INDONESIA'S DETACHMENT 88 HITTING ITS STRIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000545 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA, DS/CC DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017 TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S DETACHMENT 88 HITTING ITS STRIDE REF: A. JAKARTA 00292 ¶B. JAKARTA 00248 ¶C. 06 JAKARTA 05485 ¶D. 05 JAKARTA 14789 ¶E. 03 STATE 310662 Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since first emerging in the wake of the 2002 Bali terror attacks, Detachment 88 has begun to establish itself as the counterterrorism flagship of the Indonesian National Police (INP). A growing list of successful CT operations marks the Detachment's maturing capabilities. Recently, its CT operations again drew criticism from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who repeated his calls for the dissolution of the Detachment. Since 2002, foreign donors have focused CT assistance on the elite cadre of officers in Detachment 88, many of whom are drawn from the INP's existing special units. This steady stream of foreign assistance has given important support to Indonesia's effort to combat violent extremism; in particular, the U.S. Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and Australian and United Kingdom assistance continues to develop the Detachment's tactical capabilities. The Detachment still faces several internal INP challenges before it becomes fully functional, such as stabilizing its relationship with the INP's CT Taskforce ("Team Bomb") and developing a rank advancement plan that will retain INP officers in CT units. Lifting the 2003 ban on using International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to train INP Mobile Brigade units would help us broaden our training to include the units most in need of assistance. END SUMMARY Police CT Success Attracts Ire of Extremists -------------- ¶2. (C) JI leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and other associated with the JI-linked Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia (MMI) have again targeted the INP with public calls to dissolve its CT flagship, Detachment 88, after widely publicized INP operations in January against Central Sulawesi militants. In late January, both Ba'asyir and MMI Chairman Fauzan Al Anshori in separate statements accused Detachment 88 of conducting a war against Muslims in Poso and intentionally ignoring the crimes committed by Christians there. These and other recent criticisms launched against the INP have largely failed to gain traction among the general public and, unlike previous occasions, failed to weaken the INP's resolve to continue to pursue the Central Sulawesi extremists behind much of that area's violence. (Ref B) The GOI has no plans to change course on Detachment 88, or the pursuit of violent extremists. ¶3. (C) Detachment 88 continues to make significant progress in Indonesia's fight against terrorism and is playing an increasingly important role. The unit's growing list of accomplishments includes the recent nabbing of over 25 Central Sulawesi extremists and numerous successful raids of JI safehouses throughout the archipelago. Formed in the wake of the 2002 Bali terror attacks, the Detachment represents a massive combined Indonesian and international assistance effort to create within the INP an effective anti-terror and crisis response element. Structure of National and Local CT Detachments -------------- -- ¶4. (SBU) INP directives in June 2003 and March 2005 detail the organizational structure of Detachment 88. The roughly 350-person Detachment at the national INP headquarters remains the first and the largest of the CT units. Also identified as Directorate VI under the INP's national Criminal Investigative Division (CID),the Detachment has a chief, a deputy and four sub-chiefs, each of whom directs one of the four sub-units: Intelligence, Investigations, Operations, and Logistics. The organization of the detachments at the regional INP level is a smaller-scale mirror image of the headquarters structure. ¶5. (SBU) The 2005 directive identifies six regionally deployed, 100-person detachments designed to facilitate the JAKARTA 00000545 002 OF 004 INP's response to local crises. The six units, located in North Sumatra, Jakarta Metro Jaya, East Java, Bali, South Sulawesi and Papua, are directly under the authority of the respective regional police chief. Although the INP plans eventually to deploy 75-person units in at least 20 of the country's 33 provinces, our police contacts have told us the initial six regional units (listed above) will retain an AOR beyond their respective province. Special Police Units Form Detachment 88 Backbone -------------- --- ¶6. (SBU) The Detachment's crisis response teams (CRTs), organizationally housed under the Operations sub-unit, are by far the most talked-about of its four components. These forces are drawn almost exclusively from the INP's 30,000 man Mobile Brigade special-operations unit, which has maintained the INP's highest physical and tactical standards since its formation over 60 years ago. The Mobile Brigade gained notoriety during its checkered service in conflict areas like East Timor, Aceh and Papua under the regime of former Indonesian President Soeharto. Mobile Brigade headquarters is located a short distance outside Jakarta at the INP's Kelapa Dua facility, though many of the INP provincial commands include a local Mobile Brigade detachment. ¶7. (SBU) Among the Mobile Brigade's most distinct elements is Gegana, initially formed in the 1970s as an independent INP unit to handle terror incidents, search-and-rescue operations and explosive ordnance disposal. It was subsumed by Mobile Brigade under a 1995 INP reorganization, and placed alongside the Brigade's two Ranger units. Currently, Gegana has between 8,000 and 10,000 personnel and maintains its unique name and mission. The majority of Gegana personnel are based at Kelapa Dua, though a few Gegana personnel are deployed to provincial police commands among the regular local Mobile Brigade detachments. The crisis response force attached to the INP Headquarters Detachment consists exclusively of Gegana personnel, whereas the crisis response elements at the provincial INP commands consist primarily of local Mobile Brigade personnel. ATA CRT training does not use International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding and thus is able to train Mobile Brigade personnel. (Ref A) However, INP personnel selected for ATA training are carefully vetted for human rights violations before training begins. ¶8. (SBU) In addition to providing a ready source of recruits for Detachment 88, the Mobile Brigade provides support to major CT field operations. The January INP operations in Central Sulawesi provide a recent example. The INP officer who led the January 11 and January 22 safehouse raids told us recently that Gegana and Mobile Brigade units from Jakarta had deployed to assist the local Mobile Brigade detachments in supporting the Detachment's operations. While Detachment 88 CRTs from Jakarta and Central Sulawesi conducted the raids, the Gegana and Mobile Brigade units from Jakarta surrounded the target area, forming the first and second perimeter, respectively. (Note: Mobile Brigade personnel already in Poso have included other units called in to assist from regional police commands in East Kalimantan and North and South Sulawesi. INP contacts explained that Jakarta units, not local units, were so heavily involved in supporting the actual raids as a measure to avoid increasing tensions between residents and local police units already on the ground.) International Aid Vital to Jakarta's CT Fight -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Significant assistance from international donors has been critical to Indonesia's recent progress in combating Islamic militants. Diplomatic Security Service's ATA program remains the primary trainer of Detachment 88's CRTs, having trained approximately 240 strike-force officers since training began in 2003. CRT 11 began training 24 officers from Papua on February 26, and training of CRT 12 is slated for later this year. ¶10. (SBU) ATA conducts most of the CRT training at the INP's CID training facility in Megamendung, located in the hills south of Jakarta, where ATA maintains an office and training JAKARTA 00000545 003 OF 004 grounds. The ATA's basic six-week course gives each 24-person training class both classroom and practical training in human rights, arrest techniques, weapons, close quarter combat, sniper skills, assault planning, and breaching. The ATA's CRT Instructor Development Course has provided additional "train-the-trainer" instruction to over 36 individually selected CRT graduates to build a corps of competent CRT instructors within the INP. Of these 36 trainers, 23 have attended additional ATA courses in training management. Several of these INP trainers participate as instructors in each running of the basic CRT course. ¶11. (SBU) After successful completion of the CRT training, ATA equips the newly minted teams with the weapons, personal gear, breaching kits, communication equipment, and some of the tactical vehicles needed to be operational upon their return to the Detachment-88 unit at their home regional command. ATA records indicate the following CRT deployments (Note: The "CRT" designation listed below is a reference to that specific CRT training class): --Jakarta, INP Headquarters (CRT 1; 24 Officers) --Jakarta, Metro Jaya (CRT 2; 24 Officers) --Medan, North Sumatra (CRT 3; 24 Officers) --Denpasar, Bali (CRT 4; 24 Officers) --Yogyakarta, Central Java (Co-located with INP Headquarter CRT) (CRT 5, 10; 24 Officers) --Manado, North Sulawesi (CRT 6; 12 Officers) --Makassar, South Sulawesi (CRT 6; 12 Officers) --Palu, Central Sulawesi (CRT 7; 12 Officers) --Ambon, Maluku (CRT 7; 12 Officers) --Bandung, West Java (CRT 8; 12 Officers) --Surabaya, East Java (CRT 8, 10; 24 Officers) --Riau (CRT 9; 12 Officers) --Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (CRT 9; 12 Officers) --Jayapura, Papua (CRT 11; 24 Officers) (Pending) ¶12. (SBU) Graduates of the CRT program have played key roles in Indonesia's counterterror effort. In addition to CRT 1 and CRT 7 participation in the January Central Sulawesi operations, CRT 1 and CRT 5 conducted the April 2006 raid in Wonosobo, Central Java, and the November 2005 raid in Malang, East Java which took out the JI's main bombmakers. (Ref C,D) The explosives uncovered in these operations were defused and analyzed by INP graduates of the ATA's explosiveQcident countermeasures training. ¶13. (C) While a large part of the funding for ATA's programs with the INP -- $8 million (2003),$4.3 million (2004),$5.1 million (2005),and $4 million (2006) -- is currently directed towards training and equipping CRTs, ATA also provides the INP with other course offerings. Since 2003, the ATA has trained approximately 65 INP officers on explosive-incident countermeasures, approximately 48 INP officers on both post blast investigations and cyber-terrorism, and 22 INP officers on major case-management techniques. ATA is also training and equipping two INP canine explosive detection units, a total of 25 handlers and 25 dogs. ATA sponsored seven Detachment 88 officers to attend the 2006 Tactical Officers Association Conference in Los Angeles, where INP headquarters Detachment 88 Chief Bekto Suprapto and his Intelligence Chief, Tito Karnavian, gave a presentation on terrorism in Indonesia. The FBI (Jakarta's Legal Attache office),ICITAP, and JIATF-West are in discussions with the INP to conduct a post blast investigation course later in 2007 that will include Detachment 88 officers. Other offices in the Mission, including the Department of Defense, also are planning complimentary training opportunities with the INP, under the DS/ATA umbrella, including events in May and July that will offer advanced special operations training to Detachment 88 CRTs. ¶14. (C) Australia and the United Kingdom have focused their respective programs on equally vital needs in the Detachment's investigative and intelligence arms, including providing surveillance, counter-surveillance, and technical analytic training and equipment. Recent UK training objectives for Detachment 88 included resource management and operational planning courses, training on developing standard operating procedures, surveillance training and equipment (coordinated with the Japanese) and intelligence network JAKARTA 00000545 004 OF 004 training. Internal Rough Spots Still Need Smoothing -------------- ¶15. (C) Several important challenges facing Detachment 88 still await resolution: -- Although the INP has developed Detachment 88 as its primary CT operational arm, the INP's informal CT Taskforce ("Team Bomb") predates the Detachment by several years and remains a serious CT player. The Taskforce is a highly effective informal collection of experienced CID investigators under the direction of the INP's CID Deputy, Inspector General Gories Mere, and CID Directorate I Chief, Brigadier General Surya Dharma. Although significant operational coordination and cooperation occurs between the two CT units, internal distrust and tension remain periodic problems. -- Mobile Brigade forces receive a special financial entitlement which they lose upon joining a Detachment-88 CRT. This presents a unique challenge to identifying, recruiting, training, deploying and retaining the best officers for the Detachment. Also, CT work is not typically rewarded by rank advancement, so Detachment 88 officers will eventually have to leave in search of career progression. -- Not all CRTs are assigned fulltime to Detachment 88 units or remain an identifiable team after their training, but remain in their previous positions until activated in a time of crisis. As a result, Detachment-88 leaders will frequently deploy the INP Headquarters CRT to areas under regional police commands to avoid a cumbersome and deeply bureaucratic process required by some local Mobile Brigade commanders to request permission to deploy a local CRT consisting of Mobile Brigade members under their command.Qurther indicative of the lack of support from some field commanders, the West Java Mobile Brigade commander has a reputation for redistributing the equipment of CRT graduates under his command to his senior-level officers, despite a strongly worded internal communiqu from INP Chief Sutanto forbidding the practice. -- Lack of a central location in some INP commands to house the Detachment-88 personnel, including CRTs and equipment, contributes to the problems outlined above. The ATA program has begun to discuss with the INP the possibility of building a separate facility for the Detachment at INP headquarters to house CRT 1 members and their equipment, currently located at the Mobile Brigade's Kelapa Dua headquarters. Similar INP initiatives to develop separate facilities for other CRTs are underway in some regions outside Jakarta. COMMENT: -------------- ¶16. (C) The ATA program is crucial to the INP's CT effort and Post strongly supports this program's continued engagement with the INP. This and other Mission programs help push the INP to make necessary institutional changes, and complement other Department of State programs, such as those funded by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Post continues to urge Washington to lift the 2003 restriction prohibiting the use of INCLE funding to train Mobile Brigade units, so we can broaden our support for the INP, including in areas of human rights. (Ref A, E) HEFFERN