PRT/LASHKAR GAH - GOVERNOR: SECURITY LIMITS TRIBAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001023 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017 TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH - GOVERNOR: SECURITY LIMITS TRIBAL OUTREACH EFFORTS Classified By: A/DCM Carol Rodley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In meetings March 18 and 24, Governor Wafa reiterated that the security situation was the over-riding concern in Helmand Province. He was initially dismissive of the need for significant outreach to tribal leaders on governance and development, essentially saying that "having everything lined up beforehand" was a "Western" view that did not apply in Afghanistan. He said the Taliban had to be displaced immediately. Wafa wants military operations that are more robust than those seen to date. Nevertheless, Wafa maintained that he continues to reach out to tribal leaders, not only on the need to reject/eject anti-government forces, but alsQon the benefits flowing from the Kajaki project, once it resumed fully. In addition, Wafa said that displacing the Taliban from Musa Qala was the key to security. As the district has been the focus of intense attention beyond Helmand, removing the Taliban would have a widespread and beneficial psychological effect; Musa Qala also seems to merge the security and political efforts Wafa struggles to balance, given that district leaders and a shura are ready to govern after operations, and reconstruction is poised to begin there. Three months into his term, Wafa gets mixed reviews -- his outreach efforts to elders appear to have lost some momentum, he is vocal about his disinterest in the job, and there is growing skepticism about his skill in reaching out to elders. Nevertheless, as a Pashtun elder with connections to the President, Wafa still commands attention, if not always respect. In any case, effectively engaging tribal leaders, especially concerning crucial matters like the Kajak project, will take more than the efforts of Wafa. The PRT has been reaching out to other provincial figures. END SUMMARY Wafa: Security First (and second, and third ...) -------------- --- ¶2. (C) In a March 18 meeting with UK Task Force and PRT representatives, Governor Wafa repeated his oft-heard comments that major security operations were necessary before any progress could be seen on governance and development. He �0A;expressed skepticism about ongoing military operations, indicating his preference for a more robust approach. In his opinion, until more pressure was brought to bear in some districts like Sangin, influential elders would not be inclined to align their interests with those of the GOA, e.g., on the Kajaki energy and infrastructure project. ¶3. (C) A representative from NDS in the meeting (who was visiting the province) challenged Wafa's exclusive focus on security, backing up the PRT's repeatedly stated point that such a focus could result in a political vacuum after any military operations, one to be filled (again) by anti-government forces. Wafa initially dismissed what he described as an overly "Western" position, i.e., one that insists on "having everything lined up beforehand". In his view, the Taliban had to be displaced now. Wafa Insists He Continues to Engage Politically -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Despite dismissing what he described as a too-Western focus on political outreach in advance of military operations, Wafa maintained that he continues to reach out to tribal elders ) not only generally, regarding the importance of rejecting/ejecting anti-government forces (which will help usher in reconstruction and development),but also more specifically on the benefits of the Kajaki project. He initially said he planned to hold a jirga of the province's major stakeholders in the weeks upcoming, but later modified the plan, saying he would hold three separate jirgas, one focusing on tribal leaders, one for mullahs and the third for "mujahidin". (NOTE: The ANSF operation that commenced in the Babaji region of Lashkar Gah delayed his plan to convene the jirgas. END NOTE.) Wafa: Musa Qala is Key For Helmand KABUL 00001023 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) Late in the meeting, Wafa declared Musa Qala to be the key to security in Helmand. He said displacing the Taliban there would have ripple effects not only across Helmand but well beyond. He pointed to the attention given to the district over the last several months following the now-inoperative deal struck between the GOA and the district shura and the Taliban's subsequent attack on the district center last January. Wafa indicated that political outreach was already largely accomplished, as there were district officials already approved by the GOA (though Wafa added that they could be replaced quite easily if need be),there was an established shura, and reconstruction projects were poised to be delivered. He also mentioned that the provincial government had humanitarian supplies on hand to deliver to the district in the aftermath of any military operation. Wafa on Kajaki Project: Security first -------------- ¶6. (C) In a March 24 meeting at the PRT with a U.S. and ISAF delegation to discuss the Kajaki project, Wafa agreed to help arrange contacts with district and local elders to obtain security assurances as the road and power line projects progressed, adding that the locals in the area would support the project. However, he reiterated his conviction that security operations had to take place before any outreach to district and village shuras in Nahri Sarraj and Sangin. According to Wafa, people in those districts still lived in fear and lacked freedom of movement. Three Months On, Wafa's Star Has Dimmed -------------- ¶7. (C) Wafa, who hit the ground running last January with his tribal outreach efforts, generally gets decidely mixed reviews three months on. First, Wafa appears to have lost some energy and momentum. After having gotten two districts to sign his "protocols", Wafa no longer touts his slate of demanding and GOA-centric conditions (both district centers later were briefly occupied by Taliban forces). At a sparsely attended local media event on March 19, Wafa told local journalists that he was a traditionalist who worked through shuras, but since security now was the top priority, the province needed a "younger fighter" to lead. Second, his displeasure at serving in Helmand is apparent, e.g., at the March 19 media event Wafa said he had two jobs (cross-border jirga ("peace commission") member and Governor) and that he asked the President to eliminate one of those positions (Karzai refused). Third, there are concerns about Wafa's effectiveness in his continued outreach efforts. On more than one occasion the Deputy Governor noted that Wafa was an outsider who did not know the tribal dynamics in Helmand. While the Deputy Governor might have his own reasons to undermine the Governor, he was not the only Afghan to have made this assertion, or the only person to question the sophistication of Wafa's outreach efforts or grasp of the issues confronting Helmand. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Wafa arrived Helmand as a "shura dealmaker", but perhaps found that his status and style could not bring the elders into the GOA's sphere, or perhaps he genuinely decided that the security situation did not match his skill set. Either way, expectations are best kept modest regarding the Governor's ability to deliver on anything. A diminished Wafa means that the more crucial matters like security surrounding the Kajaki project might require the intervention of more potent powerbrokers. Other problems of security and governance besetting the province require the engagement of other actors, like key mullahs or perhaps the Deputy Governor. The PRT is engaging these and other figures. Despite the criticism, though, Wafa remains a Pashtun elder with close ties to the President, and this is not lost on local elders, who still seek him out. END COMMENT. NEUMANN