PRT URUZGAN - THE FIGHT FOR CHORA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002004 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD E.O. 12958: DE... 112974 2007-06-21 07KABUL2004 Embassy Kabul SECRET//NOFORN 07KABUL1971|07THEHAGUE1196 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002004 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SOCI AF SUBJECT: PRT URUZGAN - THE FIGHT FOR CHORA REF: A. KABUL 1971 ¶B. THE HAGUE 1196 Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/REL NATO and AUS) Summary: Chora district center came under Taliban attack Friday, June 15, the focal point of a province-wide surge in insurgent activity. When it looked as if Chora might fall, the Dutch took the politically difficult decision to go on the offensive. They mounted successful operations re-establishing GoA control over Chora and killing key Taliban commanders. Unfortunately, the fighting also took a toll on the civilian population. The Taliban executed residents and their families in retaliation for their support of the Afghan government. Preliminary investigations indicate that press reports of civilian casualties were exaggerated. The PRT is on the ground to address humanitarian needs arising from the fighting and to resume reconstruction. No doubt critics of the Dutch mission in Afghanistan will attempt to use the fight for Chora as ammunition in this summer's debate over extension of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan beyond July 2008; but advocates of extension are likely to find that the results better support their cause. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Ref A reported a significant surge in insurgent activity in Uruzgan. While this pattern was observed throughout the province, the fight for the Chora district center was the center of the storm. -------------- The Threat -------------- ¶3. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) As of Sunday, June 17, the situation in Chora looked bleak. Insurgents had overrun three checkpoints to the east of the Chora. ISAF and Afghan forces were hunkered down in the district center itself, seemingly surrounded. To the west, local tribal commanders defending Sarab village lost a checkpoint on the high ground and had fallen back into the village. Worse, insurgents held the ground between the two points, preventing one force from aiding the other. Task Force-Uruzgan (TF- U) Commander Col. Hans van Griensven commented that it looked like Chora might fall despite the vigorous defense the Dutch were mounting. Specifically, they were firing live rounds from their Panzer Howitzer and had authorized aircraft providing close air support to fire on selected targets, techniques usually eschewed by the Dutch because of the possibility of civilian casualties. -------------- -------------- A Moment of Choice: The Dutch Go on the Offensive -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) In the face of this dire situation, TF-U staff considered two alternatives. They could withdraw Dutch and Afghan forces from Chora and stay faithful to a strict interpretation of their reconstruction mandate in the province. Or they could commit themselves indefinitely to the fight for Chora, and for the first time commit their battle group to an offensive operation without the requirement that the enemy fire first. The TF-U commander chose to go on the offensive, recognizing that this might result, despite their best efforts, in some collateral damage. General Berlijn, commander of the Dutch armed forces, authorized this decision. -------------- Fighting the Good Fight KABUL 00002004 002 OF 004 -------------- ¶5. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) On Sunday evening, Dutch Special Forces attacked Taliban positions at the southern entrance to the Baluchi Valley, a traditional Taliban sanctuary that lies between Chora and the provincial capital Tarin Kowt. Their objective was to force insurgents in Chora to divert forces to defend this strategic position. On Sunday night, the Dutch bombed a location where Taliban commanders were meeting, resulting in the deaths of the commander in charge of the operation, Mullah Mutalib, and three colleagues, Mullahs Ismael, Sadiq, and Ghafour. ¶6. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) On Monday morning, June 18, Dutch troops, joined by 90 soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA),attacked insurgents on the west side of Chora, re-taking checkpoints they had lost earlier that weekend. Simultaneously, tribal militias pushed out of Sarab attacked insurgents and re-took the Sarab Hill checkpoint. Militias led by Khas Uruzgan District Chief Jar Mohammed and former provincial Chief of Police Rozie Khan Sarab joined checkpoint commanders Toor Abdullah and Adul Malek and their men in this battle. By early afternoon, the insurgents disengaged and fled. ISAF had once again re-established control of the Chora district center. One Dutch soldier was killed and three wounded on Monday during the fighting. The Dutch have not reported any casualties among the ANSF. ¶7. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) The Dutch appeared to have regained the upper hand, at least for the moment. Meanwhile, the insurgents were said to be in disarray and demoralized. They were short on ammunition and weapons. With their top commanders dead, they lacked leadership and seemed to be at a loss as to how to re- group and carry on with the fight. Many fled to safe areas or hid among the population. -------------- The Threat Remains -------------- ¶8. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) While diminished for the time being, the insurgent threat remains and attacks could soon start again. A group of insurgents remains in position between Chora District Center and Sarab. Another is sitting to the northwest of Chora in the vicinity of the Niazy checkpoint. There were reports that 100 reinforcements under the command of Mullahs Hamdullah and Qahir left Mirabad on Tuesday, June 19, bound for Chora. Reinforcements could also come from safe havens in Gizab district and the Baluchi Valley. ¶9. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) Intelligence indicates the Taliban in Uruzgan have already established a new command structure. Mullah Aktar Mohammed has been tapped as commander for the Chora district. Mullah Aminullah now commands forces in Cahar Cineh district. And Qahir Faiz Mohammed is said to now lead the Taliban in the vicinity of Tarin Kowt, including Mirabad to the east and Darefshan to the north. ¶10. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) Some Dutch platoons and ANA returned from Chora Thursday, June 21, to rest and refit. Three Dutch platoons, a number of PRT personnel and about 50 ANA will remain in Chora. The Dutch will maintain their forces in Chora for the foreseeable future. They are there to perform a number of functions: to act as a deterrent to future attack; to work with ANSF to defend the area; to provide relief to civilians affected by the fighting; and to resume reconstruction work. The ANA are likely to be pulled out as soon as police -- either local police from Uruzgan or 80 of the ASP who are already in Uruzgan -- arrive to man and reinforce checkpoints in and around Chora. KABUL 00002004 003 OF 004 -------------- Impact on Civilians -------------- ¶11. (U) Daily life in Chora is slowly returning to normal. The bazaar is open. Children are going to school. Families that fled the fighting are returning home. Local men can be seen again on the street. ¶12. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) But the fighting took a toll on the local population. There are multiple reports of civilian casualties in the press, many of them exaggerated. According to TF-U, 30 plus civilians were killed during the fight (from June 15 on) and 62 were wounded. These numbers are still preliminary and do not distinguish between casualties that resulted from enemy action and those resulting from ISAF action. The PRT has dispatched its medical and legal specialists to Chora to work with local authorities to investigate this issue. ¶13. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) The Taliban executed an as yet undetermined number of civilians. These acts were directed at those supporting the GoA and their families. The Dutch have confirmed the executions of checkpoint commander Abdul Malek's two brothers. There are multiple reports that checkpoint commander Toor Jan's family was executed, women and children included. ¶14. (S/NF) The PRT has maintained a steady presence throughout the build-up in tensions and the recent fighting. Now it is in the process of reinforcing its team in Chora with additional civil affairs personnel, police mentors, and subject matter experts. The Dutch government has put 1.2 million Afghani (approximately USD 24,000) at the PRT's disposal for emergency relief (food, blankets, shelter, and clothing). The PRT is working to access ISAF funds to assist families repairing and replacing property damaged by the fighting. However, the Dutch are not prepared to immediately promise to compensate all those civilians who claim to have suffered losses. They first want to compile information on where and when they fired into the area, so that they might limit payment to those legitimate claims for which ISAF is responsible. They also do not appear to have identified a source of funds for compensation/reconstruction of lives and personnel property. Possibly because of their policy to avoid collateral damage at all cost, they did not have a pre-existing plan/procedure to deal with this eventuality. Rather, they began Monday, June 18, to work from scratch to devise a response to the humanitarian costs of this fight in Chora. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (S/NF) The Dutch here acquitted themselves well in Chora. They accurately assessed the threat and overcame policy obstacles to the kind of forward-leaning, offensive operations demanded by the situation. They dealt the Taliban a resounding blow, even at the cost of one of their own. They are carefully but quickly replying to criticism about civilian collateral damage with facts and concrete plans to address civilian need, which prevents the Taliban from getting ahead on this front. The Dutch government has publicly stated its intent to continue the mission in the face of the dangers (ref B). There will be those who use what happened in Chora to try to argue against the extension of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan beyond 2008. Strong arguments for extension can also be extrapolated from the events of the last week. ¶16. (S/NF) In a private meeting which included the KABUL 00002004 004 OF 004 Dutch Ambassador on June 21, President Karzai expressed concern about use of artillery and the danger of civilian casualties. Both the Dutch and ISAF Commander McNeill explained the situation. We believe/believe the President was reassured. WOOD