CDA COURTESY CALL ON NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000740 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2012 TAGS: PREL PHUM KISL ID SUBJECT: CDA COURTESY CALL ON NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA REF: JAKARTA 725 -- INDONESIA RESPONDS TO PAKISTAN'S M.E. PEACE PLAN WITH ONE OF ITS OWN Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On March 13, the CDA made a courtesy call on the new Saudi ambassador to Indonesia, Abdulrahman Mohammed Amen A. Alkhayyat. The Ambassador told us that the Saudi Embassy engages with the GOI primarily on labor and religious pilgrimage issues. When asked for his opinion of Indonesia's efforts to mediate Middle East crises, Alkhayyat responded rather dismissively about Jakarta's lack of influence and contacts in the region. Alkhayyat said he has not met with the Indonesians about Iran and was reluctant so early in his tenure here to raise sensitive political issues. On Saudi assistance, Alkhayyat told us that all official relief aid is channeled through the Saudi Charity Campaign, which is supervised by the Saudi Ministry of Interior. Other Saudi charities and individuals are active in building mosques, he said, although not as many now as before September 11. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On March 13, the CDA made a courtesy call on the new Saudi ambassador to Indonesia, Abdulrahman Mohammed Amen A. Alkhayyat. Alkhayyat, who took up his assignment three months ago, is returning to Jakarta for a second tour, having served as the Saudi consular chief here from 1990-1993. Alkhayyat told us that his interactions with the Government of Indonesia (GOI) have been somewhat limited to date. He told us that he is taking the first six months of his tour to make contacts, develop relationships, and try to understand what is going on in Indonesia; he is also trying to get internal embassy matters in order, including resolving a long-standing land dispute so that the chancery can be moved closer to the center of Jakarta. Government-to-Government Engagement Mostly on Haj, Labor -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Alkhayyat, the Saudi Embassy engages primarily with the Ministry of Religious Affairs on government-to-government issues, particularly during the pilgrimage seasons. He described the umra pilgrimage especially as an irritant in the bilateral relationship. Last year, he said, there were some 75,000 Indonesian umra pilgrims during Ramadan, approximately half of whom stayed on illegally in Saudi Arabia to perform the haj nearly three months later. A smaller percentage never returned to Indonesia. Alkhayyat said these overstays put Saudi Arabia in an awkward position, since the SAG cannot forcibly expel pilgrims until the haj has been completed ("the Islamic world would make propaganda" against the government were they to do so, he commented). ¶4. (C) Another bilateral issue of note is labor. According to Alkhayyat, there are approximately 800,000 Indonesians working in Saudi Arabia, including about 20,000 illegal workers. The vast majority of these laborers are unskilled, he said, and limited by their lack of English. Although Alkhayyat described several precautionary measures that the SAG takes to ensure that laborers are not exploited (for example, maintaining a blacklist of known abusers and providing a special department for processing workers' passports),he conceded that problems persist. The Jakarta embassy processes about 1000 visas daily, he noted, with about 40,000 issued in January and February alone. To help address this problem, we urged the Saudi Ambassador to support the Government of Indonesia's pending anti-trafficking bill, which could help clean up Indonesian recruitment agencies. "Of course," Alkhayyat replied, without conviction. Indonesia's Middle East Peace Efforts: Well-Intentioned But Not Credible -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) We asked for Alkhayyat's opinion of Indonesia's efforts to mediate Middle East crises. Alkhayyat replied diplomatically that "they are trying to play a role, but what they are trying to do is difficult." He described the Indonesians as having a "gap in understanding. They don't know a lot about the area or what is going on there," nor do they have deep relationships with Saudi Arabia's neighbors (unlike Pakistan, whose mediation attempts Alkhayyat believes are more credible). We inquired about the Sunni-Shi'a mediation efforts planned by non-governmental actors like JAKARTA 00000740 002 OF 002 Nahdlatul Ulama (ref A). "I am hopeful," he said, "but I think it is for publicity." In a few years, he said, Indonesia could play a positive role in the Middle East and more broadly, but in the short term, he doubted they could. ¶6. (C) We asked for Alkhayyat's thoughts on Iran. Alkhayyat noted that the Saudi government is trying to moderate Iran, but he characterized Iran as a different place since Ahmadinejad took power. The SAG is also constrained by concerns about its own Shi'a population, he added. When asked if he meets with the Indonesians about Iran, Alkhayyat flatly replied that he did not. "I'm watching now," he commented. "Because the situation with the Sunni and Shi'a is so sensitive, I have to be careful," added Alkhayyat. When we encouraged him to speak to the GOI about Iran's nuclear program, he demurred again, arguing that he could not raise such sensitive political issues so early in his tenure here. Saudi Assistance Programs -------------- ¶7. (C) We asked about Saudi programs in Indonesia. In the field of education, Alkhayyat pointed to the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA),a branch of Riyadh's Imam Muhammad bin Saud University that was established in the late 1970s. The Institute's main role, he said, is teaching Arabic and Islamic studies "in the correct way" (Note. The Institute is a center of Wahhabist propagation in Indonesia. End note.) Saudi teachers have produced more than 7,000 graduates at LIPIA, he said, and provided Arabic language training to others, including government officials. The SAG also runs a small primary and secondary school in Jakarta, Al-Haramain Islamic School, for Saudi and other Arab embassy children. ¶8. (C) In terms of relief assistance, Alkhayyat said that all of it is funneled through the Saudi Charity Campaign. The Campaign, which was founded to centralize charitable giving for victims of the 2004 tsunami, is supervised by the Saudi Ministry of Interior (if not, he joked, "some people would be angry. Of course, you have the right.") The Campaign's staff are based in Saudi, Alkhayyat said, but travel periodically to Indonesia to supervise projects. The Campaign has been working primarily in Aceh and Yogyakarta, digging wells, repairing mosques, and distributing food during Ramadan (but not cash, he claimed). In Jakarta, the Campaign plans to build some 2,500 homes, presumably for the poor. Alkhayyat estimates that other Saudi charities (mentioning the Muslim World League particularly) have built approximately 3,000 mosques in Indonesia and that private citizens have built an additional 5,000-15,000 mosques and prayer halls in the names of their relatives. Before the September 11 terrorist attacks, Alkhayyat added, many different Saudi charities and individuals worked in Indonesia; there are fewer now, however, because people are concerned. Bio Notes -------------- ¶9. (C) Alkhayyat is a graduate of the King Abdelaziz School of Management who has previously served in Korea, Jakarta, Egypt, and the UN. He came to Jakarta from an assignment in Beirut, and his wife and 14-year old son will join him this summer. Alkhayyat has three other children: a high school-aged son who would like to study in the US (but his mother won't permit it),a daughter attending university in Jeddah, and a third son who is studying at the American University in Beirut. He told us that it is his "dream" to have a return posting in the U.S. HEFFERN