CENTRAL SULAWESI - POSO: "BACK TO NORMAL"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002597 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, DRL/PHD, INL, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KISL KCOR ID SUBJECT: CENTRAL SULAWESI - POSO: "BACK TO NORMAL" JAKARTA 00002597 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) This is a joint Surabaya - Jakarta message. ¶2. (C) Summary: During Surabaya Principal Officer's recent trip to Central Sulawesi, interlocutors uniformly described the situation in Poso as "good" and "back to normal." Despite continuing concerns that hardliners from outside Poso could potentially exploit local concerns about corruption and land ownership, our interlocutors suggested that the local population was unwilling to resume inter-religious violence. February 2007 raids demonstrated that extremists still find support in parts of Central Sulawesi. The security forces, however, expressed confidence that their efforts have significantly undermined the extremists' capabilities. All agreed that rebuilding the economy is critical to Poso's future. (Poso's economic situation is reported septel.) End Summary. Visit to Poso -------------- ¶3. (C) Surabaya Principal Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Political-Economic Assistant and Public Affairs Assistant traveled to the Central Sulawesi towns of Palu and Poso September 4-7 to discuss the current political situation and prospects for the future. Our interlocutors universally agreed that the current security situation was "good" and "back to normal." Along the five-hour drive between Palu and Poso, village residents went about their daily tasks, construction on new and expanded mosques and churches continued, and few security personnel were visible. Many told us that local residents were "fed up" with conflict and blamed reported tensions on groups and individuals that wanted to maintain a perception of chaos and conflict for financial gain. A member of the Interfaith Communication Forum suggested that the security institutions in particular benefited from continuing unrest, explaining that the Indonesian military (TNI) and National Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) received an additional Rp 275 million (USD 29,000) for every 10 days of operations in Poso. Others noted that NGOs focused on conflict resolution would also be financially disadvantaged by( peace hn Poso. Burying the hatchet -------------- ¶4. (C) Yayhya Mangun, head of the Poso Interfaith Forum and Poso reconciliation team, explained that 80% of the Malino Peace Accords (a 10-point agreement brokered by current Vice President Yusuf Kalla in December 2001 to end the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Poso) had been achieved. The outstanding 20%, which he argued can only be resolved through the intervention of the central government, focuses on the fairness of law enforcement and compensation. He said that the reconciliation team had been working to convince both religious communities to forgive each other for the violence and destruction. To achieve this forgiveness, Yayhya suggested that the central government convene a major conference, which would include the leaders of both communities and village heads. At this conference, both communities would be required to pledge their commitment to forgive the other based on the traditional philosophy of "Tambun Tanah" or "all problems must be buried." Once Tambun Tanah was agreed, any individual or community who refused to forgive would be subject to traditional social sanction. Yayhya insisted that this traditional form of resolution would preclude extremists from gaining traction in either community. He dismissed suggestions that the reconciliation team should take a more proactive role in achieving this forgiveness, stressing that it was the responsibility of the central government. ¶5. (C) Rev. Omnesimus Kamboji, the Head of the Interfaith Communication Forum in Tentena and former MP in the Poso parliament, emphasized that the security situation in the predominantly Christian town of Tentena was good. He noted that Muslim traders again felt confident selling goods in the Tentena market, although the town is 80% Christian. Rev. Kamboji criticized plans to divide villages, towns, and regencies by religion, arguing that refugees should be encouraged to return to their homes and interact with their neighbors regardless of religion. He stressed that plans to JAKARTA 00002597 002.2 OF 003 create a separate Christian-majority regency in Tentena were counter-productive for Central Sulawesi's long-term security. The separation of Morowali and Tojo Unauna into a new regency split a religiously balanced Poso regency into two religiously based regencies: Poso is now 70% Christian; Morowali/Tojo Unauna is now 80% Muslim. February raids successful -------------- ¶6. (C) Piet Inkiriwang, the Bupati (Regent) of Poso, a retired police officer who had run President Yudhoyono's campaign team in Poso during the presidential election, stressed the safety and security of Poso, especially following the successful raids in Gebangrejo/Tanahruntu villages in February 2007. Central Sulawesi Government H.B. Paliuju and Chief of the Central Sulawesi Police (Kapolda) Brig. Gen. Badrotin Haiti echoed the importance of these raids for establishing security in Poso and the surrounding area. Badrotin explained that hardline "Ustadz" (religious teachers) from Central Java had taken advantage of Central Sulawesi's religious conflict and poverty to press Islamic radicalism, teaching that it was religiously permissible to kill unbelievers in support of jihad. According to these officials, dozens of radicals had been arrested and homemade weapons had been confiscated in the February raids. Most of those arrested originated in Central Java and the weapons had been procured from the southern Philippines. ¶7. (C/NF) Kapolda Badrotin argued strongly that provincial religious officials and police must provide a better understanding of Islamic teachings to local communities. Local authorities were inviting moderate "Utadz" from Java to promote a better understanding of Islam. Additionally, teams of four young police officers were being stationed in local villages as part of a community policing program (Polisi Masyarakat) to monitor village activities and identify potential threats. Kapolda Badrotin noted that the police were monitoring the activities of an "Ustadz" from Lamongan, East Java, named Zakaria, who had arrived in Poso the previous week. The Kapolda added that 200 members of Brimob from Jakarta would be stationed in Poso until December 2007. At that time, the provincial police force would take over security. Corruption -------------- ¶8. (C) The central government's response to the conflict was universally criticized as insufficient and self-serving. Many noted that local residents had no trust in the government, and believed government programs were overwhelmingly corrupt. Rev. Kamboji suggested that the population dismissed the Malino Accord as a central government product that failed to address the aspirations of the local population. Activists and NGOs highlighted the level of corruption, which siphoned off funding and undermined reconciliation. The provincial court's decision to release Aminudin Ponulele, the former Governor of Central Sulawesi who was charged with embezzling Rp 8 billion (USD 854 million) in state funds earmarked for refugees from the conflict, for lack of evidence was particularly galling. Others suggested that the Poso Bupati had faked the educational documents required for office. Edmon Leonardo, the head of the Central Sulawesi office of "Kontras" argued forcefully that the current sense of calm could end before December if authorities did not address the issue of corruption. Who owns the land? -------------- ¶9. (C) Outstanding questions of land ownership raised the most concerns within the activist community and even the police. Rev. Kamboji estimated that approximately 7,000 refugees live in Tentena. Like refugees in towns and villages throughout Central Sulawesi, many plan to return to their homes, while others prefer to stay put. Unfortunately, when Muslim and Christian refugees return to their villages, they discover that their property has been occupied by members of the other religious group. Police officers reportedly take advantage of the situation by offering to escort people to their land, for a fee. JAKARTA 00002597 003.2 OF 003 ¶10. (C) To make matters more complicated, in many instances, the local government has issued property ownership certificates to the new occupants. Local activists and government officials blame local land offices for the current problems and demand these offices find a way to restore legal ownership to the original owners. No group suggested that these cases could be resolved through the courts. Kapolda Badrotin himself noted that speeding up the process of returning land to its original owner is critical to long-term stability in the area. How the local governments resolve this issue will be watched closely by both communities for evidence of balance. HUME