JCS CHAIRMAN PACE'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000430 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS ID SUBJECT: JCS CHAIRMAN PACE'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace met with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on February 13 in Jakarta to discuss a range of strategic issues, including bilateral military-to-military cooperation, instability in the Middle East and future East Asian security. Yudhoyono thanked Pace for U.S. military assistance and welcomed the resumption of military training and exchanges. He expressed support for Pakistani President Musharraf's initiative to involve moderate, predominantly Muslim countries in resolving Middle Eastern problems and related Indonesia's own efforts. He said China would become a superpower whose incessant growth would create a chronic strategic imbalance in the region, and stressed the importance of the United States, Japan and other countries in offsetting China's growing influence. Chairman Pace urged future brigade-level military exercises and conclusion of a SOFA, said additional troops in Iraq were part of the answer to the continuing cycle of violence but other countries also needed to help, and confirmed North Korea's recent nuclear test had involved an explosion signifying weapons development. End summary. U.S. ASSISTANCE IMPORTANT TO INDONESIA AND TO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ¶2. (C) Yudhoyono noted he had met with President Bush several times and was committed to strengthening the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship. The United States was important for Indonesia and had contributed generously to Indonesia both in times of need and in times of peace. Democracy was being consolidated in Indonesia and Indonesians hoped that change would continue to be for the better. Indonesia was proud to be a new member of the club of democracies. ¶3. (C) Yudhoyono thanked the Chairman for the resumption of assistance under IMET. He noted he himself was an IMET graduate and that experience had been an important part of his training. IMET was important because it taught not only military skills but democratic values as well. Peacetime military operations were also important, including cooperation on earthquake relief in Yogyakarta, the Adam Air incident, and Peacekeeping Operations such as UNIFIL. Cooperation over a sustained period was essential to restoring the bilateral relationship. ¶4. (C) The Chairman voiced agreement on IMET and said the exchange benefited the United States as well. He said he would welcome the opportunity to hold brigade-level exercises with the Indonesian military. Natural disasters, while devastating, had provided a chance to cooperate. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would be of benefit to both countries. CONTRIBUTING TO SOLUTONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ¶5. (C) Yudhoyono said he was working to help find solutions to the problems in the Middle East. He had met the previous week with the secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and had met two weeks earlier with Pakistani President Musharraf. Moderate Islamic leaders were committed to helping resolve the problems in the Middle East. It was important that politicians cooperate to build stable governments in areas of conflict. ¶6. (C) Yudhoyono said he had spoken with Lebanese Prime Minister Sinora four times in the past year in an effort to establish a strategy for national reconciliation in Lebanon. Lebanon and the international community had to identify the political centers of gravity in Lebanon and the desired ends to be achieved and agree upon the means for reaching those ends. This would not be easy. Yudhoyono believed it would be easier to achieve a solution in Lebanon as part of an overall settlement of the situation from Iraq to Palestine. ¶7. (C) On Iraq, the Chairman said no number of additional troops would end the fighting in Iraq. The solution needed to be three-pronged, encompassing security, good governance and political leadership, and spurring economic growth. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki had promised that the coalition forces could operate without political restraints. Sending JAKARTA 00000430 002 OF 003 21,000 additional U.S. troops was not the solution but it was part of the answer. Washington was encouraged by Maliki's recent decisions. The United States was obligating significant funding for Iraqi jobs. Change in Iraq would not come without risk. The bombing of the Shi'a mosque in Samara had touched off a cycle of sectarian violence, which was exactly what Al Qaeda wanted. The cycle had taken on a life of its own. Current plans were directed to bringing it back under control, but the assistance of more international partners would be needed. ¶8. (C) Yudhoyono said Musharraf had asked him to be part of a common approach of moderate Islamic countries in handling the Iraq situation. Musharraf had invited seven countries-- Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan--which he believed held the key to a solution in Iraq because they were distinctly Islamic but had good ties with the West. Reconciliation required a stable security environment. Indonesia was committed to finding and addressing the root causes of the problem. This would not be easy but Indonesia had to try. The people of Iraq and Afghanistan had grasped the concept of democracy. This was a new era for Iraqis where democracy and values had been reintroduced. Iraq must not return to a dictatorship, and Islamic countries could help Iraq. ¶9. (C) The Chairman said voices like President Yudhoyono's would have a positive impact in the United States. For Iraq, he said, the United States had established several benchmarks on the road to stabilization. One was to have nine out of ten Iraqi divisions under Iraqi control by the end of March. Another was to have all provinces under Iraqi control by the end of June. By the end of 2007, many of the Coalition forces would be on their way out. The question was whether to make this public. Going public would require that governments take responsibility for achieving those benchmarks. The problem was that it would give the enemy important information about Coalition strategy and specific goals to disrupt. It was useful to have benchmarks, and it was important they be kept. Once other countries understood what needed to be done, they would be willing to help. ¶10. (C) Yudhoyono said he had met with Iranian President Ahmedinejad and asked him to reduce the anti-U.S. rhetoric. He had also asked UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to send the same message. He had outlined four areas where Iran needed to take steps: 1) cooperation with the IAEA, 2) dialogue with EU-3, 3) broader dialogue (such as with the UNSC P-5 plus Germany) and 4) temporary suspension of uranium enrichment. Ahmedinejad had agreed to the first three but not to the fourth. Ahmedinejad had later indicated, however, that he could compromise on the fourth. Indonesia had no illusions about Ahmedinejad, however, and feared he would not prove tractable. ¶11. (C) The Chairman stressed the importance of precision and care in dealing with Iran . There was no room for miscalculation, but there was also no room for troops or military operations in Iran. Iran might misinterpret the increased U.S. presence on the ground in Iraq and on water in the Persian Gulf. These measures were intended to show support for the region and for the future of Iraq. EAST ASIA: NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA AND SUPERPOWER CHINA ¶12. (C) In North Korea, the Chairman observed, the international community continued to apply a logic that did not apply to their leader. There was no doubt that South Korea could defend itself. It was clear that North Korea had a nuclear device: their recent test had released radioactive materials. The next time North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 2 missile the world would need to consider what kind of warhead it had. Noting the strong relationship the United States had with Japan, the Chairman said Japan wanted to be even more helpful in maintaining regional security and was studying ways to contribute more without violating its constitution. He expressed optimism on China, describing his Chinese counterpart, General Guo Bo-Xing as "a tough soldier and worthy adversary" but not a future enemy. The two countries stood to gain much more through trade and investment with each other. China had 1.3 billion people to worry about. If there were to be any miscalculation, it would be over Taiwan. JAKARTA 00000430 003 OF 003 ¶13. (C) Yudhoyono said Indonesia needed equilibrium and a balance of power in the East Asia region. China, Japan, India, ASEAN, and the United States must maintain stability there. Indonesia had re-established relations with China in 1990 after a hiatus of 25 years, but China had gained the bigger economic benefit. Economic development must include an equitable distribution of wealth. China was on its way to becoming a superpower. Yudhoyono said North Korea must stop missile tests and resume Six Party Talks and related that he had canceled his visit to North Korea in the fall of 2006 because of the tests. In November 2006 he had spoken with Japanese Prime Minister Abe and reiterated Indonesia's position on North Korea. Japan would be critical to the region's ability to counterbalance China in the future, Yudhoyono said, but China's continued growth threatened to create a perpetual imbalance. ¶14. (C) On Burma (Myanmar),Yudhoyono noted Indonesia had been the only country to make a statement on this issue at the recent ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines. Indonesia was not satisfied with the situation in Burma but hoped a roadmap could be drawn up. Indonesia had not voted for the recent UN Security Council resolution on Burma, he explained, because we Indonesia wanted to hold open the chance for a turn to democracy in Myanmar. Indonesia had done much work to try to create a roadmap. Burma was only interested in its two larger neighbors, China and India, but other players also needed to be included in discussions. ¶15. (C) Noting that China had 1.3 billion people and India had 1.1 billion people, all of whom would put increasing demands on the world's natural resources, Yudhoyono predicted the world was facing a future energy crisis if did failed to develop a forward-looking energy policy. PASCOE