UNSC/KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO INDONESIA ON AHTISAARI

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000871 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK YI ID SUBJECT: UNSC/KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO INDONESIA ON AHTISAARI PROPOSALS REF: A. STATE 37835 (DEMARCHE TO SUPPORT UN KOSOVO PROPOSALS) ¶B. JAKARTA 738 (NEXT STEPS ON KOSOVO) ¶C. JAKARTA 683 (INDONESIA WOULD ONLY SUPPORT CONSENSUS RESOLUTION) Classified By: Marc L. Desjardins, Political Counselor. Reason (1.4 b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. According to an official at Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs, the GOI is still developing its position on independence for Kosovo. Despite long-held principles that would preclude support for an independent Kosovo, our contact conceded that the GOI would remain flexible on the issue in light of the specifics of the Kosovo case and support for Kosovo Muslims on the part of the Indonesian public and politicians. He said that the OIC was divided on the matter. End summary. ¶2. (C) We met March 26 with Hery Saripudin, Deputy Director for International Security at Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs, to urge that Indonesia support the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari. In light of past GOI statements (refs B and C),we stressed that the case of Kosovo is unique, and that support for its independence does not create a precedent for other areas, such as Indonesia's Papua province. ¶3. (C) Saripudin replied that Indonesia was still thinking through its position on the matter, and would study Ahtisaari's recommendations closely. Repeating comments we have heard in previous discussions, Saripudin said that the GOI had three guiding principles on the issue. First, the GOI supports the territorial integrity of existing states, including Serbia. Second, the GOI does not want to create a precedent for international community involvement in separatist movements. Third, the GOI promotes resolution of such conflicts by means of dialogue and negotiation. Saripudin cautioned, however, that these reflected ideals, and said that the GOI would have to be flexible in looking at this issue of Kosovo. He went on to note that public opinion and many Muslim leaders and politicians in Indonesia tend to support Kosovo independence, and that this would influence the decision-making process. ¶4. (C) We asked whether there was an OIC position on the Kosovo question. Saripudin said that there was still a "tug of war" in progress within the OIC on the matter. Although most members were sympathetic to the plight of Kosovar Muslims, he said, some argued that taking a collective position had implications for other regions such as Cyprus and the Western Sahara. ¶5. (C) Saripudin asked whether Russia would support independence for Kosovo. We responded drawing of reftel A para 7. Saripudin said he felt that China would not be inclined to support it, and that Chinese diplomats had recently told the Indonesians that supporting independence for Kosovo would create a precedent for international community involvement in ethnic issues in the PRC such as Uighur separatism. Saripudin said that he looked forward to being in touch with us as the Kosovo issue moved forward in the coming months. HEFFERN