A/S BOUCHER MEETING WITH AFGHAN NSA RASSOUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000184

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF IR PK ECON
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER MEETING WITH AFGHAN NSA RASSOUL

REF: KABUL 0115

Classified By: A/DCM Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) During a January 9 meeting between Assistant
Secretary Boucher and Afghan National Security Advisor

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Rassoul, Rassoul offered a comprehensive look at the security
situationin Afghanistan, and the two shared concerns over the
situation in Musa Qala and poppy cultivation. Boucher said
the U.S. had doubts about the effectiveness of mining and
fencing the border and urged that the issue be taken up in
the military tripartite talks. On jirgas, Rassoul was
hopeful that once the Commissions were in regular contact
there would be progress on preparations. Rassoul said Karzai
recently warned Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki that the
Taliban could return if the West left Afghanistan and advised
Iran to chose which it preferred. Boucher briefed on U.S.
funding for Afghanistan. He explained the new Joint
Coordinating and Monitoring Board "Contact Group" concept,
underlining the U.S. expects Afghanistan to drive discussions
at the upcoming meeting in Berlin on January 30. U.S. goals
are to raise the profile of civilian work in capitals and
direct money where it is needed most on the ground. END
SUMMARY

Musa Qala
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2. (C) Afghan National Security Advisor Rassoul used their
January 9 meeting to brief Boucher on latest developments in
Musa Qala. He noted that the Policy Action Group had decided
to test the agreement by the end of January but was concerned
that the UK was not keen on a timetable for the critical
third test (presence of government security forces from
outside the district stationed there). This is "worrisome,"
he said, and commented that most Afghans were concerned about
the situation there.


3. (C) Rassoul reported that former Helmand Governor Daud
was at the Hajj and would be appointed someplace "less
troublesome." Daud had been in trouble in Helmand as there
were many who were opposed to him. Daud wants to be near
Kabul, so he'll likely be appointed somewhere near the
capital. The new Governor, Wafa, is much better with the
tribes, so is more suitable for Helmand, Rassoul explained.


4. (C) Boucher asked why Helmand is so different from other
provinces. Rassoul believes it is because of the dominance
of poppy and the convergence of Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and drugs
in one place. Tribal elders were neglected under Daud, so he
paid a price. The Taliban have taken advantage of the
situation. Rassoul said that when the UK first went into
Helmand, they were willing to conduct military operations but
found that they never had enough Afghan National Security
Forces to fill in behind once an area had been cleared out.
All these factors have contributed to the present
difficulties, said Rassoul.


5. (C) Rassoul predicted that the situation in the East
would improve this year ) Kunar, Nuristan and Paktika in
particular. He expressed concern over Waziristan where he
said many have left to conduct suicide bombings in
Afghanistan. The rest of Afghanistan was "Okay", although
suffering from the usual post-conflict security problems.

Security Sector Reform
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6. (C) Rassoul reported that the Afghan National Army was
doing well and had performed commendably in battle. The
Afghan Government has requested better equipment from the

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United States, which will soon be arriving. The speed of
training was much better now, Rassoul commented, which has
led to greater confidence in the ranks.


7. (C) Rassoul contrasted this with the Afghan National
Police which still faces lots of problems. On the plus side,
district-level police were ready to be approved and the
agreed list was waiting Presidential signature. Some Chiefs
of Police have been removed who were not doing well (the
infamous 14 - reftel),he reported. The result is that a
structure is now in place and ready to absorb money and
assistance from the U.S. The Policy Action Group will
continue to monitor developments. Rassoul said that vetting
and training had slowed down, but is now up and running
again.

Judicial Reform and Anti-Corruption Efforts
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8. (C) Rassoul assessed that judicial reform was progressing
well, with the help of the Italians. Rassoul highlighted
the strong support that Sabit was receiving from Karzai,
adding that Attorney General Sabit was doing a good job and
that people were starting to fear him. Boucher agreed that
if average Afghans started to see big people go down, they
would believe that Sabit was serious. He noted there is a
difference between preventing corruption and cracking down on
corruption and asked if sufficient controls were now in
place, including appointment vetting procedures. Rassoul
replied that this was a top priority for the Government. In
the past, the Government was concerned that it risked
stability if it went after influential people. Now the
Government felt strong enough and is going after them.
Rassoul said that the court and judicial systems were also
improving daily, so it was all coming together.

Narcotics
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9. (C) Rassoul described poppy cultivation as the most
difficult issue facing the Government. There were no
indications of a reduction, except in parts of the north and
central regions. Rassoul was concerned that increases in
Helmand would compensate for any reductions in the north.
The biggest concern remained Helmand. Rassoul said it was
important to see a decrease this year.


10. (C) Boucher asked if the current strategy was working.
Rassoul argued that the strategy was sound but implementation
was lacking. He said that we might have to go ahead with
ground spraying. Boucher noted that the British would be in
Washington January 22-23 for another round of discussions.
In December, they had agreed to ground spraying, but not in
Helmand. Boucher noted that there was much discussion in
London on the issue and that the decision would be made
there. Boucher understood the UK's focus on Helmand but
hoped that they would begin thinking about the country as a
whole. Rassoul agreed and noted the difference between
Coalition Forces and NATO. The former looked nationally
while NATO countries focused only on their respective
provinces.


11. (C) Boucher briefed Rassoul on his talks with Turkey and
Pakistan last year regarding their experiences with poppy
eradication. Their experience indicated that it took 5-10
years to solve the problem. Government determination was a
key factor -- speeches, public relations campaigns --
together with arrests and eradication. A third factor was
that real alternatives had to be provided, not just
alternative livelihood crops, but jobs, industries, and a new
rural economic system. Rassoul added that a fourth factor,
the Taliban, had to be considered for Afghanistan. The
country was at war. Rassoul argued that the Government was
showing its determination and now needed to go after more bad
guys.

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Pakistan and Jirgas
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12. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher recommended that
Pakistan's proposal to mine and fence the border be taken up
in military channels. He shared that the issue had come up
before and that the U.S. had doubts about the effectiveness
of the measures. He saw the latest move as a sign that the
Pakistanis want to show the world that they are serious about
terrorism.


13. (C) Rassoul agreed that Pakistan wanted to send a
message but also believed that the Pakistanis wanted to
physically delineate the Durand Line. He argued that the
border was not the problem. It was the sanctuaries, the
training camps and the madrassas. These were the main
factors, emphasized Rassoul. Mining and fencing will only
create more problems. The initiative was "anti-jirga" as
jirgas are intended to bring people together while fencing
will only separate them. Boucher concurred that it was less
a matter of control at the border than it was control behind
the border. He said that the U.S. was pushing for political
solutions. Boucher explained that Aziz had told him that
Pakistan's intentions were to take action against
concentrations of Al-Qaeda and Taliban along the border,
especially in Waziristan. Pakistan will also be looking at
more intel operations as well as more political solutions.
Musharraf was determined to make the North Waziristan
Agreement work, Boucher said.


14. (C) Rassoul stressed the importance of keeping up
contacts with Pakistan. Boucher assured Rassoul that the
U.S. would be encouraging more dialogue. In the short-term,
he suggested we identify steps to now take militarily while
we had the winter advantage. "Making the spring offensive
our offensive" should be our goal, Boucher said.


15. (C) On the jirgas, Rassoul stressed the need to hold
them soon. The purpose for the jirgas is to help prepare
better for the summer, he said. Boucher asked if in the
meetings with Aziz and Kasuri the Afghan side had been able
to break the impasse over the difference in approaches.
Rassoul responded that it was not possible with Kasuri as he
only dealt in generalities. In contrast, with Aziz, Karzai
had put everything on the table and the answer was yes, but
since Aziz was not a security person, the discussions could
only go so far. Boucher said it would be important to have
both national support and local decision making, a
combination that would make the jirgas work. Rassoul agreed
and believed that if the two Commissions get together in a
serious way, the process "will get rolling."

Iran
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16. (C) Rassoul briefed on the recent visit of Iranian
Foreign Minister Mottaki, characterizing the talks with
Karzai as frank. Karzai told him that if Iran worked against
the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan, the Taliban would only take
advantage. He challenged Iran to decide who it preferred in
Afghanistan -- the Taliban or NATO. Karzai also argued that
Iran's policy toward the U.S. was wrong, both for Iran and
for the region. He called on Iran to open up and talk to the
U.S. Mottaki had been resistant and denied the poor
relations with the U.S. were Iran's fault. Mottaki insisted
that the U.S. did not want to engage with Iran.


17. (C) Rassoul did not think that the Iranian Foreign
Ministry was the right channel through which to discuss the
Taliban. Iran,s intelligence service were the people in
touch with the Taliban, Rassoul said. He noted that Iran was
putting money in Afghanistan, not only for projects, but also
for mullahs and clergy who were directing anti-West
propaganda. Rassoul said Afghanistan was watching closely

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for any signs of Sunni-Shia conflicts in the region as this
would be most unwelcome.

U.S. Funding/Supplemental Budget
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18. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher briefed Rassoul on the
upcoming budget request for Afghanistan. He said that
additional funding would be announced in President Bush's
State of the Union Address, with more details coming out at
the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting. There would be billions
of dollars for police and equipping the army and additional
funds for governance, justice, police, roads, energy, and
power lines. Big money was being put on the table for both
this year and next, he explained. Boucher said that the
expectation is that the money would be available in the
summer or early fall.


19. (C) Boucher described past successes where military
action had been followed by reconstruction and development
money. This was done in some areas successfully and now the
U.S. wanted to expand this throughout the country, Boucher
said. The Europeans also understood this, but their numbers
were declining. Boucher said that at the January 26 NATO
Foreign Ministers meeting the U.S. would be pushing for an
end to caveats. He urged Rassoul to keep the funding issue
in front of the Europeans.

New Contact Group
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20. (C) Boucher explained that the proposal for a new
Contact Group was a French proposal. The U.S. proposed a
different idea to ensure it is linked to and supports the
Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board, with the Afghan
Government driving the process. This will be a useful
mechanism for raising the civilian profile in capitals and
ensuring that the money goes where it is needed most, Boucher
said. The new name of the group would be the "Joint
Coordinating and Monitoring Board Contact Group" and would
require the Afghan Government to be the main driver.


21. (C) The Assistant Secretary cited as a model the
Regional Economic Cooperation meeting in New Delhi where the
Afghans drove the event, which made it a huge success. He
would encourage the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan and President Karzai,s Senior Economic Advisor
Naderi to take the same approach to the Political Directors'
meeting in Berlin. Rassoul agreed with the value of this
approach.


22. (U) SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden cleared this cable.

NEUMANN