Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL1454
2007-04-29 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
PRESIDENT KARZAI ON EXPECTATIONS FOR THE ANKARA
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBUL #1454 1191340 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291340Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7767 INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0453 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5123 RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 0365
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001454
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT
NSC PASS FOR AHARRIMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK TU AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI ON EXPECTATIONS FOR THE ANKARA
TRILATERAL AND PAKISTAN BORDER ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 54917
B. ANKARA 986
C. KABUL 1345
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001454
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT
NSC PASS FOR AHARRIMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK TU AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI ON EXPECTATIONS FOR THE ANKARA
TRILATERAL AND PAKISTAN BORDER ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 54917
B. ANKARA 986
C. KABUL 1345
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Ambassador used April 27 meeting with Karzai and
CENTCOM CG Admiral Fallon to preview the upcoming trilateral
with President Musharraf in Ankara. The Ambassador presented
Ref A suggestions on ways to achieve a productive exchange.
2. (C) Karzai had a press conference on the Ankara meeting
as Fallon and the Ambassador were arriving for the meeting,
proving an opportunity to raise Afghan-Pak issues. The
bottom line result was a good discussion, no fireworks -- but
probably no progress either. Karzai had read Musharraf's
latest public pronouncement and said he deliberately had
taken a more conciliatory line in his press statement. Both
Fallon and the Ambassador pressed Karzai to make progress in
Ankara, along lines in Ref A.
Political Dimensions of the Border Dispute
--------------
3. (C) Privately, the Ambassador told Karzai that his border
problems with Pakistan were interfering with his security and
commercial interests and that he needed to find a way to
neutralize the issue -- not solve it, but neutralize it. The
Ambassador suggested giving the problem to the non-legal,
non-binding OIC to study. This could be done with the
proviso that no step taken after 2002 could be included in
their findings, so as to open the door to no-risk,
on-the-ground solutions now. He looked thoughtful, but
didn't bite. His real concern is the pressure he is under
from the Pashtuns on the Pak side, who are determined not to
be cut adrift by a border decison. The press here is vocally
anti-Pakistan.
Public Conciliatory Note
--------------
4. (U) In public remarks on April 27 at the Afghan
Development Forum in Kabul, Karzai sounded a conciliatory
note with respect to Pakistan. Referring to the April 26
suicide bombing attack on Pakistani Interior Minister
Sherpao, Karzai criticized the attack, said he ahd attempted
to reach out by telephone to contact Sherpao last evening,
and pointed to the common enemy faced by Afghanistan and
Pakistan in terms of Taliban extremists. With Ankara in
mind, he clearly made a concerted effort to take the high
road given recent Pakistani-Afghan verbal jousts.
WOOD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT
NSC PASS FOR AHARRIMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK TU AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI ON EXPECTATIONS FOR THE ANKARA
TRILATERAL AND PAKISTAN BORDER ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 54917
B. ANKARA 986
C. KABUL 1345
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Ambassador used April 27 meeting with Karzai and
CENTCOM CG Admiral Fallon to preview the upcoming trilateral
with President Musharraf in Ankara. The Ambassador presented
Ref A suggestions on ways to achieve a productive exchange.
2. (C) Karzai had a press conference on the Ankara meeting
as Fallon and the Ambassador were arriving for the meeting,
proving an opportunity to raise Afghan-Pak issues. The
bottom line result was a good discussion, no fireworks -- but
probably no progress either. Karzai had read Musharraf's
latest public pronouncement and said he deliberately had
taken a more conciliatory line in his press statement. Both
Fallon and the Ambassador pressed Karzai to make progress in
Ankara, along lines in Ref A.
Political Dimensions of the Border Dispute
--------------
3. (C) Privately, the Ambassador told Karzai that his border
problems with Pakistan were interfering with his security and
commercial interests and that he needed to find a way to
neutralize the issue -- not solve it, but neutralize it. The
Ambassador suggested giving the problem to the non-legal,
non-binding OIC to study. This could be done with the
proviso that no step taken after 2002 could be included in
their findings, so as to open the door to no-risk,
on-the-ground solutions now. He looked thoughtful, but
didn't bite. His real concern is the pressure he is under
from the Pashtuns on the Pak side, who are determined not to
be cut adrift by a border decison. The press here is vocally
anti-Pakistan.
Public Conciliatory Note
--------------
4. (U) In public remarks on April 27 at the Afghan
Development Forum in Kabul, Karzai sounded a conciliatory
note with respect to Pakistan. Referring to the April 26
suicide bombing attack on Pakistani Interior Minister
Sherpao, Karzai criticized the attack, said he ahd attempted
to reach out by telephone to contact Sherpao last evening,
and pointed to the common enemy faced by Afghanistan and
Pakistan in terms of Taliban extremists. With Ankara in
mind, he clearly made a concerted effort to take the high
road given recent Pakistani-Afghan verbal jousts.
WOOD