COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA RACKS UP MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003375 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR BOULDIN DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH NCTC WASHDC NSC FOR EPHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV KJUS PTER ID SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA RACKS UP MORE CONVICTIONS REF: A. JAKARTA 3350 ¶B. JAKARTA 3312 ¶C. JAKARTA 3214 ¶D. JAKARTA 2101 ¶E. JAKARTA 826 ¶F. JAKARTA 194 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (U) This message was coordinated with Consulate General Surabaya. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: A Jakarta court has handed down guilty verdicts to four more terrorists involved in a series of attacks in Central Sulawesi in 2004-06. The sentences were consistent with those handed out the previous week in six other cases involving the same crimes. Collectively, the 10 convictions represent a milestone in the GOI's largely successful effort to defuse tensions in the formerly restive province. There is no sign that the government plans to let up in its winning effort. END SUMMARY. FOUR MORE!! ¶3. (SBU) The GOI has racked up more convictions in its war against terrorism. On December 11, prosecutors from the Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime won convictions against four more terrorists who participated in a series of deadly attacks in Poso and Palu, Central Sulawesi. The men were members of the "Tanah Runtuh" group, a Poso-based terror cell led by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operative Hasanuddin (one name only),currently serving a 20-year sentence (ref E). Six other members of the cell were similarly convicted on terrorism charges the week of December 3 (ref B). Those convicted have yet to indicate whether they will appeal the convictions. ¶4. (U) The newly convicted include (the trial and penalty phases are merged in Indonesia): -- Muhammad Basri, who received the stiffest penalty (19 years) for his role in multiple attacks targeted at Poso Christians, including the 2005 beheadings of several schoolgirls, the murder of a pastor and the shooting of two students; -- Ardin Djantau, who received a 14-year sentence for his role in the 2005 Tentena market bombing that killed 22 people; and, --Tugiran and Ridwan (both one name only),who also received 14 years for a bombing attack in September 2006 that killed one. The sentences were consistent with those handed out to other members of the Tanah Runtuh group, as well as those received by 17 Poso Christians convicted this past August of murdering two Muslims (ref D). THAT WINNING FEELING ¶5. (C) The 10 convictions mark a milestone in the GOI's largely successful effort to bring an end to the simmering conflict in Central Sulawesi (ref C). The spate of attacks in 2005 and early 2006 threatened to revive the communal violence of 1999-2001. Instead, in 2006, the GOI made a concerted effort to arrest those who were provoking attacks, some of whom were JI provocateurs from outside the province. ¶6. (C) The arrest of Hasanuddin and two others by Indonesian National Police (INP) in May 2006 was followed by a lengthy INP campaign to locate the other members of the Tanah Runtuh group. These efforts culminated in a series of raids on the group's Poso stronghold in January which yielded 18 arrests (ref F). Nine of those arrested were among the 10 newly convicted terrorists. JAKARTA 00003375 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) While focusing primarily on catching Muslim extremists, the GOI also took action against Christians who engaged in violence. In September 2006, the GOI carried out death sentences against three Christians involved in attacks. Moreover, the INP acted quickly in apprehending 17 Christians who murdered two Muslims in reaction to the executions. GOI law enforcement made a point of treating the Christians the same as Muslim arrestees: they were sent to Jakarta for trial, charged with terrorism, and received sentences in the 12-14 year range. This seemingly evenhanded approach has largely quieted earlier claims by radical Muslim leaders that the INP was unfairly targeting Muslims. ATONEMENT? ¶8. (C) The GOI was clearly embarrassed that it failed to prevent the brutal violence that afflicted the Poso region, which had been festering for several years prior to 2005. Its patient but effective response since then has clearly born fruit and--in the process--earned a strong measure of respect from domestic and international observers. Moreover, there is no sign--as it continues to atone for past mistakes--that the government plans to let up in its effort now. HUME