ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA'S POSITION ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000994 SIPDIS SIPDIS KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE BLACK, EAP/P FOR BAILES, PA/OBS FOR MURPHY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC KPAO UNMIK PGOV YI EU ID SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA'S POSITION ON KOSOVO REF: A. STATE 45355 ¶B. JAKARTA 0673 Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.5 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Indonesia will resist taking a clear position on the Ahtisaari proposal for Kosovo until the last minute and will look for UNSC consensus and a solution agreed by both Serbia and Kosovo. We see little prospect for Indonesian leadership on Kosovo, nor even tacit support for Kosovo independence, if contested by any of the parties. Territorial integrity is a deeply engrained principle here, due not only to long-held NAM principles, but also the history of East Timor's independence and sensitivities over problem regions such as Aceh and Papua. Democracy and human-rights concerns over Serbia's past actions may temper this reluctance, but will not alter this basic position. Religious leaders and members of Parliament have shown little interest in the Kosovo issue. Appeals to Muslim solidarity would not likely be effective and would conflict with other U.S. policy objectives in the Council. The most likely outcome is an abstention. ¶2. (C) The arguments, which could have some resonance here, are that Council Members must uphold the UN process, that Kosovo is a special case and that Ahtisaari is a renowned international problem-solver (notably in Aceh). We believe the single most effective tactic would be a direct personal appeal by Ahtisaari to top policy makers, including the Persident. Second, we propose a series of demarches to the Foreign Ministry both here and through telephone calls by senior State Department officials, e.g., by U/S Burns to Foreign Ministry Secretary General Cotan. Third, we will approach the Europeans here to urge they take the lead on this issue, both because of the obvious regional interest, but also because the GOI is taking lots of heat for "succumbing to U.S. pressure on the Iran resolution." Fourth, we recommend a television interview with Ambassador Wisner on a leading Indonesian news program. End Summary. BACKGROUND ¶3. (C) President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Wirajuda found themselves facing significant domestic fallout following recent UNSC votes on Burma and Iran. Accordingly, the GOI will proceed very cautiously on Kosovo. We believe that while the GOI is strongly leaning against support for Kosovo independence, it has not reached a final decision. Responding to the Ahtisaari proposal in early March, Foreign Affairs Department (DEPLU) Director General for Americas and Europe Eddi Hariyadhi said Indonesia's "basic position" was to "respect territorial integrity of a country once it is acknowledged by (the) international community." It is likely that the GOI is hoping that Russian opposition to Kosovo independence will provide cover for an Indonesian abstention. Whatever Indonesia's final decision, we believe that domestic factors preclude a leadership role for the GOI in shaping the resolution. Assuming the issue remains contested we do not expect a clear GOI decision in favor of either Serbia or Kosovo. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UPPERMOST ¶4. (C) Fundamentally, the GOI's natural inclination is to uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity, i.e., to resist full independence for Kosovo, unless all parties agree. Indonesia will view this issue through the prism of its own regional and ethnic challenges, including Aceh and Papua. Nationalist elements still resent the UN's role in securing the independence of East Timor and would be averse to reinforcing this precedent by condoning independent for Kosovo. Moreover, Indonesia's success in granting extensive autonomy to Aceh and Papua predisposes Jakarta to recommend a halfway solution such as autonomy rather than full JAKARTA 00000994 002 OF 003 independence. At the same time, Indonesia will not want to be seen as endorsing Serbia's past human rights violations in Kosovo. ¶5. (C) Factors that could, in principle, influence the GOI in the direction of Kosovo independence include Indonesia's recent democratic and human rights reforms, as well as Islamic solidarity. In the end, however, we do not believe these influences will be sufficient to carry the day. Indonesian Islamic leaders and members of the legislature have largely shunned the issue, partly because of the geographic distance and because multilateral Islamic organizations such as the OIC have not enunciated a clear position on Kosovo. Taken together, these factors will encourage Indonesia to seek a middle position that is sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy these conflicting policy considerations, again suggesting a likely abstention. DECISION MAKERS ¶6. (C) We believe the decision on a Kosovo resolution will be made, as in the case of the Iran and Burma resolutions, by Foreign Minister Wirajuda in consultation with President Yudhoyono. SBY's spokesman for national security affairs Dino Djalal will play a key coordinating role, and DEPLU Secretary General Imran Cotan would be a useful interlocutor SIPDIS on the issue. Yudhoyono may take a personal interest in Kosovo because of his previous experience as commander of Indonesian peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. But the practical meaning of that peacekeeping experience, part of a long-standing Indonesian foreign policy tradition, is neutrality, which will counsel (again) a middle position on the Kosovo resolution. APPROACH: AHTISAARI TOPS ALL OTHER OPTIONS ¶7. (C) We believe that public outreach on Kosovo is important, but the lack of interest here will make it an uphill battle. Specifically, we recommend a one-on-one exclusive interview with Ambassador Wisner by a leading television news program which would reach a large audience, including influential policy makers and opinion shapers. After that, we would take soundings to see if additional programming could be helpful, but so far we are finding insufficient interest here to warrant a more aggressive public U.S. approach. ¶8. (C) The best chance of mobilizing support for Ahtisaari's proposal lies in a visit by Ahtisaari himself. We believe the Europeans would be more effective selling Ahtisaari's plan due both to obvious regional interests and the sense here that, on the Iran resolution, the GOI succumbed to "American pressure." Ahtisaari is key, though, because he commands widespread respect and goodwill here because of his role in brokering the Aceh accords. A return visit to Indonesia would receive extensive media exposure and would make the case more convincingly than anyone else. Its most important impact, however, would be on GOI officials and we have no doubt that Ahtisaari would have access to officials all the way to the President. ¶9. (C) Because of the relative lack of public traction on the issue, we will want to approach DEPLU directly with our position. This should be done on several levels, e.g., initial discussions at the working level (already occurring) in Jakarta; a formal demarche by the Charge to the FM's key UNSC advisor Desra Percaya; a telephone call by U/S Burns to Secretary General (essentially Deputy Foreign Minister) Imran SIPDIS Cotan; and, in the end game, a telephone call by the Secretary to FM Wirajuda. The last two steps could be SIPDIS double-tracked by regular calls by the Charge on Dino Djalal. We also intend to approach European missions here to urge that they take an active role in lobbying on this issue. JAKARTA 00000994 003 OF 003 ARGUMENTS ¶10. (C) The most effective argument with DEPLU is to emphasize the need to uphold the UN process. We need to sell the Ahtisaari plan as the natural outgrowth of UNSCR 1244 and/or demonstrate that Serbia is not abiding by that resolution. One of the GOI's central points in defending the Iran resolution vote before the Indonesian public was that it fulfilled previous UN decisions on Iran. Indonesia's commitment to the UN is the only possible trump card to counter Indonesian concerns over the implications the Kosovo resolution could have for Aceh, Papua and other regions whose relationship with the center remain problematic. Appeals to Islamic solidarity will not likely register with DEPLU and run counter to our other interests on the Council. ¶11. (C) As with the Iran vote, the key to gain Indonesia's support is to somehow reach a consensus on the Kosovo resolution. Absent Russian (and by implication Serbian) support, obtaining an affirmative vote from here is most unlikely. We will put on a full court press for an affirmative vote, but we should be prepared for abstention. HEFFERN