DEFENSE COOPERATION -- INDONESIA INCREASINGLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003155 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, PM, PM/RSAT, PM/DDTC, DRL SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN JOINT STAFF FOR P.CLEMMONS NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV ID SUBJECT: DEFENSE COOPERATION -- INDONESIA INCREASINGLY LOOKING AT U.S. AS ARMS SUPPLIER REF: A. JAKARTA 2990 ¶B. JAKARTA 2893 Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: There are signs that the GOI is increasingly interested in purchasing U.S. military equipment as it begins to rebuild its defense capabilities. Two prospective F-16 deals continue to move forward (ref a) and the Indonesian military is considering possible deals for other items. We now understand the Indonesian Army is interested in two major U.S. systems. This growing interest by the Indonesian military (TNI) as a whole in U.S. equipment reflects, we believe, a strong preference for U.S. quality and reliability. Mission supports this process and urges Washington to take this opportunity to further cement defense ties with Indonesia. END SUMMARY. F-16 DEALS A STEP CLOSER TO TAKEOFF ¶2. (C) The two previously reported prospective F-16 deals, one for new planes and the other involving mid-life upgrades (ref a),are moving forward. Regarding the first, a U.S. team--including representatives of Lockheed-Martin and officials from the Air Force--will visit Indonesia during the week of November 26 to make an offer of price and availability. Lockheed representative James Gribbon confirmed this information to Defense Minister Sudarsono in Sudarsono's meeting with a delegation from the US-ASEAN Business Council on October 30 in Jakarta. ¶3. (C) Gribbon later told Mission that, in his view, it is critical that Washington put together an attractive financing package in order to secure the deal, given the substantial cost of the purchase and the Russian government's competing offer of Russian military equipment valued at $1 billion on the basis of soft credits. ¶4. (C) The second deal reportedly was circulated for GOI interagency review near the beginning of November. The Department of Defense is heading that process. ARMY NOW OPEN TO U.S. SYSTEMS ¶5. (C) According to both commercial vendors and TNI officials, the Indonesian Army is considering new U.S.-origin equipment to replace obsolescent systems. One ageing system consists of British-origin Rapier air-defense missiles, which could be replaced by a U.S.-origin multi-point fixed system of missiles and guns with a range of five kilometers or less. The Army Headquarters, which has budgeted the project at $100 million, appears to be drawing upon multiple sources, including Polish missiles. On the basis of indications that U.S. systems would be seriously considered, Mission has encouraged Raytheon to seek approval to provide a price and availability quotation. ¶6. (C) Also up for replacement are the British-origin Scorpion light-track reconnaissance vehicles. According to sources in Indonesia, the TNI reportedly is looking to spend $46 million for wheeled (6x6) armored personnel carriers (APC),which could double as infantry fighting vehicles, and is considering a U.S. model among the options. ¶7. (C) A turning point in the Army's thinking may have occurred at a meeting of Army Chief Djoko Santoso with Embassy defense officials on September 3. The meeting, Mission's first substantive meeting on assistance with Santoso since the lifting of U.S. sanctions two years earlier, involved an extensive briefing of U.S. programs, including IMET, FMF, FMS, Section 1206 and others, and was attended by Santoso's senior staff. The atmosphere was very positive, as though a new leaf had turned over. We note that shortly before these meetings, Washington had issued an export license for competition pistols. Santoso was aware of this development, and seems to have taken the issuance as JAKARTA 00003155 002 OF 003 proof that sanctions had indeed been lifted and the United States was newly interested in Indonesia as a partner. NAVY: AN ISSUE OF REPLACEMENT PARTS ¶8. (C) Mission has sought to clarify and resolve several complaints by Navy staff, including outgoing Navy Chief Slamet Soebijanto, alleging difficulty in obtaining U.S. parts for TNI Navy equipment. These complaints were raised at the 2007 Strategic Dialogue in Jakarta in April and by Soebijanto during a meeting with Mission's Naval Attache in October (ref b). Mission has been investigating these cases to determine whether they have any basis in fact. ¶9. (C) In the case involving a U.S. inertial navigation system manufactured by Honeywell for Corvette frigates constructed in Holland, a check of the license application record indicates that Department returned the application because Honeywell's electronic signature on the form had expired earlier. This information was communicated to the Indonesian Navy. In the case of a magnetic detection system of U.S. origin, electronics- systems specialists at Navy Headquarters told Mission's Office of Defense Cooperation on November 13 that there was no need for U.S. parts because those systems had been functioning normally. These are the only two identifiable cases that the Navy has mentioned to us. To the extent that Navy officials are willing to provide details, Mission is endeavoring to determine whether any problems exist and, if so, to resolve them. DESPITE RHETORIC, U.S. IS TOP CHOICE ¶10. (C) These reports must be taken in the context of statements by senior Indonesian military and civilian officials alleging that the United States is an "unreliable partner" for arms supplies due to prior sanctions, etc. Defense Minister Sudarsono and TNI Commander (Panglima) Djoko Suyanto have made such statements publicly, and recently-dismissed Navy Chief Soebijanto had alleged the same to Mission officials directly (ref b). Working-level TNI officials and commercial defense-industry sources here have made clear U.S. equipment remains attractive because of its quality and sophistication and because of the reliability of the equipment and its servicing. ¶11. (C) In contrast, we are told, the TNI disdains Russian and Chinese equipment because of the degraded nature of the export version of the technology compared with domestic versions, inferior performance and unreliable servicing. Little, if any, of the much-hyped $1 billion in Russian arms credits agreed during recent reciprocal state visits by President Yudhoyono and President Putin has materialized into actual arms purchases. Military sources tell us the Russian deal was put together by the Indonesian Defense Department for political purposes and that the TNI was not really interested in it. NEED TO FURTHER CEMENT TIES ¶12. (C) Defense cooperation with Indonesia is picking up steam. Mission firmly supports this process and urges Washington to take this opportunity to further cement defense ties with this important partner. In particular, the potential F-16 deals represent a real opportunity which, if properly used, could come to symbolize a new era in U.S.-Indonesia relations. These potential sales, and the cooperation they represent, would help to provide a strategic center to the U.S.-Indonesian Strategic Partnership agreed to by Presidents Bush and Yudhoyono. In making this recommendation, we note that Indonesia is often not easy to deal with: its procurement process is complex and not readily transparent, and nothing is certain yet on any of these deals. That said, we think that Indonesia is looking at the U.S. in a new, positive light. Given the psychological and material legacy of U.S. sanctions on the TNI, this is an enormous step forward. We should move JAKARTA 00003155 003 OF 003 forward quickly to act on this interest and to test their readiness to further improve ties. HUME