NATO SCR EVERTS CALLS FOR MORE UNITY OF EFFORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001609 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO AF SUBJECT: NATO SCR EVERTS CALLS FOR MORE UNITY OF EFFORT Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol A. Rodley, for reason s 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (C) In a May 8 meeting with Counselor Cohen, NATO Senior Civilan Representative Daan Everts said that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had a "distinctly more positive" view than they had previously, based on their most recent visit to Afghanistan. His own view was somewhat different, however, based on his interaction with Afghans. He said that the perception among the populace here is that no progress has been made, and that the international community has a "credibility problem." Although we are heading in the right direction, there is a gap with the population that has been aggravated by unfortunate incidents such as the recent event in Shindand. Everts discussed the need to review our disclosure policy related to military actions in order to make information publicly available quicker. He said he was convinced that the military action in Shindand was "reactive and by the book, and successful in eliminating opposing elements and discovering arms caches." Had we been better at getting our story out we could have avoided much of the controversy over civilian casualties. ¶2. (C) Everts noted that there is often confusion in theater between which operations are ISAF lead and which are Coalition, since the two forces are not under unified command. There has been an improvement, but operations still take place without advance consultations, and they are also often not coordinated with the Afghan side. NAC policy is to Afghanize much of what we are doing, and COMISAF has offered to sit with both the Coalition and Afghans to improve coordination, he said. ¶3. (C) Overall, Everts remains positive. He said that we are realizing the comprehensive nature of the problem here. The military is robust and firm, and we are turning our attention to the need for good governance. However he assessed that the international community is sometimes "too timid," too respectful of the Afghan leadership,s tendency to recycle or protect bad governors and commanders rather than firing them. He rhetorically asked, "Why do we live with this when soldiers' lives are being sacrificed?" (Comment: the IC is in constant dialogue with President Karzai and the MOI about leadership appointments. While the GOA often does less than we would like in firing local power brokers, the complex balance of power in some regions, as well as the ongoing insurgency, means that it can be very difficult for Karzai to make these decisions. End comment.) ¶4. (C) Everts also said that we are too divided among ourselves. We were late in recognizing the importance of law enforcement, rule of law, and police, and not all entities have been as active as they might have been. He said that he personally recognizes that the U.S. contribution in these areas has been disproportionately large and worthy of praise. ¶5. (C) Finally, Everts said that he believes we should further increase pressure on Pakistan. He has come to the conclusion that "private pressure, public praise," is not effective. He recognizes that there is a complex of factors driving Pakistan,s policy, but said that in the end he believes the Pakistanis are not doing enough and from the Afghan side the result is "agonizing." Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) The civilian casualty events in Shindand and KABUL 00001609 002 OF 002 subsequently in Sangin have focused attention in Kabul on the need for a better strategic communications plan for complicated situations involving military operations. The issue is being addressed at the PAG and among senior international representatives. In addition, however, these incidents point to the need for better coordination among the different military forces in Afghanistan, including ISAF, Coalition, other international forces, and the Afghan army and police, as well as between military and civilian elements. We have recently had some significant military successes, and have also laid the groundwork for institutional development in police and rule of law. Our focus going forward needs to be on developing the capacity of all elements, international and Afghan, civilian and military, to support each other across organizational fault lines, and to use that unity of effort more effectively to convey our actions and long-term vision to the Afghan people. ¶7. (U) The delegation has cleared this cable. WOOD