JOINT PLO-EC AND FCC MEETING OFFERS BOLD POLITICAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001201 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL PTER IS SUBJECT: JOINT PLO-EC AND FCC MEETING OFFERS BOLD POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO HAMAS REF: JERUSALEM 01189 Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: A joint PLO-EC/FCC meeting on June 14 recommended to PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) that he break the political partnership with HAMAS and dismiss the current government. Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire between HAMAS and Fatah delegations in Gaza continue. Abu Mazen is waiting to see if these efforts can succeed before making an announcement to implement the recommendations of the PLO-EC/FCC. END SUMMARY. PLO-EC/FCC Meeting -------------- ¶2. (S) A June 14 combined meeting of the PLO Executive Committee (PLO-EC) and the Fatah Central Committee (FCC), recommended that President Mahmud Abbas take the following steps: -- dismiss the national unity government (NUG) based on the powers vested in the President by the Basic Law; -- declare a state of emergency; -- call for an immediate meeting of the PLO Central Council; -- define the HAMAS military wing and the Executive Force as illegal; -- return the selection of leadership to the people through elections; and -- demand international protection forces. Sources in the President's Office say they expect Abbas to make an announcement and issue an official decree late on June 14. (Note: The PLO Central Council is a 130 member body elected by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and authorized to make decisions when the PNC is not in session. End Note.) ¶3. (S) The PLO-EC meeting came following a June 13 FCC meeting at which FCC members urged Abbas to dismiss the NUG and declare a state of emergency. Senior Fatah officials say they believe drastic steps are needed given HAMAS's refusal to make concessions to obtain a cease-fire. Abbas briefed the FCC regarding HAMAS's conditions for a cease-fire, adding that he had agreed to discuss those demands with HAMAS only after implementation of a ceasefire. Cease-Fire Efforts Continue -------------- ¶4. (S) Prior to the PLO-EC/FCC meeting, MG Burhan Hamad (EGIS) met June 13 with senior HAMAS officials including Khalil al-Haya and Ayman Taha. After the meeting, Hamad gave Abu Mazen HAMAS's eight conditions for a cease-fire. They include: -- preserving and strengthening the NUG; -- conducting negotiations through Abbas' representative, vice those of NSA Muhammad Dahlan; -- ensuring one authority and one gun by replacing some security chiefs including Rashid Abu Shabak; -- implementing the Ministry of Interior (MOI) security plan; -- respecting the Cairo understanding of 2005 and implementing the Mecca agreement, to include reform of the PLO; and -- prosecuting Fatah and HAMAS members who killed others during the latest round of violence. ¶5. (S) Abbas rejected the conditions for a cease-fire in a phone call with PM Ismail Haniya later on June 13, but indicated that he will accept the conditions as a basis for negotiation after/after a cease-fire is in place. According to Abbas' advisors, the President and Haniya agreed to work together toward a cease-fire. According to Presidential Guard contacts, plans for Egyptian-brokered cease-fire talks between Fatah and Hamas delegations in Gaza were disrupted by an attack on the Egyptian delegation carried out by Force 17 members who said Abu Mazen had "abandoned" them. Next Steps and Comment -------------- ¶6. (S) The Egyptian brokered talks in Gaza are scheduled for later June 14. According to PLO Chief Negotiator Sa'eb Erekat, Abu Mazen wants to give these talks time to succeed and has delayed an announcement of plans to implement the PLO-EC/FCC recommendations until the evening of June 14. ¶7. (S) Comment: Implementing the PLO-EC/FCC recommendations will not reverse the situation in the Gaza Strip, but it might strengthen Abu Mazen in the West Bank, if he is seen to be decisive. He has been heavily criticized by Fatah cadres JERUSALEM 00001201 002 OF 002 for being indecisive, and a strong step might rally support around him. Ending the political partnership between Fatah and HAMAS likely will not force any HAMAS concessions, and will widen the gap between a Fatah-dominated West Bank and a HAMAS-dominated Gaza Strip. End Comment. WALLES