Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL1170
2007-04-10 03:53:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

FARAH PROVINCE SEES RISE IN TALIBAN ACTIVITY,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER EAID MARR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9139
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1170/01 1000353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100353Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7386
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3925
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3571
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001170 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID MARR AF
SUBJECT: FARAH PROVINCE SEES RISE IN TALIBAN ACTIVITY,
PROGRESS ON POPPIES

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001170 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID MARR AF SUBJECT: FARAH PROVINCE SEES RISE IN TALIBAN ACTIVITY, PROGRESS ON POPPIES -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) Ambassador Neumann's March 5 visit to PRT Farah revealed that the province, which one year ago was a relatively low threat area (albeit with high rates of criminality and poppy production),has witnessed a disburing increase in Taliban activity, and its central districts are now considered a high threat area. PRT officials attribute the increased threat to the double-edge sword of development: completion of the Ring Road from Herat through Farah to Helmand has helped the local economy, but has also brought increased connectivity to the insurgency and local crime rings. Wedged between Iran, Nimroz province (which shares one of Afghanistan's most porous borders with both Iran and Pakistan), and Helmand's most troublesome districts (Musa Qala and Naw Zad),Farah's location is the stereotypical "bad neighborhood." To combat these factors, local government and PRT officials have organized a highly active Provincial Development Council (PDC) and Poppy Eradication Program (PEP) Team. The PDC has set clear priorities, and the province witnessed an overall 25 percent reduction in poppy cultivation between 2005 and ¶2006. Local police officials have also developed a new security strategy calling for increased ISAF patrols between Sharar and Delaram. End summary. -------------- DETERIORATING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT -------------- ¶2. (U) PRT officials noted a new trend in insurgent tactics throughout Farah province, not previously seen in other parts of Afghanistan, whereby Taliban elements have begun using the road as a weapon, imbedding IED's directly into the asphalt and detonating them as targets pass over. (Note: Just four days before the Ambassador's visit, a roadside bomb targeting a police vehicle in Farah City left three civilians dead and 48 wounded. On April 8, a roadside bomb struck a police convoy and reportedly killed nine police officers. Taliban insurgents attacked another police checkpoint near the Iranian border the day before. End note.) ¶3. (U) PRT officials opined that the deteriorating security environment was related to comple
tion of the Ring Road in Farah Province which has enabled insurgents and petty criminals to communicate and maneuver throughout the province better. Police checkpoints remain ineffective at curbing insurgent activity and, in fact, are vulnerable to attack themselves because they are static and have no capacity to transfer information from one checkpoint to another in an emergency. ¶4. (U) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Governor Mawlawi Mohideen Baluch expressed concern about increased Taliban activity and particularly stressed the importance of improving security on the road between Farah City and the town of Delaram. Governor Baluch asked for a permanent ISAF patrol and increased aid to Delaram. This request was echoed by the local ANP commander, who specified that increased patrols were needed between the area of Sharar and Delaram. ¶5. (U) Attacks on local schools have also increased since February 2006, although there was a lull during the fall and winter. (Note: Taliban attacks on schools nationwide decreased during this period, as they realized such attacks were not winning them any points amongst the local population. End note.) PRT officials noted that there have also been attacks on local clinics and "night letters" issuing threats to the local population throughout the Bakwa district. KABUL 00001170 002 OF 003 -------------- -------------- A NATIONAL POLICE "IN NAME ONLY"; NEW SECURITY STRATEGY -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) Of the ANP in Farah, the police commander noted, "We have a national police in name only. We really function more like a tribal system." ANP in Farah are primarily made up of members of the Barakzai Pashtun tribe, and it is difficult to instill in officers the notion of loyalty to the national government rather than the interests of their particular tribe. He also noted that no one had been willing to take on the position of police chief in Bakwa district since the former police chief's removal. (Note: A candidate was assigned via the rank reform process, but never showed up for duty. MOI is in the process of replacing several dozen AWOL district chiefs.) When asked, the police commander was adamant that bringing in ANSF from outside the province would be a bad idea, as it would only fuel local mistrust of the central government. ¶7. (U) Local police representatives announced completion of a new security strategy which identified the province's key security points as Khaki Safeid, Bakwa and Delaram. It also called for 350 ANAP to be depoloyed throughout Farah as well as a 500-member ANA battalion along with one ISAF company to patrol the Delaram district, where the Taliban are said to have made significant inroads. According to the police commander, requests to the MOI for ammunition have fallen on deaf ears, and local police have been forced to buy it from smugglers on the black market. ¶8. (U) The new security strategy also calls for an increase in the number of border police. Farah shares a 296 km border with Iran, and local officials noted that there is currently only one battalion patrolling the border (versus two battalions that operated there earlier). The local ANA commander assessed that the insurgency was not strong enough to defeat the ANA. Rather, they had filtered into Farah to create a distraction, as evidenced by their ability to carry out only scattered attacks against police checkpoints. -------------- PROGRESS ON POPPIES -------------- ¶9. (U) Between 2005 and 2006 Farah province secured a significant decrease, 25%, in poppy cultivation. (Note: This decrease was due, in part, to a prolonged drought throughout the province. End note.) The UNODC's most recent Rapid Assessment Survey predicts no change in 2007. Poppy cultivation takes place predominantly in Bakwa district, as well as the Gulistan and Farah Valleys. Local representatives of the INL-funded Poppy Eradication Program (PEP) noted their focus on increased public awareness, expansion of job opportunities, and investment in irrigation systems as a means to further combat poppy culvitation. They noted that one major barrier has been the lack of cooperation between the different tribal groups involved in anti-poppy programs. Pressure from police patrols has been marginally successful at prompting self-eradication. They stressed that government employees cultivating poppy must be punished and also noted that they were still awaiting delivery of 30 tractors for eradication that were promised to them. ¶10. (U) The local representative of the PEP program also shared his thoughts that last year's pre-planting program started too late and speculated that the province would have experienced a 60% decrease in cultivation had efforts started before drug lords had already issued "poppy loans" to local farmers encouraging them to grow poppy. He KABUL 00001170 003 OF 003 suggested a new program to provide small loans to farmers for plastic pipes that would help them grow vegetables instead. The PEP international advisor agreed that poppy loans - the only source of income for many farmers - were a huge factor in the existing level of cultivation and stressed that any aid or cash programs for farmers must be managed to ensure that the aid is not being used to repay poppy loans. -------------- LOCAL GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶11. (U) It is still too soon to evaluate local leadership as Farah has had three different governors in the past year and no Deputy Governor since June 2006. Governor Baluch has only been in office since January 31, 2007. He is said to be close to Karzai and has attempted to assert his authority in part by regulating the people's access to the PRT. Baluch has said that while he is willing to accept assistance from Iran, he does not want to foster dependence on Iran. Baluch added that although he lived in Iran for seven years, he has no desire to build up relations and no political interests in Iran. He was reportedly chosen by the GOA to serve in Farah partly to signal to the Iranians that their activities in Farah will not go unchecked. ¶12. (U) There was a large showing of the local PDC for the Ambassador's visit. They stated emphatically that their first priority is security and seemed particularly concerned about spillover from the unrest in Helmand's districts of Musa Qala, Naw Zad, Kajacki, and Sangeen, which they described as a bridge connecting Farah to Helmand and Taliban networks there. Other priorities include getting access to electricity, drinkable water, building of a dam, wells, hospitals, and schools for the province's 91 thousand students. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (U) Post will continue to watch developments in Farah province closely, as the Taliban will undoubtedly continue using the province to create the illusion that the GOA is losing control of not only the South, but perhaps part of the West and North as well. NEUMANN

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -