AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON DEFENSE MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000452 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PHUM ID SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON DEFENSE MINISTER SUDARSONO Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a farewell call on Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono on February 16, the Ambassador reviewed progress in bilateral relations and military-to- military cooperation and stressed continued progress on military reform was important to a good relationship. Describing Papua as his major concern in departing Indonesia, Ambassador urged greater openness and suggested the government was misinterpreting as insurgency a simple desire of Papuans for jobs and a fair share of Papua's wealth. He also raised U.S. concerns about the promotion of military officers responsible for human rights abuses. Sudarsono thanked the Ambassador for the disaster relief the U.S. military had rendered, said the Indonesian military's near-term strategic objective was force mobility and asserted Indonesia's "territorial command" supported civilian governance and assisted the police. He said elements in the military and the intelligence services were concerned about Papuan separatism and he acknowledged U.S. concerns about military promotions. End Summary. GROWING BILATERAL COOPERATION ¶2. (C) Ambassador said Indonesia and the United States had a good relationship and had been able to move forward over the past two and a half years. There was support from both capitals and the timing was right. Better military-to-military relations were important as such, but they also provided a psychological boost by demonstrating that the two countries were equal partners. Cooperation had grown from almost no exercises to over 175 activities per year. The Ambassador stressed that cooperation was designed for those areas that Indonesia considered most important. The United States hoped to see a professional, modern military that served and supported democracy. The GOI had seemed to want the same thing. Removing the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) from politics had helped greatly to improve its image at home and in Washington. The new image, as defender of the country, was much more positive and had changed the military's relationship with the Indonesian people. ¶3. (C) Sudarsono thanked the Ambassador and the United States for the progress in cooperation during the Ambassador's tenure in Jakarta. President Yudhoyono's visit to Washington in May 2005 and President Bush's visit to Bogor in 2006 had provided a framework for that progress, including the lifting of U.S. sanctions on military assistance to Indonesia. The GOI had begun to change the TNI's image in the public eye, but it would require time to put substance on the fact that Indonesia had become the world's third largest democracy. The defining moment in U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation had been the tsunami of December 2004, which had put the Indonesian and U.S. militaries side by side in relief operations. Press photographs of the operation showed this cooperation graphically. FUTURE REFORM AGENDA ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that it was important to continue to make progress on military reform. Indonesia was modernizing its military procurement process and had begun working with the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS). To maintain the momentum, it would be good to review the agenda over the next few months to see if it might be updated. There was still much room to cooperate on peacekeeping operations. Indonesia already had a strong tradition in this area, and the need for peacekeepers was growing. He had conveyed the same message to Indonesian Police Chief Sutanto. ¶5. (C) Sudarsono said TNI restructuring plans were focused on mobility, but a dedicated strike force was beyond Indonesia's capability. The military's territorial command was poorly understood. Observers saw the territorial commands as a means for the military to control civilian administration, but in fact, the territorial commands supported regional and local civilian government. This was a useful traditional function of the TNI. The Ambassador remarked that this depended on whether they were seen as helping to build the community or simply had their hands out for money. Sudarsono agreed but noted the TNI was supporting the Indonesian Police (INP) by collecting evidence. The police were effective after a crime, but needed help from the TNI in preventing crimes. JAKARTA 00000452 002 OF 002 AREA OF CONCERN: PAPUA ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted he had visited Papua in January and had called on congressional leaders on Papua in Washington during his most recent visit there. The visit had reinforced his impression that Papua's problem was fundamentally one of economics: that the main things Papuans wanted were money and jobs. Newly installed Governor Suebu seemed to be headed in the right direction and wanted technical assistance most of all. Acknowledging the central government's concern about separatism, the Ambassador said his biggest worry in leaving Indonesia was Papua. Keeping Papua closed to the outside would continue to breed "the wildest stories," which the outside world would accept because it had no other point of reference. Events in Aceh over the past two years had shown the benefits of opening up. The fact that interested visitors could not get access to Papua was counterproductive. ¶7. (C) Sudarsono replied that the issue was "a matter of degree." Some in the TNI, he confirmed, still worried about separatism. The Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN) was also concerned. Australian church groups and NGOs were encouraging separatism. Tribal rivalries could flare up in the absence of security forces. The Ambassador replied that he was not recommending a troop pull-out but rather a conceptual change. Publicly, Jakarta continued to project an image of insurgency in Papua. In reality, Papuans simply wanted a fair share of the province's wealth. ¶8. (C) Sudarsono said the GOI had held a cabinet meeting the previous day on Papua, which Governor Suebu had attended. At $1.5 billion, Papua had the highest income of any Indonesian province, including transfers from Jakarta. The problem was a lack of infrastructure and trained personnel to deliver that money to the people. The Ambassador noted that Embassy's USAID Director, who had accompanied the Ambassador on his recent visit to Papua, was planning to return to Papua in March to help develop assistance programs. ¶9. (C) Sudarsono said the challenge was less daunting in West Papua province (former West Irian Jaya) than in Papua because nature was less severe, although both provinces needed development. The governor of West Papua was a former marine, from the same class as President Yudhoyono, which helped smooth the province's relations with the national government. Both sides were working on infrastructure and road development. The Ambassador welcomed this positive note and underscored, in concluding, that Papua was "the one issue" that continued to worry him. AREA OF CONCERN: MILITARY PROMOTIONS ¶10. (C) After the meeting, the Ambassador pulled the Defense minister aside to register a second concern: the possible promotion of TNI officers implicated in former human rights abuses. Ambassador said Washington was following these promotions closely. Sudarsono said he understood U.S. concerns and would take the Ambassador's words on board. HEFFERN