UNSC/IRAN: INDONESIA WANTS MORE TIME ON UNSC ACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000768 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND IO/T - VAN BEHREN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC IR ID SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: INDONESIA WANTS MORE TIME ON UNSC ACTION REF: A. STATE 33349 (UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAN) ¶B. USUN 213 (P5 RESOLUTION INTRODUCED) Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On March 16, Charge and PolCouns pressed several Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs officials and advisors to President Yudhoyono to support the P-5 UNSC resolution on Iran (reftels). Foreign Minister Wirajuda, who is currently traveling in Europe, will ultimately decide the matter, but we were told that Indonesia favors referring the issue to Experts on Tuesday, March 20 and bringing it before the Security Council for action on Wednesday, March 21. None of our interlocutors engaged on the substance of the resolution. The EU-3 received similar responses to their joint demarche. End summary. ¶2. (C) Charge pressed Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Dino Djalal for speedy action on the resolution. Djalal assured us that he understood the urgency of the matter, but needed to discuss it with the now-traveling Foreign Minister before seeking instructions from the President. He was not familiar, in detail, with the substance of the resolution nor the timing of UNSC action. After going over key points of the resolution, Charge stressed that the international community needed to stay united on this issue, requiring a 15-0 consensus on the resolution. Djalal promised to get back to us over the long weekend (Monday is a local holiday) with a more substantive response. ¶3. (C) Separately, in the absence of more senior Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Charge raised the resolution in a meeting with acting Director General for Multilateral Affairs Budi Bowoleksono. He stressed that the draft resolution reflected an incremental diplomatic approach consistent with previous resolutions, and that it was critical that the Security Council speak with one voice on Iran's non-compliance with UNSCR 1737. The credibility of the Council was at stake, he noted. ¶4. (C) Bowoleksono said that Indonesia wanted a few days to study the resolution further. Indonesia, he said, was in a difficult position because Foreign Minister Wirajuda and other senior officials are traveling, and it was the Friday before a long holiday weekend. Indonesia, he said, wanted Experts to take up the matter in New York on Tuesday, March 20 and the Security Council to address it on Wednesday, March ¶21. Pressed on whether the Indonesians were prepared for UNSC action on March 21, Bowoleksono said they were. ¶5. (C) Bowoleksono also expressed annoyance over "process." He claimed that Non-Permanent Members such as Indonesia, South Africa, and Qatar had not been adequately consulted by the P-5 during the formulation of the resolution, and that Indonesia was displeased to learn about its contents first through the media. Bowoleksono assured us, however, that he would present our views up in a call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda later in the day. ¶6. (C) Also on March 16, PolCouns met with Tri Djandan, a foreign policy advisor to President Yudhoyono, and Harry Purwanto, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs North America desk. PolCouns stressed that the draft resolution reflected P-5 consensus, and that it also reflected the United States' commitment to a multilateral approach on a vitally important issue. PolCouns argued further that since several of Iran's regional neighbors were threatened by the prospect of its acquisition of nuclear weapons, this was not a "Muslim issue," and that the U.S. was not sympathetic to Indonesian politicians who framed the matter in these terms. We said that this resolution was of critical importance and that Indonesia's vote was extremely important to the U.S. The credibility of the Security Council was at stake, we said, and we would be watching Indonesia's actions closely. ¶7. (C) Purwanto responded that he understood the significance of this matter, and that Foreign Minister Wirajuda would decide the issue. Djandan said that he would have to study the resolution in detail, but added that there were "domestic considerations" that would have to be factored in to Indonesia's decision. ¶8. (C) PolCouns also took a call from Department of Foreign Affairs Director for International Security Affairs Desra Percaya, who is currently out of Jakarta. Percaya, repeating the line we had already heard from Budi Bowoleksono, said that Indonesia favored holding an Experts meeting on Tuesday, and bringing the Iran issue to the UNSC the following day. This is evidently the working level Department of Foreign Affairs position until the Minister is able to address the matter personally. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) This vote will be a difficult call for Indonesia. If the GOI supports a resolution condemning Iran, President Yudhoyono will face an outcry from Muslim opposition politicians, a group which he has been loathe to offend to date. Our best bet for securing GOI support would be to accommodate any reasonable request for extra time, then to forge the broadest UNSC bloc possible in favor of the Iran resolution in order to play on Indonesia's strong aversion to being isolated in diplomatic fora. Arab and Muslim support for such a resolution will be indispensable for getting the Indonesians on board as well. End comment. HEFFERN