INDONESIA -- DRAFT 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003397 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, DS/IP/EAP, DS/T/ATA, EAP/ANP S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- DRAFT 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: STATE 145833 ¶1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified -- Please handle accordingly. ¶2. (SBU) The draft text of Mission's 2007 Country Report on Terrorism for Indonesia follows in para 3. This text will be posted on Intellipedia, the USG classified website, as part of its review by Washington agencies. ¶3. (SBU) Begin text: INDONESIA -- 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM Indonesia experienced its second consecutive year of no major terrorist incidents in 2007. Radical groups in Indonesia have had their ability to carry out attacks further diminished during the past year due to the Indonesian government's counterterrorism efforts. The Indonesian National Police (INP) scored major successes in breaking up terrorist cells linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic extremist organizations. While JI cells in Java and Central Sulawesi have been weakened, JI and its radical associates remained a security threat to both Western and domestic targets. The Attorney General,s Office made some strides toward conducting more efficient and effective CT prosecutions despite weaknesses in Indonesia's anti-terror law. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) continued to create a legal and law enforcement environment conducive to fighting terrorism within its borders, and numerous terrorists were convicted of crimes in 2007. In January, the INP conducted two raids against a radical stronghold in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The second raid used 500 security force personnel against a large group of terrorists and their supporters, who were armed with small arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The raids ended with 18 dead, 18 injured and 28 captured. Subsequent operations netted five more suspects. While the Poso operation was criticized as "heavy-handed" by some members of the local community, it calmed the previously tense situation in Central Sulawesi. In March, information gained from the Poso suspects helped the INP initiate a series of raids in Central and East Java which resulted in the arrest of several members of the so-called "military wing" of JI and several cell leaders and the seizure of a large cache of explosives in East Java. In June, INP,s Special Detachment 88 (SD-88), stationed in Central Java, arrested several key JI terrorist operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka Zarkasih)) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal Bahri). As the JI Emir, Afghanistan-veteran Zarkasih, a former JI leader, is thought to be senior to Dujana in the JI hierarchy. Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran, was part of JI's central command and had been involved in several JI attacks in recent years. The arrests in January, March, and June removed several key JI leaders. To create sympathy for these radical groups and to discredit the INP (especially SD-88),lawsuits were brought against the INP by Abu Dujana's wife and by JI co-founder and spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba,asyir. The two lawsuits did not create the expected groundswell of public attention and were eventually thrown out of court. The newly-formed U.S.-funded Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime took the leading role in handling prosecutions of terrorists. The Task Force won convictions against: Hasanuddin, a JI leader in Poso; four men who participated in the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings; and three others who were involved in the 2005 Tentena market bombings. The Attorney General also won convictions against 17 Poso Christians who had murdered two Muslims in revenge killings in September 2006. The Task Force is currently prosecuting six members of JI,s military unit who were arrested in March. JI top operatives Abu Dujana and Zarkasih are expected to come to trial in December 2007. JAKARTA 00003397 002 OF 002 Other Indonesian legal institutions also took a hard line against terrorists. In September, the Supreme Court rejected the final appeals of three men on death row for carrying out the 2002 Bali bombings. The Court also upheld the life sentence imposed on JI trainer/recruiter Subur Sugiyarto. In October, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced that convicted terrorists would no longer be given automatic sentence remissions at major holidays. The new policy came too late to prevent the early release of some 20 convicted terrorists in 2007, but most of these were minor figures. The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and prosecutions. Indonesian police froze terrorist financial assets uncovered during investigations. However, the government's implementation of the UNSCR 1267 sanctions was hampered by poor interagency coordination and by continued lack of human and technical capacity within both the government and financial institutions. It remains to be seen whether or not the GOI has the political will to do what is necessary to implement UNSCR 1267. USAID is promoting capacity building through its Financial Crimes Prevention Project, a multi-year program to provide technical advisors and support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and credible regime against money laundering and terrorism finance. Other donors are also providing assistance to the Financial Crimes Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK). The unit receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Cash Transaction Reports. PPATK has dramatically increased the number of STRs from 10 per month in 2002 to 483 per month in 2007 and these reports have led to 32 successful prosecutions to date. While only one of these had a terrorist component, strengthened financial oversight will assist the GOI in tracking potential terrorist financial transactions. In 2007, the INP continued a program to "de-radicalize" convicted terrorists. The program identifies individuals who may be open to more moderate teachings and INP officials work with them while they are in prison. The program focuses on providing spiritual support to the men and modest financial support to their families. By providing this support, the police attempt to gain the trust of the men and receive valuable information about terrorist networks. The program also aims to reduce terrorist recruitment inside prisons. While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been impressive, more could be done in some areas. Despite the successes in Sulawesi and Central Java, JI networks and "sleeper" cells remain intact, and have the capacity to go operational with little warning. Moreover, Malaysian JI operative and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top remains at large, despite his suspected involvement in nearly every major terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002. Finally, the GOI needs to address weaknesses in the prison system, where convicted terrorists are able to maintain ties to their communities and to recruit new members into groups like Jemaah Islamiyah. End Text. HUME