COMING TO GRIPS WITH "THE YEAR OF LIVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002923 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, DRL/AWH NSC FOR EPHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV SOCI PHUM KISL PREL ID SUBJECT: COMING TO GRIPS WITH "THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY" JAKARTA 00002923 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Events in the 1965-66 timeframe shook Indonesia to its core: faced with an attempted leftist takeover, the military launched a successful counter-coup. This was followed by widespread massacres as military and conservative Muslim elements killed an unknown number of alleged communists and ethnic Chinese, a number perhaps measured in the hundreds of thousands. Freedom to discuss these events was sharply circumscribed during the Suharto period. Even after that regime collapsed, public discourse was halting at best. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): Increasingly, however--aided by the passage of time and by the spirit of the new democratic Indonesia--local media, academics and politicians are freely debating what exactly occurred and why. It is a refreshing, cathartic debate that Indonesians are using--in a process that will take time--to move forward in a deeper, more confident manner toward transparency and reconciliation on other fronts. END SUMMARY. A VERY DANGEROUS YEAR ¶3. (SBU) While there is still a swirl of controversy surrounding the exact course of events, most observers now agree that leftist military elements aligned with the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI - Communist Party) were responsible for a September 30, 1965, coup attempt, involving the killing of six senior generals in Jakarta. The coup--immortalized in acronym form as "G30S" in Indonesia--fizzled when it was met by a strong, rapid response from the Indonesian Army led by General (later president) Suharto. ¶4. (SBU) In the immediate months after the coup attempt, military elements and conservative Muslims fanned out, killing an unknown number of alleged communists. Estimates of the number of dead vary anywhere from 80,000 to over one million. The PKI's leadership structure was decimated in the process. Many of the victims were evidently not affiliated with the PKI, but were at the wrong place at the wrong time or were the victims of village grudges. The ethnic Chinese community--as often happens during times of tumult in Indonesia--also became the victims of violence. SUHARTO'S KULTURKAMPF ¶5. (SBU) During the period of the Suharto regime (1965-98), there were strict guidelines on what was said and taught about the mayhem of G30S. "Atheistic, anti-Islamic" communists with links to Red China--according to the storyline--had tried to seize power and had been defeated by the heroic Indonesian Army. Virtually nothing was said about the mass killings. An annual pilgrimage was made to the place where the bodies of the six slain generals were found. Ultimately a huge monument was built, extolling Suharto's version of what took place. School textbooks and media outlets stuck to the regime-sponsored explanation. REFORMASI SPARKS RE-THINKING ¶6. (SBU) Suharto's 1998 ouster sparked many democratic reforms in Indonesia. There was a "Glasnost" of sorts, for example, regarding how the 1965-66 events could be addressed in public. This was particularly discernible during the short (1999-2001) presidency of Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, who recommended that the Indonesian government officially lift the legal proscription on Communism. Although nothing came of the proposal--the ban remains in place--it did help spark discussion. There was still considerable opposition to discourse on the issue, however, from conservative Muslim groups, conservative lawmakers and Suharto family loyalists. NO HOLDS BARRED ¶7. (C) With almost ten years separating contemporary Indonesia from the Suharto regime, the debate about 1965-66 has gained momentum and is now virtually no holds barred. Examples of the new openness include: JAKARTA 00002923 002.2 OF 003 -- NGO investigates killings: In the past several years, an NGO called the Indonesian Institute for the Study of the 1965-66 Massacre has continued efforts to locate mass graves of victims of the killings. It has found some sites, although Islamic groups--some of which were probably complicit in the killings--have impeded its efforts. -- Destroy the Monument?: In 2002, an opinion piece in the English-language newspaper, "The Jakarta Post," advocated that the government's memorial to the 1965 events be torn down, or, alternatively, maintained as testimony to Suharto's "distorted representation" of the past. (Note: The memorial is still intact.) -- Revising the "official" story: In 2003-04, leading historians demanded that the GOI revise its account of what transpired in 1965-66. The effort to reform school and university texts led to some changes in the official account, but the texts were still far from accurate and barely mention the mass killings. -- Court Ruling: In 2004, the Constitutional Court restored the political rights of former PKI members and their relatives, allowing them to run for office. -- A Commission is formed: In 2004, the national legislature endorsed a bill to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission tasked with looking into "gross human rights violations" which have taken place in Indonesia. The 1965-66 events were understood to be included in its purview. (Note: In 2006, the Constitutional Court ruled that this commission was unconstitutional, so planned investigations never got off the ground.) -- Search for the missing: Beginning in 2004-05, the National Commission on Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM),began to accept requests from families to look into cases of missing persons from the 1965-66 period. So far, these investigations have not been successful. KOMNAS HAM has also advocated for the rights of families whose relatives had been political prisoners accused of PKI links. -- Rehabilitating the PKI?: In the past several years, numerous articles and books have been published reviewing the activities of the PKI. The popular magazine "Tempo" placed a photo of D.N. Aidit--slain in 1965 and the last PKI leader--on an early October 2007 cover, for example. The article favorably noted Aidit's anti-Dutch efforts during the Indonesian Revolution. In its lead editorial, the magazine underscored that the PKI as a party was in many ways admirable in its dedication to its platform and compares favorably with Indonesia's current parties. FACE THE PAST; FACE THE FUTURE ¶8. (C) The debate is controversial. Many Indonesians, especially conservative Muslims, remain committed to the Suharto-era version of events. At times, there has been tension involving these groups when NGOs attempt to dig at sites where bodies may be buried. The Indonesian government recently destroyed a set of school texts because they were not sufficiently anti-PKI. In addition, there is no move by the Indonesian government to actually hold anyone accountable for what took place, and even staunch Indonesian human rights activists underline the need for societal reconciliation and not confrontation. ¶9. (C) At the same time, the debate is refreshing. By finally putting to rest some of the ghosts of the 1965-66 period, many observers feel that Indonesia may be able to move forward in a deeper manner toward transparency and reconciliation on other fronts. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a well-known political analyst, told Pol/C that "we are showing we are willing to reconcile ourselves to the horrible things that took place and learn the lessons." Gembong Prijono, a key assistant of Vice President Kalla and a former board member for the Human Rights Commission, commented -- "We must face the past in order to face the future and, by doing so, we can better deal with the abuses in Aceh, Papua, East JAKARTA 00002923 003.2 OF 003 Timor, and the other violence that has plagued us." Given what has transpired recently, it seems that Indonesians have at least tentatively reset the clock, allowing it to finally tick toward some form of closure on "the Year of Living Dangerously." HUME