the inherent uncertainty of NEPS, to alert them to slippage in some of the NEPS timelines, to mobilize support for a renewed momentum on NEPS, and to seek donor assistance to fill some of the funding gaps in NEPS. The third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference in Islamabad (dates TBD) and the CASA100 conference in Kabul this September offer other opportunities for NEPS discussions. Embassy Kabul appreciates the support for NEPS provided by Embassies Dunshanbe, Tashkent, Ashgabat and Delhi and the SARI/E and REMAP programs. Given the somewhat opaque operating environment, we are working NEPS with imperfect information. Your continued reporting and assistance is very valuable to us. End Summary. Energy: A High Priority For Afghans -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Electricity is one of the most politically sensitive issues in Afghanistan (reftels). Surveys show that Afghans view electricity as one of their highest priorities. Only about 10 percent of the population has access to public power. Even more disquieting is that the supply of electricity in the country has not improved during the last five years, raising serious political fall-out for the GOA as well as the USG and the international community. President Karzai and other GOA leaders have singled out support for the power sector as one of the most pressing needs of the country. To address these political and economic imperatives, we are working with the GOA and the donor community to build a sustainable network that delivers affordable and reliable electricity to Afghans. Such a network would also advance Afghan economic growth, prosperity and stability, high priority strategic USG objectives in Afghanistan. NEPS: Shifting Assumptions -------------- KABUL 00002070 002 OF 007 ¶4. (SBU) The multi-donor North East Power System (NEPS) project is at the core of our power sector strategy for Afghanistan. Together with the smaller USG-funded South East Power System (SEPS) project, NEPS would provide access to electricity in areas covering about 60 percent of Afghanistan's population. During the last four months some of the assumptions underlying NEPS have changed (see paras 9-22). It does not mean that NEPS is endangered. It remains a multi-donor, diversified power source flagship program designed to provide a major supply of power to Kabul and to communities along the way. We must, however, respond to some of the shifting assumptions and encourage other donors to do so as well. We must also re-energize our NEPS efforts and continue to urge Afghans to establish a homogenous overall vision. As a result of the NEPS changes, there is likely to be slippage in the 2008-2009 target date for NEPS completion, although if we address selected issues, power can begin to flow by end-2008. With the likelihood of delays in some pieces of NEPS, the USG decision this year to go ahead with 100MW of generation capacity in Kabul appears to be even more justified and prescient. ICE: Highly Effective -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Inter-ministerial Committee on Energy (ICE), established by Presidential decree in November 2006 (ref B),has been a highly effective vehicle to respond to these changes. While still trying to find its organizational legs, ICE has already become a very productive coordinating body on energy issues both within the GOA and between the GOA and donors. Under Economy Minister Jalil Shams, ICE has also become an important player in providing high level policy direction in the energy sector. It is through the ICE-convened coordinating meetings that the GOA and donors as a group have been able to identify the some of the changes in NEPS assumptions and to deliberate on how best to respond to these changes. ICE has taken the lead role in mobilizing the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) and donors to systematically prioritize energy sector development projects, to identify funding and resource gaps and to seek funding alternatives. Opportunities to Reenergize NEPS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Embassy believes that the sixth meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB-VI) to be held in Kabul in September 2007 offers an excellent opportunity for the GOA to increase awareness among donor representatives about the inherent uncertainty of NEPS, to alert them to slippage in some of the NEPS timelines, to mobilize support for a renewed momentum on NEPS, and to seek donor assistance to fill some of the funding gaps in NEPS. Other targets of opportunity to push forward on NEPS with regional states and donors are the third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference in Islamabad (dates tbd) and the CASA1000 conference in Kabul September 5-6. ¶7. (U) Embassy Kabul appreciates the support for NEPS provided by Embassies Dunshanbe, Tashkent, Ashgabat and Delhi and the SARI/E and REMAP programs. Given the complexities of various pieces of NEPS and the somewhat opaque environment in some Central Asian states, we are working NEPS with imperfect information. Your continued reporting and assistance is very valuable to us. We suggest even more invigorated coordination and exchange between the Embassies and the SARI/E and ReMAP programs. Such coordination will allow us to deliver a consistent and synchronized message to the NEPS players and to influence their actions so that NEPS becomes a reality in a timely manner. In particular, we would appreciate any information on the availability of surplus power in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Original NEPS -------------- ¶8. (U) NEPS was conceived in 2003 as a cross-border project in KABUL 00002070 003 OF 007 which 220kv transmission lines would be built to import 300 MW of power each from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These cross-border arrangements would be locked in with power purchase agreements (PPA) drafted according to international best practices. The three lines would converge at Pul-e-Khumri in north central Afghanistan, from where another transmission line would be built over the Hindu Kush mountains and the Salang Pass to Kabul. NEPS would also be fed by a 100 MW thermal plant to be built by USAID at the Sheberghan gas field near Mazar-e-Sharif. Of the proposed 1000 MW thus flowing into NEPS by end-2008, 600 MW would be transmitted to Kabul and the adjoining areas, with 400 MW to be absorbed by communities along the transmission lines in northern Afghanistan. If other domestic sources of electricity were to be developed in the future, they could also be fed into NEPS. In this manner, NEPS was envisaged as a transmission backbone for a large part of the country. Tajikistan Connection: ADB -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is responsible for the 142km $35 million transmission line from the Tajik border to Pul-e-Khumri. The ADB is also responsible for construction of the line on the Tajik side of the border. Completion of the transmission line for Tajik power has been delayed and, when it is built, it is expected to carry less power than originally anticipated. A fundamental difficulty about the Tajik connection is uncertainty about the amount of surplus power available within Tajikistan. -- The line has been delayed beyond 2008 because power purchase agreement negotiations are taking longer than expected and ADB will not begin construction until a PPA is in place; -- Instead of the expected 300 MW to be imported year-around, the Tajiks are willing to only agree to 100 MW and only during 5-6 months in the summer; in their latest offer they are unwilling to make any commitments on firm supply or to lock in a price; ¶10. (SBU) Embassy recommends a multi-pronged effort to push the GOA, the Tajiks and the ADB as well as the World Bank (both of which are providing consultation advice to the Tajiks and the Afghans on the PPAs) to: -- conclude the PPA at the earliest so construction can begin on the transmission line; -- encourage the Tajiks to be more forward leaning on providing guarantees on supply and price; -- encourage the ADB, the GOA and the Tajiks to agree to begin construction on the line without a finalized PPA; and -- reinvigorate our USAID-funded consultation services for the PPA and technical aspects of the transmission links. Uzbekistan Connection: ADB -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The ADB is responsible for the 192km $55 million line from the Uzbek border to Pul-e-Khmuri. Construction of the line is on schedule for completion by end-2008. There are serious questions, however, about transmission capacity on the Uzbek side of the border which may both delay and severely limit power supply from Uzbekistan. Instead of the expected 300 MW, there may be no electricity supply into the NEPS network from Uzbekistan unless there is some investment soon in transmission capacity on the Uzbek side of the border. -- The GOA and the donor community recently learned that there is no 220kv connection line on the Uzbek side of the border to feed power to the 220kv line being built within Afghanistan by the ADB. The KABUL 00002070 004 OF 007 existing connection within Uzbekistan is a 110kv line which feeds 25 MW into a 110kv line to Mazar-e-Sharif. The 110kv connections are not part of the 220kv NEPS transmission system. -- In order to get any power from Uzbekistan, NEPS needs a 50km 220kv transmission line from the border to Surkhan within Uzbekistan. This new line would allow 150MW of power we believe is available at Surkhan to flow into NEPS. -- In order to get an additional 150MW (for a total of 300MW) at Surkhan, transmission connections will also have to be built from Surkhan to northern Uzbekistan; we do not know the detailed systems configurations for this connection. -- A recent ADB mission to Uzbekistan recommended that ADB consider assistance on transmission lines within Uzbekistan to enable import of electricity by Afghanistan. We understand, however, from ADB staff that its project approval procedures make it highly unlikely that either the line from the border to Surkhan or the one from Surkhan to northern Uzbekistan can be built before 2010. ¶12. (SBU) Embassy believes that our immediate aim should be to find a means to fund the 50km 220kv line from the border to Surkhan soQthat it can be completed before end-2008 and 150MW can begin to flow into NEPS. Without this line, we are unlikely to have any power in NEPS by end-2008 even though key pieces of NEPS -- Uzbek border to Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul -- will be completed by then. -- GOA Funding: The most promising option for the Surkhan-to-border line appears to be one where the GOA fronts the $20 million needed for this line to the Uzbeks as prepayment for the power they will import and the Uzbeks fast track construction of the line. In a May 27 ICE meeting, the GOA told donors that it had reached internal agreement on this approach. Energy and Water Minister Ismail Khan, Economy Minister Shams and Deputy Finance Minister Shahrani plan to visit Tashkent to make this offer to the Uzbeks. Embassy will press the GOA to make this visit at the earliest. -- Korea: We understand Korea has expressed some interest in providing assistance within Uzbekistan to support Afghan-related projects. If the GOA-funded, Uzbek-built proposal is not finalized soon, we should encourage the Koreans to assist with the Surkhan-to-border transmission line. For the Koreans, such a project would have multiple advantages: assistance to Uzbekistan, assistance to Afghanistan, and a seat at the high table by becoming stake-holders in NEPS, the flagship multi-donor energy program in Afghanistan. In any approach we make to the Koreans, we should underscore the urgency of this piece of the NEPS puzzle. -- ADB: We should encourage the ADB to work on a parallel track on funding the transmission lines beyond Surkhan to northern Uzbekistan so that up to 300 MW of electricity would be eventually available for import from Uzbekistan into NEPS. -- USG: Due to constrained Uzbek relations with the United States, the USG should remain in the background on the Uzbek-Afghan energy trade issue. We should, however, continue to provide consultant support to the GOA on the proposed PPA as well as the technical aspects of the transmission links. Turkmenistan Connection: USAID -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Under the original NEPS structure, USAID is responsible for the 267km $57 million transmission line from the Turkmenistan border to Sheberghan. Due to the ADB's decision in 2006 not to fund the Sheberghan-Mazar connection, this section was also added to USAID's program. The Turkmenistan connection appears to be the most bedeviling at this point because recent developments have reopened some fundamental decisions that had been made. It appears now that more than 300MW of power may be available from Turkmenistan but the transmission line from Turkmenistan will cost more and will be KABUL 00002070 005 OF 007 delayed beyond end-2008 because Afghan-Turkmen discussions on the technical aspects have not yielded results to date. ¶14. In a June 2007, Afghan Minister of Energy and Water Ismail Khan and the Turkmen Minister of Energy and Industry signed a "Protocol of Intention" under which: -- Turkmenistan is willing to supply electricity on a 500kv line (Note: We understand that 500kv is the standard the Turkmen now use for all new lines on their grid. NEPS standard is 220kv); -- each country would fund transmission lines within its territories from its own funds; -- Turkmenistan agreed to supply 300MW of power (Note: we have heard that the Turkmen privately told the Afghans that they could supply more.) -- the terms of the power trade would be defined by a PPA. ¶15. (SBU) Donors will receive a complete read-out of the GOA visit to Turkmenistan at the next ICE meeting scheduled for June 28. The connection to Turkmenistan presents the largest true construction problem. Turkmenistan's offer of more power on a 500kv line raises several questions and reopens some previous decisions: -- Who will fund the additional $30 million for a substation to step down the voltage from 500kv to 220kv? -- Given the opportunity to receive more power from Turkmenistan (to make up in part or in whole for less power from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan),is it more appropriate to build a larger capacity 500kv line within Afghanistan as well? -- Who will fund the excess cost of a 500kv line within Afghanistan relative to a 220kv line budgeted for by USAID? -- What is the optimal border crossing point for the Turkmenistan connection? -- If the transmission line from the Turkmenistan border were 500kv, where should it terminate within Afghanistan? Pul-e-Khumri, Naibabad, Mazar, Sheberghan or Andkhoy? ¶16. (SBU) USAID currently has $57 million for the originally proposed line from Turkmenistan to Mazar. If the decision is to build a 500kv line along the original alignment within Afghanistan, then either USAID will need additional funding or the GOA and donors will have to seek other funding sources. The GOA is also considering asking the Turkmen to build the line within Afghanistan because they claim to be able to build transmission capacity cheaper and quicker than the international community. This option would raise questions about whether to risk the GOA and Turkmenistan building this crucial line. ¶17. (SBU) We understand that Turkmenistan believes that an elaborate PPA is not necessary for cross-border electricity trade and the existing MOU will be adequate. We should encourage the Turkmenistan Government to engage in serious PPA discussions with the GOA because it is in its self-interest to enter binding agreements that promise to bring in a significant and steady stream of revenue over a long period of time. The USG should continue to provide consultant support to the GOA on the proposed PPA. The Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul Backbone: India -------------- ¶18. (SBU) The Indian Government is responsible for the 201km km 220kv line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul. Construction is ahead of schedule, with completion expected in October 2008. This line, however, will only have the capacity to transmit 250MW instead of the originally conceived 600MW because mountainous terrain and KABUL 00002070 006 OF 007 difficult weather conditions pose constraints on the volume. -- The GOA and donors should begin discussion about a second line in the medium term from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul to enable more power to be transmitted to Kabul and provinces to the south and east of Kabul. Sheberghan Power Plant: USAID -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The proposed 100MW USAID-funded power plant at Sheberghan is a critical piece of the Afghan electricity strategy because it represents the only planned domestic source of power in NEPS at this point. The project has been delayed to 2010 for several reasons. USAID had to initially wait for ADB's project to rehabilitate gas wells at Sheberghan before it could move ahead on its project. After two aborted ADB tenders to find a service contractor for the gas well rehabilitation, USAID decided in late 2006 to move ahead itself on a $12 million project to verify reserves and rehabilitate seven wells so it can begin the design and construction the power plant. The task order has been issued to USAID contractor Black and Veatch, which is looking for service provider. We expect the verification and rehabilitation work will begin in October 2007, with design work on the power plant to commence in 2008 after proof of availability of gas for 20-25 years has been established. Separately, we are discussing with ADB a proposal to combine the ADB and USAID natural gas projects at Sheberghan to launch a more comprehensive development of the gas fields in the Sheberghan region (septel). Another reason for the delay on the Sheberghan power plant is that USAID had to reprogram money allocated for the power plant to purchase the generators for Kabul (Ref A: 07 Kabul 936 and 07 Kabul 692). Funding/Other Gaps in NEPS -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Working closely with donors, ICE has systematically identified funding and other gaps in NEPS over the last four months. Some of those gaps have been plugged: -- India has agreed to fund substations at Doshi and Charikara; -- Germany will fund substations at Mazar and Konduz; -- GOA will reallocate $27 million from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund for a partial upgrade of the Kabul distribution system. ¶21. (U) There are, however, several areas that need urgent attention: -- $5 million for a reactive power compensation system -- Additional funding for the distribution system in Kabul to stop leakages and to enable it to absorb the additional 250MW when NEPS come on line -- $27.5 million Load Dispatch and Control Center and a NEPS Operations and Maintenance contractor -- $4.5 million for an Emergency Restoration System -- $6.0 million for Operations and Maintenance -- Distribution systems in Doshi, Charikar, Mazar, Pul-e-Khumri, Khulm and Aybak. Comment on Power Purchase Agreements -------------- ¶22. (SBU) According to feedback from MEW and international consultants helping with the power purchase agreements, the KABUL 00002070 007 OF 007 prospective NEPS suppliers -- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan -- are reluctant to enter into binding power purchase agreements. The commercial approach of these countries is heavily influenced by their soviet-era roots in which commercial relations did not need contractual agreements laying out in detail the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Utility officials in these states also do not appear to have the capacity to fully understand the PPAs drafted to international best practice standards by international consultants that are being offered to them. We should continue to press vigorously on all sides for the countries to enter into these PPAs at the earliest and continue robust USAID consultant support for these PPA processes. However, we should be prepared to accept that it may not be possible to finalize the PPAs in a timely manner and that the actual cross-border flow of NEPS power may have to begin under the existing non-binding MOUs that Afghanistan has in place with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. We believe that once electricity begins to flow into NEPS in sufficient volumes, there will be increasing incentive for the trading partners to formalize the arrangements into binding agreements. The only line that is contingent on a PPA at this time is the Tajikistan connection, where the ADB will not begin construction of the line until a PPA is in place. We should encourage the ADB to loosen this conditionality. Wood