ASEAN SUMMIT/BURMA -- INDONESIA MUDDLING THROUGH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003201 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ID BM SUBJECT: ASEAN SUMMIT/BURMA -- INDONESIA MUDDLING THROUGH REF: JAKARTA 3180 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Indonesian officials support allowing the Burmese regime to sign the ASEAN Charter during the upcoming Summit in Singapore. The GOI continues to support UN Envoy Gambari's mission and believes he could play a role in the East Asia Summit on November 21. The ASEAN Secretariat--which has its headquarters in Jakarta--is SIPDIS focused mainly on ASEAN's "Economic Blueprint." The government's policies re Burma continue to ring hollow to many critics at home who feel that Indonesia is muddling through, trying hard to offend no one. END SUMMARY. BURMESE REGIME TO SIGN ¶2. (U) Presidential advisor and spokesman Dino Djalal recently told reporters that Indonesia supported the idea of Burma's signing the Charter at the upcoming Summit. He noted that the Charter contained "progressive" language on democracy and human rights and said signatory countries "are expected to uphold and apply the values mentioned in the Charter," adding that Burma's performance would be compared and contrasted with those criteria. Djalal dismissed the possibility of ASEAN sanctions against Burma and argued that ASEAN's policy of engagement had the best chance of yielding results. ¶3. (C) In meetings with emboffs, other Indonesian government officials, including at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),have generally echoed this line. Some DEPLU officials in private, however, have taken a bit of a harder stand toward Burma than Djalal's comments indicate, expressing deep concern about the crackdown and any sort of return to the policy of "constructive engagement." Mission has repeatedly underscored that it was important that the Summit not be "business as usual" for the regime. A GAMBARI ROLE? ¶4. (C) There has been some discussion about a possible role for UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari. Gudadi Sasongko, DEPLU's Deputy Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told poloff that ASEAN members were discussing the possibility of Gambari addressing the East Asia Summit (EAS) scheduled to follow the ASEAN Summit on November 21. Indonesia supported a role for Gambari at the EAS, he said. Some ASEAN members might object on the grounds that there was no precedent for the EAS dealing with political issues, especially one as controversial as Burma. Sasongko said he did not know how or when EAS participants would ultimately decide on the matter of giving Gambari a hearing. GOI UNDER SOME PRESSURE ¶5. (C) The Indonesian government continues to come under criticism for what some see as a lackluster stand toward the Burmese regime's brutality. Theo Sambuaga, the head of Commission I on foreign and defense relations of the national legislature (DPR),told Pol/C on November 15 that he had repeatedly urged the GOI to use the Summit "to send a message to the Burmese regime." He was disappointed, however, because the government showed little inclination to do anything "strong" against the regime and he expected the Summit to basically "go quietly, without significant pressure on the regime." Other contacts have echoed Sambuaga's points. (Note: Per ref A, Sambuaga has mentioned that there is support in the DPR for not giving the GOI's nominee for the post of ambassador to Burma approval when Commission I meets later this month. Sambuaga said this action would show the DPR's deep concern about the Burmese regime and its brutal crackdown.) ¶6. (C) Indonesian ASEAN-watchers also remain skeptical of the government's Burma policy. Alexandra Rento Wulan, an ASEAN specialist at Jakarta's Center for Strategic and International Studies, told poloff that the Charter's lack of enforcement mechanisms renders it nearly useless as a tool to press for reforms in Burma. Wulan, who recently returned from a conference of ASEAN experts in Brunei, said her academic and think-tank colleagues were increasingly JAKARTA 00003201 002 OF 002 frustrated with ASEAN members' timid approach to Burma. Engagement had failed, yet ASEAN members had not considered alternative approaches. Wulan felt a temporary suspension of Burma would increase pressure on the regime, but she seriously doubted that ASEAN governments were inclined to support that approach, barring further regime-sponsored violence in Burma. ASEAN SECRETARIAT VIEW ¶7. (C) The ASEAN Secretariat's view is basically "it's business as usual." Secretariat officials told econoffs that handling Burma was up to member countries. The Secretariat expressed relief that the Thai parliament had approved the Charter for signature before the Summit, and was not concerned that the actual Economic Blueprint (ASEAN's roadmap to economic integration) was still under review. Member-states, Secretariat officials explained, would sign a declaration on the Economic Blueprint in addition to the Charter, but this would not create any binding agreements. After the Summit, the Secretariat would map out implementation mechanisms based on the Blueprint while awaiting the Charter's ratification by member-states. Officially member countries had one year to ratify the Charter, though there was no certainty this deadline would be met. ¶8. (C) Secretariat official Bala Kumar Palaniappan told poloff the biggest challenge would be developing the transitional arrangements necessary to implement the Charter's human rights and democracy provisions. Chief among these would be whether there should be any mechanism for monitoring human rights in member countries. Palaniappan thought it was unlikely that member-states would agree on this issue within a year but said other elements of the Charter could be implemented even without progress on human rights and democracy. INDONESIA MUDDLING THROUGH ¶9. (C) GOI interlocutors frequently tell us they are frustrated by ASEAN's limited leverage on Burma. This sentiment has grown over the past year and--while Indonesia wants to preserve a role for ASEAN--the government increasingly is tending to revert back to its pre-crackdown "constructive engagement" approach. Lacking--in its estimation--any other alternative, the Indonesian government looks to UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari's mission as the only viable way forward on Burma. In throwing up its hands in regard to serious regional or bilateral pressure, there is more than an element of the Indonesian government just trying to muddle through without offending anyone. HEFFERN