ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA'S POSITION ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000994

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KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE BLACK, EAP/P FOR BAILES, PA/OBS FOR
MURPHY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPAO UNMIK PGOV YI EU ID
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA'S POSITION ON KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 45355

B. JAKARTA 0673

Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Indonesia will resist taking a clear
position on the Ahtisaari proposal for Kosovo until the last
minute and will look for UNSC consensus and a solution agreed
by both Serbia and Kosovo. We see little prospect for
Indonesian leadership on Kosovo, nor even tacit support for
Kosovo independence, if contested by any of the parties.
Territorial integrity is a deeply engrained principle here,
due not only to long-held NAM principles, but also the
history of East Timor's independence and sensitivities over
problem regions such as Aceh and Papua. Democracy and
human-rights concerns over Serbia's past actions may temper
this reluctance, but will not alter this basic position.
Religious leaders and members of Parliament have shown little
interest in the Kosovo issue. Appeals to Muslim solidarity
would not likely be effective and would conflict with other
U.S. policy objectives in the Council. The most likely
outcome is an abstention.


2. (C) The arguments, which could have some resonance here,
are that Council Members must uphold the UN process, that
Kosovo is a special case and that Ahtisaari is a renowned
international problem-solver (notably in Aceh). We believe
the single most effective tactic would be a direct personal
appeal by Ahtisaari to top policy makers, including the
Persident. Second, we propose a series of demarches to the
Foreign Ministry both here and through telephone calls by
senior State Department officials, e.g., by U/S Burns to
Foreign Ministry Secretary General Cotan. Third, we will
approach the Europeans here to urge they take the lead on
this issue, both because of the obvious regional interest,
but also because the GOI is taking lots of heat for
"succumbing to U.S. pressure on the Iran resolution."
Fourth, we recommend a television interview with Ambassador
Wisner on a leading Indonesian news program. End Summary.

BACKGROUND


3. (C) President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Wirajuda
found themselves facing significant domestic fallout
following recent UNSC votes on Burma and Iran. Accordingly,
the GOI will proceed very cautiously on Kosovo. We believe
that while the GOI is strongly leaning against support for
Kosovo independence, it has not reached a final decision.
Responding to the Ahtisaari proposal in early March, Foreign
Affairs Department (DEPLU) Director General for Americas and
Europe Eddi Hariyadhi said Indonesia's "basic position" was
to "respect territorial integrity of a country once it is
acknowledged by (the) international community." It is likely
that the GOI is hoping that Russian opposition to Kosovo
independence will provide cover for an Indonesian abstention.
Whatever Indonesia's final decision, we believe that domestic
factors preclude a leadership role for the GOI in shaping the
resolution. Assuming the issue remains contested we do not
expect a clear GOI decision in favor of either Serbia or
Kosovo.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UPPERMOST


4. (C) Fundamentally, the GOI's natural inclination is to
uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity, i.e.,
to resist full independence for Kosovo, unless all parties
agree. Indonesia will view this issue through the prism of
its own regional and ethnic challenges, including Aceh and
Papua. Nationalist elements still resent the UN's role in
securing the independence of East Timor and would be averse
to reinforcing this precedent by condoning independent for
Kosovo. Moreover, Indonesia's success in granting extensive
autonomy to Aceh and Papua predisposes Jakarta to recommend a
halfway solution such as autonomy rather than full

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independence. At the same time, Indonesia will not want to
be seen as endorsing Serbia's past human rights violations in
Kosovo.


5. (C) Factors that could, in principle, influence the GOI in
the direction of Kosovo independence include Indonesia's
recent democratic and human rights reforms, as well as
Islamic solidarity. In the end, however, we do not believe
these influences will be sufficient to carry the day.
Indonesian Islamic leaders and members of the legislature
have largely shunned the issue, partly because of the
geographic distance and because multilateral Islamic
organizations such as the OIC have not enunciated a clear
position on Kosovo. Taken together, these factors will
encourage Indonesia to seek a middle position that is
sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy these conflicting policy
considerations, again suggesting a likely abstention.

DECISION MAKERS


6. (C) We believe the decision on a Kosovo resolution will be
made, as in the case of the Iran and Burma resolutions, by
Foreign Minister Wirajuda in consultation with President
Yudhoyono. SBY's spokesman for national security affairs
Dino Djalal will play a key coordinating role, and DEPLU
Secretary General Imran Cotan would be a useful interlocutor

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on the issue. Yudhoyono may take a personal interest in
Kosovo because of his previous experience as commander of
Indonesian peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. But the practical
meaning of that peacekeeping experience, part of a
long-standing Indonesian foreign policy tradition, is
neutrality, which will counsel (again) a middle position on
the Kosovo resolution.

APPROACH: AHTISAARI TOPS ALL OTHER OPTIONS


7. (C) We believe that public outreach on Kosovo is
important, but the lack of interest here will make it an
uphill battle. Specifically, we recommend a one-on-one
exclusive interview with Ambassador Wisner by a leading
television news program which would reach a large audience,
including influential policy makers and opinion shapers.
After that, we would take soundings to see if additional
programming could be helpful, but so far we are finding
insufficient interest here to warrant a more aggressive
public U.S. approach.


8. (C) The best chance of mobilizing support for Ahtisaari's
proposal lies in a visit by Ahtisaari himself. We believe
the Europeans would be more effective selling Ahtisaari's
plan due both to obvious regional interests and the sense
here that, on the Iran resolution, the GOI succumbed to
"American pressure." Ahtisaari is key, though, because he
commands widespread respect and goodwill here because of his
role in brokering the Aceh accords. A return visit to
Indonesia would receive extensive media exposure and would
make the case more convincingly than anyone else. Its most
important impact, however, would be on GOI officials and we
have no doubt that Ahtisaari would have access to officials
all the way to the President.


9. (C) Because of the relative lack of public traction on the
issue, we will want to approach DEPLU directly with our
position. This should be done on several levels, e.g.,
initial discussions at the working level (already occurring)
in Jakarta; a formal demarche by the Charge to the FM's key
UNSC advisor Desra Percaya; a telephone call by U/S Burns to
Secretary General (essentially Deputy Foreign Minister) Imran

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Cotan; and, in the end game, a telephone call by the
Secretary to FM Wirajuda. The last two steps could be

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double-tracked by regular calls by the Charge on Dino Djalal.
We also intend to approach European missions here to urge
that they take an active role in lobbying on this issue.


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ARGUMENTS


10. (C) The most effective argument with DEPLU is to
emphasize the need to uphold the UN process. We need to sell
the Ahtisaari plan as the natural outgrowth of UNSCR 1244
and/or demonstrate that Serbia is not abiding by that
resolution. One of the GOI's central points in defending the
Iran resolution vote before the Indonesian public was that it
fulfilled previous UN decisions on Iran. Indonesia's
commitment to the UN is the only possible trump card to
counter Indonesian concerns over the implications the Kosovo
resolution could have for Aceh, Papua and other regions whose
relationship with the center remain problematic. Appeals to
Islamic solidarity will not likely register with DEPLU and
run counter to our other interests on the Council.


11. (C) As with the Iran vote, the key to gain Indonesia's
support is to somehow reach a consensus on the Kosovo
resolution. Absent Russian (and by implication Serbian)
support, obtaining an affirmative vote from here is most
unlikely. We will put on a full court press for an
affirmative vote, but we should be prepared for abstention.
HEFFERN