AMBASSADOR REES MEETS BURMA CAUCUS CHAIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000517 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KDEM KISL UNSC BM ID SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REES MEETS BURMA CAUCUS CHAIR REF: A. JAKARTA 293 (DPR FLEXES MUSCLES ON BURMA) ¶B. JAKARTA 98 (UNSC RESOLUTION ON BURMA) JAKARTA 00000517 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 20 meeting with Djoko Susilo, the Chairman of Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) Caucus on Burma, Special Representative for Social Issues Ambassador Grover Joseph Rees commended the DPR's activism on Burma (Ref A),and discussed additional measures the DPR might take to pressure the GOI to revise its Burma policy. Amb. Rees deplored the Burmese junta's record of gross human rights violations, singling out in particular the use of rape as an instrument of policy against ethnic minorities, and urged the DPR to continue its efforts to compel the GOI to take a leadership role on Burma within ASEAN. Djoko, also a member of the DPR's Commission I, which handles foreign policy and defense, said that Commission I members had approached the DPR chairman about passing a statement on Burma before a full plenary session. Djoko shared the text with us, included below in its entirety, and said that it enjoyed strong support across the party factions. A contact in DPR Chairman Agung Laksono's office separately confirmed the meeting took place, but asserted the statement would not be voted on in plenary. Djoko sees Foreign Minister Wirajuda as the biggest obstacle within the GOI to a more assertive stance on Burma, and suggested that the Burma Caucus would focus its energies on lobbying President Yudhoyono more forcefully. End Summary. MEETING WITH BURMA CAUCUS CHAIR -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 20, Special Representative for Social Issues Ambassador Grover Rees and the Charge d'Affaires met with Djoko Susilo, Chairman of the Burma Caucus and a member of Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN). Amb. Rees asked Djoko about FM Wirajuda's Jan. 25 appearance before Commission I (Ref A) and Djoko noted that Wirajuda was heavily criticized by a range of parliamentarians from across party lines for the GOI's UNSC abstention. Djoko disparaged Wirajuda's performance before Commission I - a hearing that lasted until one-thirty the following morning - and noted that Wirajuda cited "dwifungsi" ("two functions," the 
Soeharto-era arrangement under which the Indonesian military had social-political as well as military functions) as a possible transitional tool in Burma, a particularly unhelpful suggestion given Indonesia's own history with an authoritarian military regime. Djoko had personally met with FM Wirajuda on the Burma issue both before and after the GOI's abstention, and he believed that FM Wirajuda was almost single handedly responsible for the decision to abstain. According to Djoko, Director for International Security Affairs Desra Percaya was a strong advocate for a "yes" vote, but ultimately could not overcome FM Wirajuda's objections (Comment: Percaya said the same (septel) in a separate meeting but we believe his suggestions of having an independent position are suspect). Djoko said that President Yudhoyono played virtually no role in the vote decision making process and he asserted that he and other members of the Burma Caucus would have to focus their lobbying efforts on the President personally if they were to overcome FM Wirajuda's obstructionist tendencies on the issue. ¶3. (C) Djoko said that some of his Foreign Ministry contacts had suggested to him that Indonesia might have supported the resolution had they been given an opportunity to provide more input into its wording. The Charge disputed this assertion and pointed out that the GOI had in fact been given every possible opportunity to help shape the resolution, both in Jakarta and New York. ¶4. (C) Djoko said that he was aggressively working to build popular support for a new GOI approach to Burma by highlighting the plight of Muslims in Burma suffering under the junta's rule. Djoko pointed to a recent article that he had written in the Jakarta Post newspaper as one example of his efforts in this regard. Djoko asked rhetorically why Indonesia should be so outspoken in its support of a UNSC JAKARTA 00000517 002.2 OF 003 resolution on Israeli actions in Gaza, a problem thousands of miles away and with little direct impact on Indonesia's security, and yet fail to endorse a resolution on Burma, a nettlesome issue in its own backyard; Burmese refugees had in fact already landed on Indonesian shores in Aceh. ¶5. (C) Djoko decried the fact that ASEAN had taken very limited action to date to pressure the Burmese junta. He noted that the GOI had repeatedly pointed to ASEAN as the appropriate forum to help resolve the impasse with Burma, and yet he lamented that virtually nothing had been accomplished. If ASEAN were to play a truly useful role, he argued, Indonesia would need to use its muscle as the largest member to begin to develop a consensus and bring to heel reluctant members such as Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei. While the ASEAN inter-parliament group had already taken steps to lead the regional charge, it was simply not enough. ¶6. (C) The previous week Djoko met with DPR Chairman Laksono to discuss the possibility of bringing a formal criticism of Burma to a vote in a DPR plenary session. Djoko claimed that Laksono had signaled his interest in such a vote and Djoko suggested that the DPR would soon endorse a Commission I statement on Burma before a full plenary session. Our contacts in Chairman Laksono's office separately confirmed that a meeting on Burma was held on February 14, but disputed Djojko's account that Laksono had provided any such assurances. Arief Budiman, a member of Chairman Laksono's staff, said Laksono told Djoko and other Commission I members that he would consider bringing the statement to a vote, before ultimately concluding it would serve no political purpose. According to Arief, Laksono felt the issue did not resonate because of a lack of popular support. He said the statement would not make it to a plenary vote. ¶7. (SBU) Below is the translated text of Commission I's statement on Burma: The House of Representatives of The Republic of Indonesia Statement of the Commission I of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia On Myanmar Background: (1.) As we have all known for more than a decade, Myanmar has become the subject of concern in the world community because democracy is experiencing a decline there. The setback is most obvious with respect to the Human Rights situation, which has been getting worse since the military junta, called the State Peace Development Council (SDPC),took power in Myanmar. The junta negated the results of the 1990 general election, won by the National League of Democracy (NDL) and detained its Secretary General, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who has gone ten years without a court proceeding. (2.) When it became a member of ASEAN, the government of the military junta, the State Peace Development Council (SPDC), promised to fulfill the Road Map to Democracy. The junta developed this itself and highlighted its importance in promoting national reconciliation as a way of overcoming the many conflicts occurring among different groups in society and among political parties in Myanmar, including upholding the result of the 1990 general election. However, until today, there have been no significant developments towards the promised reconciliation process. (3.) Indonesia's DPR Commission I believes that the reconciliation process will take place only if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the other political detainees are freed. Only if this requirement is fulfilled can a just and satisfying political reconciliation in Myanmar occur. We share this belief with fellow ASEAN countries, as well as local civil society groups in Myanmar seeking to increase transparency on what is taking place with respect to the reduction in democracy and human rights in Myanmar. (4.) The decline of democracy and human rights in Myanmar is no longer a domestic affair of Myanmar. It has become a regional and international issue, and, therefore, needs other ASEAN members to participate on that issue in light of the JAKARTA 00000517 003.2 OF 003 social, political and economic implications for the region. For that reason, Indonesia, as the third biggest democratic country in the world, should play a more significant and active role in encouraging democracy in the Southeast Asia region, particularly in the ASEAN community. Based on the above mentioned facts, we, members of Commission I DPR-RI recommend the following: (1.) Urge the Burmese government and the State Peace Development Council (SPDC) to immediately release Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners as a pre-condition for a just and equal national dialogue on national reconciliation in Burma. (2.) Urge the State Peace Development Council (SPDC) to fulfill the plans written in the Road Map to Democracy and especially to immediately resolve their conflict with the National League of Democracy (NLD). (3.) Urge the State Peace Development Council (SPDC) to immediately open a dialogue with groups of society and political parties in conflicts and to take positive steps towards a program for solving the problems that have caused the conflict so that national reconciliation and democracy can be realized in Burma. (4.) Urge the Indonesian government to ask ASEAN countries to support a UNSC resolution on Burma affairs after the previous resolution was rejected in the Security Council meeting. Jakarta, January 16, 2007 Commission I Chairman (signature) Theo L. Sambuaga End of draft of Commission I statement ¶8. (U) Amb. Rees has cleared this cable. HEFFERN