U.S. TEAM VISITS INDONESIA'S SULAWESI SEA AREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000706 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA, DS/CC DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017 TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO ID SUBJECT: U.S. TEAM VISITS INDONESIA'S SULAWESI SEA AREA REF: A. JAKARTA 00092 ¶B. 2006 JAKARTA 10926 ¶C. 2006 SECSTATE 143178 ¶D. 2006 JAKARTA 07378 ¶E. 2006 SECSTATE 115283 ¶F. 2006 BANGKOK 02270 ¶G. 2006 JAKARTA 03898 ¶H. 2006 JAKARTA 1454 Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) Summary. In late January, a DS/ATA-led team of U.S. and GOI security officials sponsored by S/CT assessed the security needs along Indonesia's Sulawesi Sea border areas. The visit was part of the Border Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) targeting the strategic Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines triborder area, in response to a 2006 request by regional Chiefs of Mission. GOI officials were supportive of the study and regarded it as directly relevant to countering ongoing terrorist operations. Many local officials appeared eager to make needed improvements, while the team observed a general lack of security equipment, training, standard procedures and coordination among law enforcement agencies. The local GOI Immigration and Customs capabilities were the most underdeveloped and neither agency exercised control over the area's ports of entry. The GOI's difficulties in overcoming even the most basic operational challenges indicates that foreign assistance remains crucial in order for GOI agencies to secure this important border area. The release of the team's study, expected later this month, will create an opportunity for USG and partner nations to work with the GOI to develop the capabilities required to improve border security, including the monitoring and interdicting of terrorists and other transnational criminals and the routes they exploit. We need to find the necessary resources to make the most of this opportunity. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) A nine-member DS/ATA-led team of U.S. and GOI security officials conducted a January 23-29 visit of Indonesia's Sulawesi Sea border areas to meet with local GOI officials and assess the security needs there. The S/CT-sponsored visit was part of the Department's Border Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) directed at the strategic Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines triborder area, in response to a 2006 request by regional Chiefs of Mission (Refs E, H). The team consisted of six U.S. officials from DS/ATA, the U.S. Coast Guard, DHS/CBP, DHS/ICE, DOD/JIATF-West and DOJ/ICITAP, as well as three GOI officials from the Indonesian National Police (INP),Immigration and Customs. An Embassy officer accompanied the team throughout the assessment. ¶3. (SBU) During a January 23 pre-trip meeting with GOI officials, (ret) INP Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai, head of the National CT Coordinating Desk, told the assessment team of the direct relevance of the triborder area to ongoing terrorist operations. Using a large wall-size relief map of the archipelago, Mbai pointed out the traditional cross-border channels in East Kalimantan and the Sangihe-Talaud islands of North Sulawesi used by terrorists and other transnational criminals. He told the team that he hoped the study would build momentum and support for the assistance needed to secure these areas, and that he hoped we would not find ourselves returning to this point every few years to conduct yet another initial assessment. As a parting instruction, Mbai urged the team's three GOI members to ensure local officials facilitated the team's work, and said the border study comprised part of our ongoing bilateral cooperation. ¶4. (C) Starting with Manado and Bitung in North Sulawesi, followed by Balikpapan, Tarakan and Nunukan in East Kalimantan, the team met with local INP, Immigration and Customs officials and conducted site visits to observe the security tools and procedures in place at important transit locations. The closer to the border and the further from Jakarta the team traveled, the more meager the GOI investment in security measures became. Previous Post observations (Refs A, G) were confirmed in the general lack of security equipment, training, standard procedures and coordination JAKARTA 00000706 002 OF 002 among law enforcement agencies, despite an apparent eagerness among many local officials to improve overall security. ¶5. (C) The team's DHS members noted that the GOI Immigration and Customs offices functioned at the most basic levels, and were as much as 30 years behind the times. Neither Immigration nor Customs were seen as exercising control over the area's ports of entry. While visiting the formal cross-border maritime entry point in Nunukan, team members witnessed few security procedures in place: nearly all the baggage and passengers arriving on the ferry from Tawao, Malaysia went unchecked. Neither agency appeared to have a strategy for continuous improvement or professional development, nor did they perceive themselves as having a role as a law enforcement authority. Except for the INP, the agencies did not maintain the ability to conduct serious investigations, detentions or arrests. In the rare instance where Immigration or Customs detained someone, they told the team, no restraints were used either in transporting or in detaining the person. ¶6. (C) The lack of a baseline from which to assess either the threat or the GOI response complicates the effort to develop recommendations for improving security. None of the GOI agencies maintained a reliable set of statistics, performance indicators or standardized reporting system, and local officials were hardpressed to point to recent arrests related to crossing the border. Nonetheless, INP and other GOI security officials continue to assert that transnational criminals, including terrorists, currently use official maritime ports of entry as their primary crossing points when transiting among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Southern Philippines. Former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member Nasir Abas confirmed to us recently that the JI continues to actively use the border crossing between Nunukan and Tawau. ¶7. (C) The GOI's difficulty in overcoming even the most primitive operational challenges, such as fuel to operate existing assets, suggests that foreign assistance will remain essential for GOI agencies to achieve the more advanced level of readiness needed to secure this important border area. As a case in point, the GOI Immigration Department's International Cooperation Section contacted the Embassy shortly after completing the border trip to request assistance to publish internal resource manuals on identifying fraudulent documents and conducting border operations that the office had recently compiled but lacked the resources to publish and distribute. Also, the Mission will use funds from an existing Department of Defense program to publish and distribute the manuals to GOI Immigration field offices, including in the triborder area. The release of the team's study, expected later this month, will create an opportunity for USG and partner nations to work with the GOI to develop the capabilities required to improve border security, including the interdiction of terrorists and other transnational criminals and the monitoring and control of the routes they exploit. We need to find the necessary resources to make the most of this opportunity. HEFFERN