PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES ANTI-TERROR MEASURES, NAMRU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000635 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM KISL SN ID SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES ANTI-TERROR MEASURES, NAMRU REF: A. JAKARTA 229 (POSO REMAINS CALM) ¶B. JAKARTA 248 (SUPPORT FOR POSO) ¶C. JAKARTA 122 (NAMRU AGREEMENT) JAKARTA 00000635 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 26 hearing with several security Ministries, the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) urged the government of Indonesia to address terrorism's root causes more forcefully. The DPR's Commission I, the Commission for foreign policy and defense issues, summoned Coordinating Minister Widodo and the Ministers for Defense, Foreign Affairs (the Minister was not able to attend),Home Affairs, and Justice and Human Rights to a marathon nine hour hearing that covered a wide range of topics. The Minister of Fisheries, the TNI Commander, the National Police Chief, and the National Intelligence Chief also provided testimony in what has become a biannual ritual with the DPR. Commission I Chairman Theo Sambuaga set the tone for a session that focused heavily on terrorism by calling on Coordinating Minister Widodo and the GOI to establish a campaign of "deradicalization," with the goal of creating a climate in Indonesia that would be hostile to hard line religious groups and terrorism in general. Commission I also heard testimony on NAMRU negotiations, border security concerns, and the politically charged issue of Singaporean land reclamation projects using Indonesian sand. In a March 2 meeting with the Charge d'Affaires, Commission I Chairman Theo Sambuaga spelled out the components of his plan for deradicalization and explained the DPR's concerns with a continued NAMRU presence in Indonesia. End Summary. COMMISSION I CHAIRMAN CALLS FOR DERADICALIZATION -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 2, Commission I Chairman and Golkar Vice Chairman Theo Sambuaga provided the Charge with a full readout of the Commission's February 26 hearing. Theo lamented the GOI's inability to address the root causes of terrorism in Indonesia and noted that his Commission had urged Coordinating Minister Widodo and his team to develop a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism. Theo explained that his call for "deradicalization" represented a rebuke of the administration for its apparent unwillingness to fight terrorism through education and public awareness. In Theo's estimation, the counter-terrorism battle could not be waged simply with guns and police action, but would also have to incorporate a campaign to moderate religious fervor. Such a campaign would not only make recruitment for terrorist elements much more difficult, but would also enhance public support for the GOI's counter-terror measures. Charge agreed, but stressed that GOI leaders and politicians needed to support strong police actions against terrorists, as in Poso in January. WIDODO BLAMES POVERTY, ANTI-TERROR CHIEF DEFENDS EFFORTS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In his appearance before Commission I, Coordinating Minister Widodo acknowledged the complexity of the anti-terror battle and argued that to be truly effective, the government would have to enlist help from throughout the country. Widodo emphasized the importance of poverty as an underlying cause of terrorism and suggested that economic improvement and poverty alleviation would greatly enhance the GOI's battle against terrorism. ¶4. (SBU) Widodo's Anti-Terror Desk Chief, Ansyaad Mbai, also addressed Commission I and argued that the GOI had already taken steps to "deradicalize" the country by enhancing cooperation with religious and community leaders and working to prevent the misuse of religion as a tool of terrorist elements. Ansyaad noted in his testimony that the two largest mass Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, had endorsed and assisted these efforts. A FEW PARLIAMENTARIANS DECRY THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE -------------- -------------- JAKARTA 00000635 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) During the course of the hearing, a small contingent of Commission I members took issue with what they characterized as the government's heavy handed approach during the January Poso raid described in Refs A and B. The legislators expressed regret for the loss of civilian life in conjunction with the raid and characterized the GOI's approach to the operation as repressive. Theo Sambuaga told the Charge these legislators were vastly outnumbered by Commission I members that were supportive of the raid and he said that they represented an insignificant minority. ¶6. (C) Jeffrey Massie, a Commission I legislator from the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS),a Christian party with only a minor presence in the DPR, told us that he was "not at all impressed" by the proceedings. He explained that most legislators simply used the discussion to posture and grandstand, and that "nothing of substance" was covered during the Commission's discussion of the Poso raid and the government's anti-terror efforts. NAMRU -------------- ¶7. (SBU) During the February 26 hearing, Coordinating Minister Widodo provided Commission I members with an update on the technical negotiations toward a Memorandum of Understanding for the Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-2) in Jakarta (Ref C). Widodo told the Commission the negotiations would determine whether the GOI would extend its cooperation with NAMRU and noted that such a determination would be based exclusively on whether or not it would be in Indonesia's national interest to do so. ¶8. (C) Theo Sambuaga told the Charge that some members of Commission I questioned the wisdom of extending cooperation with NAMRU. According to Sambuaga, their concerns revolved around four outstanding questions that they would need to resolve before endorsing the MOU: What did Indonesia have to show for the first 40 years of its cooperation with NAMRU?; why should NAMRU employees be given diplomatic immunity; why did the Naval Medical Research Unit not coordinate with the Indonesian navy?; and why was NAMRU so secretive? The Charge outlined for Theo the benefits of the GOI's 40 year cooperation with NAMRU, explained that NAMRU employees were members of the U.S. Embassy community and therefore entitled to "A T equivalent status, and briefed him on NAMRU's medical mandate and its close collaboration with the GOI Ministry of Health. He explained that the Indonesian navy did not have the capacity to liaise with NAMRU as it did not have medical expertise. The Charge further noted that NAMRU shared all of its research with the Ministry of Health, underscored the fact that 70 Indonesian professionals worked there, and highlighted the transparent nature of NAMRU's operations. The Charge invited Theo and all the members of Commission I to inspect NAMRU's facilities. Theo accepted the invitation and promised to identify a time for the Commission to tour NAMRU, provided it was jointly sponsored by the GOI. BORDER CONCERNS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Commission I members also used the hearing to question TNI commander Djoko Syanto about border security. Djoko explained to the Commission that the government had recently closed the East Timor-Indonesia border in an effort to stem the exodus of East Timorese attempting to escape the deteriorating situation there. He suggested the TNI would be able to secure the border without reinforcements. ¶10. (C) According to Theo Sambuaga, Commission members also used the hearing to give voice to concerns about Indonesia's porous border with Malaysia. Theo emphasized the importance of strong border security and questioned whether the GOI had dedicated adequate resources to addressing this crucial national security issue. HEY SINGAPORE - DON'T TOUCH MY SAND! -------------- ¶11. (C) Of all the topics discussed during the all day JAKARTA 00000635 003.2 OF 003 session, the discussion of the bilateral relationship with Singapore was arguably the most charged. In his introduction of the topic, Theo Sambuaga lectured Widodo and told him not to allow Singapore to "dominate or dictate" in negotiations over regional borders and a Defense Cooperation Agreement. ¶12. (C) Yuddy Chrisnandi, a legislator from Golkar, seized the opportunity to score easy political points on a topic of much discussion in Indonesia as of late: the use of Indonesian sand for Singaporean land reclamation projects. Yuddy noted that in 1976 Singapore was only 581 square kilometers in size, while in 2001 it had grown to 650 square kilometers. He added that Singapore's official reclamation plan called for the country to grow to 750 square kilometers in 2020, a gain of 100 square kilometers in just 20 years. Yuddy questioned rhetorically how Singapore had been able to add so much territory while purchasing only a fraction of the needed sand from Indonesia (Note: Indonesian news outlets have reported extensively about the alleged use of smuggled Indonesian sand in Singapore),before urging the government to monitor the export of the vital commodity more assiduously. HEFFERN