Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL1572
2007-05-09 16:18:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT LASHKAR GAH: GOVERNMENT RETURNS TO SANGIN

Tags:  PGOV PTER MARR AF 
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VZCZCXRO0317
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1572/01 1291618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091618Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7951
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4042
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3617
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001572 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: GOVERNMENT RETURNS TO SANGIN

REF: KABUL 1344

Classified By: POLCOUNS Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

-------
SUMMARY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001572 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR AF SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: GOVERNMENT RETURNS TO SANGIN REF: KABUL 1344 Classified By: POLCOUNS Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Following the military operation to clear Sangin district of Taliban, Governor Wafa has sought to reach out to locals long separated from the central government, and to extend the reach of the Afghan Government (GOA) into the district. Wafa recently appointed an interim District Governor, Haji Izatullah, and the Provincial Police Chief appointed an interim district police commander, a close associate of Izatullah. Both appear to meet with the approval of the tribes in Sangin. Izatullah prefers to describe himself as mujahed, rather than a GOA official. His credentials as a fighter seem to have played a strong role in Wafa's choice of Izatullah, as did the simple fact that he was willing to accept such a difficult job. Wafa is sending Izatullah in with no budget or salary, apparently preferring Izatullah not to get too comfortable in the position. Izatullah says he has asked Wafa to appoint line ministry directors and send them to Sangin. These interim appointments reflect an "Afghan solution" rather than a "GOA solution" to the question of the next appropriate steps in bringing lasting stability to Sangin: Izatullah was chosen for his credentials as a fighter, and will arrive in Sangin with sixty police from the province. While this may help bring stability to Sangin, it will not automatically bring the GOA to the district. Balanced against this concern is Wafa's apparent appreciation of the problem, Izatullah's own expressed interest in bringing in line ministry representatives, and Izatullah's interest in a consultative approach to governing, including holding a number of shuras with locals. The PRT will closely engage Izatullah on the ground, once he arrives in the next several days, and will work with Wafa on other means to bring a GOA presence to Sangin. END SUMMARY. Following Clearance Ops, Governor Installs Officials -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Following the recent military operation to clear the Taliban from Sangin distric
t, located in northern Helmand, and following Governor Wafa's jirga held in Sangin on April 12 (REF),the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) has worked to re-introduce itself to the district, particularly through the recent appointment by Governor Wafa of Haji Izatullah as interim District Governor. Provincial Police Chief Nabi Jan Mullahkhel named an interim district police chief, but withdrew the name when Sangin elders and Izatullah rejected him. Mullahkhel then appointed Gulam Wali, Izatullah's choice, as interim police chief. Wafa expects the two to take up their posts around the first week of May. Why Izatullah? He's Crazy Enough to Accept the Job -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Asked why he chose Izatullah for the position, Wafa told PRT representatives that, to paraphrase, "he's mad enough to go there." Wafa, who has known Izatullah for years, also placed importance on Izatullah's status as a "fighter." Izatullah separately told PRT representatives that he was chosen because he is mujahed, and because he brought security to the Mukhtar region of Lashkar Gah. Both Izatullah and Wafa claim that he has support from all the tribes in Sangin. KABUL 00001572 002 OF 003 ¶4. (S/NF) (NOTE: Izatullah is from Mukhtar, an area located just north of Lashkar Gah. He is from the Barakzai tribe (one of the tribes in Sangin),and perhaps a prominent member, as he claims to be able to call upon 800 fighters from his tribe. END NOTE.) Wafa Does Not Want Izatullah Too Comfortable -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Izatullah is going into Sangin with no budget. Wafa readily admits that Izatullah will not receive a salary; if his posting is made permanent, then he will receive compensation. Asked why, Wafa replied, "I want him to suffer a little," by which he may have meant that he does not want Izatullah to feel too comfortable in the position. Asked why he was temporary, Izatullah avoided the question, saying that Wafa believes he can bring security to the district. Tacitly acknowledging a form of probation, Izatullah said that if he shows progress he could remain in the position months, maybe considerably longer. ¶6. (S/NF) A reason Wafa might not wish Izatullah to feel overly comfortable in the position might be found in Izatullah's response to the question of whether he considers himself an official of the GOA. Izatullah would not explicitly state that he was a GOA official; rather, he referred to himself as a mujahed, and pointed to his successful history as a fighter. Izatullah's Expectations -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Foremost, Izatullah intends to bring stability. He is not completely devoid of resources, as he and Wali claim to be bringing sixty Afghan National Police (ANP) with them to Sangin. It seems likely that a number of the guards will act as Izatullah's close protection, while others man checkpoints. (NOTE: The sixty ANP are all from Helmand, and are not related to the Afghan Standby Police deployed to Helmand for possible use in Sangin. What, if any, direct ties they have to Wali and Izatullah is not known. The PRT is pursuing the matter. END NOTE.) ¶8. (S/NF) Security is not Izatullah's sole interest. He claims that he has raised with Wafa the need to appoint directors of the line ministries and send them to Sangin. He expects ministry representatives to arrive after the situation becomes more stable. ¶9. (S/NF) In setting the conditions for an increased GOA presence, Izatullah did not appear eager to dictate to the local population, but rather to employ a consultative approach. He told PRT representatives that he intends to hold a series of shuras in the district, and said he wants locals to feel free to seek him out directly. Comment -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) The appointments of Izatullah and Wali reflect more a traditional "Afghan solution" than a "GOA solution" to the question of the next steps in bringing stability to Sangin. The qualifications for the District Governor's position are in the classic mold - his anticipated effectiveness flows from a proven history as a fighter, not an administrator, and he will arrive with a police force (with as yet undetermined ties to himself and his loyal, hand- picked police commander). While this may help bring stability to the district, it is not automatically encouraging from the standpoint of bringing the GOA there. Wafa appears to have some appreciation of this KABUL 00001572 003 OF 003 concern, given Izatullah's temporary status. Also, Izatullah's interest in bringing line ministry representatives into the district is encouraging - even when keeping in mind his reluctance to be associated with the GOA - as is his interest in holding shuras that could include GOA officials. The PRT will engage Izatullah and Wali closely, including by having as much a presence on the ground as possible, e.g., in his outreach shuras, and will work with Wafa on other ways to bring a GOA presence to Sangin. END COMMENT. WOOD

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