HOPES DIM FOR RATIFICATION OF INDONESIA-SINGAPORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002660 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, T, PM, L SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP (IPSEN) JOINT STAFF FOR CLEMMONS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV ID SN SUBJECT: HOPES DIM FOR RATIFICATION OF INDONESIA-SINGAPORE DEFENSE AGREEMENT REF: A. JAKARTA 1566 ¶B. SINGAPORE 1377 ¶C. SINGAPORE 1045 JAKARTA 00002660 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b)(d). ¶1. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Singapore. ¶2. (C) Summary: Indonesian officials see chances for ratification of the Indonesia-Singapore Defense Agreement as dimming, five months after its signature. Leading the charge, a key Indonesian legislator has urged the GOI to cancel the agreement unilaterally, asserting that it is advantageous to Singapore. A key bone of contention involves the so-called "Area Bravo," a proposal to use Indonesian waters as a key training site. Aside from provoking nationalist-type outbursts, the agreement has also fallen victim to endemic executive-legislative branch infighting. End Summary. From the DPR with love -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Indonesian legislature (DPR) has taken another swipe at the proposed Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Singapore. Theo Sambuaga, Chairman of Commission I of the DPR, which oversees foreign and security affairs, called for the GOI's outright cancellation of the agreement after meeting with Defense Minister Sudarsono on September 17. Sambuaga asserted, erroneously, that Singapore had ratified the DCA despite known Indonesian differences, and characterized that step as jus]ifying Indonesian cancellation, given the outstanding differences that remained between the two sides. Minister Sudarsono noted--considerably more circumspectly--that the DCA was not a self-executing agreement and that it could not be ratified without a more detailed document specifying technical, administrative and operational issues. If the report were true, therefore, Indonesia would have to reject the pact. The treaty, which was negotiated and signed in tandem with a parallel Extradition Treaty in April (refs a, c),came under heavy fire early on from the DPR and, after a recent brief respite, has returned to the front page with Sambuaga's statement. ¶4. (C) Sambuaga and fellow legislators appear to be out ahead of the facts on their report of Singaporean ratification. Embassy Singapore has confirmed with the Singapore Parliament that the DCA has not yet been submitted for approval. The DCA was last discussed in Singapore's parliament in July (ref b) when it came up during question time. It is quite possible that Singaporean officials may have told Indonesian counterparts such a step was imminent, which could explain Sudarsono's consultations with Sambuaga. Even if the allegation is not based in fact (not always a serious impediment in the DPR),it underscores how far the Indonesian legislature is from ratifying the agreement. "Area Bravo" Plans not Popular -------------- ¶5. (C) Commenting on these developments, Director General for Defense Strategy BG Dadi Susanto at the Indonesian Defense Department (DEPHAN) expressed serious concern to us about prospects for Indonesian ratification of the proposed DCA with Singapore. Five months on, Susanto said he was "frankly worried" about the fate of the treaty. The barrage of DPR attacks was more than mere political posturing and reflected genuine sensitivities on the part of many Indonesians. Moreover, provincial legislators in areas near projected training sites had written to the Defense Minister protesting what they characterized as future "war exercises" in their vicinity. ¶6. (C) The central obstacle at this point, Susanto explained, was the status of the Implementing Arrangement (IA) for "Area Bravo." This site, the largest and most controversial of the training areas allotted to Singapore under the draft agreement, encompasses a substantial stretch of the Natuna JAKARTA 00002660 002.2 OF 002 Sea east of Singapore and would be used for air and naval exercises, including live fire, firing of missiles and participation of third countries, under the agreement. Susanto said such arrangements had been finalized for all other training areas except Bravo, where Singapore was unable to agree with the provisions proposed by Indonesia. Much of the public outcry on the Indonesian side has in fact focused on the broad latitude that the DCA would allegedly give Singapore in Area Bravo without an IA. Additional points of contentioNDm*kommander in Chief of Defense Forces (Panglima) to proceed with negotiations, but Singapore had yet to designate a counterpart. If Singapore proceeded to ratify the DCA without the Bravo IA, enraged Indonesian legislators would likely scuttle the agreement, Susanto asserted. You can't always get what you want -------------- 3QQ+krPJQ*@ were surprised when the agreement was signed in April. The administration is not throwing in the towel just yet. It knows the score, however, and seems prepared for non-action by the DPR on this foreign policy priority. Beyond the merits of the case, there is also the fact of executive-legislative branch sparring, with the DPR trying to exert itself as a big-time player on international relations as well as domestic policy. In this game, DPR members are more than willing to play to the crowd for points against the Palace and do not seem at all disturbed by the potential fallout in cross-strait relations. HUME