INDONESIAN/IRANIAN RELATIONS: MARGINAL SUBSTANCE,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002549

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T, EAP, EAP/MTS, NEA, NEA/IR, ISN,
ISN/RA, IO, IO/UNP
S/ES-O: PLEASE PASS TO IRAN COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL MNUC PARM ETRD UNSC ID IR
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN/IRANIAN RELATIONS: MARGINAL SUBSTANCE,
BUT COMPLEX DUE TO NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: A. JAKARTA 1919


B. 06 JAKARTA 6026

C. JAKARTA 2276

D. JAKARTA 1793

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Many elements of a strong bilateral
relationship remain underdeveloped between Indonesia and
Iran. The two countries maintain marginal trade and
investment links. Defense and security cooperation is
virtually nonexistent. Despite this, much of the public and
Indonesian legislature support Iran during the current crisis
over its nuclear program as a result of a vaguely anti-U.S.
worldview and feelings of Muslim solidarity. When looking at
the Iranian nuclear issue, Indonesian policy makers are
driven primarily by domestic political calculations and
global nonproliferation goals rather than concern about the
aggressive nature of the Iranian regime. The appearance of
Iranian cooperation with the IAEA complicates Indonesian
support for another UNSC resolution. A consensus among the
UNSC P-5 will be essential to any successful lobbying here.
End Summary.

DPR rips into Yudhoyono
--------------


2. (S) Some of Iran's most vocal Indonesian supporters are in
the House of Representatives (DPR). Immediately after the
vote on UNSCR 1747, the DPR went after the Yudhoyono
administration with a fury. Legislators from all major
political parties except Yudhoyono's own small Democratic
Party waged a three-month battle to force the president to
explain the vote before a plenary session of the DPR. As we
reported previously, Iran promised financial benefits,
including oil concessions, to the leaders of major parties in
the DPR, including Speaker Agung Laksono (Ref A),if they
would take steps to support Iran in the crisis.


3. (S) In addition to personal benefit, DPR motives for
pushing this issue include Muslim solidarity, domestic
political calculation, and a power struggle between the
executive and the legislature. Department of Foreign Affairs
(DEPLU) contacts and foreign policy watchers most frequently
mention Abdillah Toha, a member of the Islamic National
Mandate faction (PAN),as committed to supporting Iran on the
grounds of Muslim solidarity. His is a rare case. More
commonly, politicians jockeying for the 2009 elections see
the Iranian nuclear issue as providing a cost free
opportunity to attack SBY's government. The DPR's Commission
I, responsible for foreign affairs and defense, sees the
issue as a way to assert its newly emerging legislative
authority in foreign policy making.


4. (C) Several well-connected interlocutors have told us that
the DPR may have overplayed its hand pushing the Iran issue
for so long and so stridently. Indonesians are increasingly
impatient with this transparently political power struggle
between the DPR and the President delaying action on
important legislation. As a result, the DPR has recently put
on hold any effort to force the president to testify and the
criticism has quieted down.

Iranian outreach
--------------


5. (C) Iranian lobbying has built support among Indonesian
Muslims, who constitute about 85 percent of the population.
The Iranian Embassy has been engaged in a long-standing and
ongoing campaign to garner the support of Indonesia's Muslim
leaders. In advance of the vote on UNSCR 1747, for example,
Iranian officials visited the leaders of Indonesia's two
largest mass Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhammadiyah, to press for support. After the UNSC vote, NU
and Muhammadiyah slammed the Indonesian government. The
loudest and most frequent critic, NU's Hasyim Muzadi, charged
that "if war breaks out eventually between Iran and the US,
the Indonesian government will be responsible." DEPLU called
in the Iranian Ambassador to protest the aggressiveness of
the Iranian campaign here.


6. (C) Although less strident, Muhammadiyah Chairman Din

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Syamsuddin also criticized the vote, saying that "if we want
to be consistent, Indonesia should also press for sanctions
against all countries that have a nuclear program, including
Israel and the United States." Even former president and
one-time head of NU Abdurrahman Wahid ("Gus Dur") accused the
GOI of being "George Bush's henchman," although he later
backed away somewhat from his initial negative stance. Not
surprisingly, the Muslim hard-liners have been more
vitriolic. The Muslim Defenders Team (TPM),a group of
attorneys who defend extremist suspects, threatened a lawsuit
against SBY, saying that "this lawsuit (would be) a message
from the ulama circle that they do not agree with the
government's decision to support the resolution."


7. (C) While religious affinity is a factor for some, Iran
also appeals to secular Indonesians whose views are shaped by
anti-colonial nationalism and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Iran, as a leader of the NAM, has capitalized on this
support by pitching itself to Indonesians as defending the
rights of NAM countries against the U.S. This dynamic was
particularly apparent during President Ahmadinejad's May 2006
visit to Indonesia. Many Indonesians looked at him with
nostalgia for a Sukarno-like figure who could stand up for
the rights of developing countries against "bullying" by the
U.S. As we have reported previously, the GOI, and President
Yudhoyono personally, were angered by Ahmadinejad's antics in
Jakarta. Indonesian leaders were embarrassed that the
Indonesian public treated him like a rock star (Ref B).
Shortly after Ahmadinejad's visit, the GOI turned off a
proposed visit by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez out of
fear that he would espouse the same anti-American rhetoric,
and receive the same rapturous welcome from Indonesians.
Similarly, SBY refused to meet the Iranian FM when he dropped
into Jakarta uninvited in the days just before the vote on
UNSCR 1747.


8. (C) Iran has exploited a generally cool relationship
between Indonesia and leading Arab states. While they are
also predominantly Sunni, many Indonesians resent that the
"Wahhabi" Muslims of the Gulf do not recognize as truly
Islamic Indonesia's syncretic and Sufi-influenced variant of
their faith. Iran, adhering to a Shia Islam that is mystical
and syncretic, seems to some Indonesians somewhat closer to
their own religious inclinations, although few Indonesians
really are expert in Sunni-Shia differences, and Indonesian
Islam is far more moderate and tolerant than the Iranian
variety. (Note: The percentage of Shia in Indonesia is
extremely small -- see septel.) Regular cases of Indonesian
migrant workers abused and exploited in Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf States also contribute to Indonesian coolness
toward the Arabs. Iran also appears to many Indonesians to
be more effective than the Arab states as a champion of
Muslim causes, most notably that of the Palestinians. This
has bought Iran significant good will with Indonesians.


9. (C) U.S. diplomatic efforts have focused on explaining our
Middle East policy and on building support for that policy
among the Indonesian public. In meetings with Indonesian
officials, we have stressed our shared interest in
nonproliferation. In these efforts we must remain mindful of
the fact that many Indonesians view the U.S. as a "bully"
that tries to dictate what developing countries can do. As
an example, many IndoneOians point to a telephone call
between Presidents Bush and Yudhoyono prior to the vote on

1747. While the call had been primarily a discussion of an
upcoming G-33 meeting on the Doha Round, Indonesians saw it
as the United States telling Indonesia to "shut up and take
notes" on how to vote in the UNSC. Although we have actively
pressed our case on Iran, our efforts are hampered by the
fact that aggressive U.S. lobbying risks provoking an
negative backlash, a danger that is far less acute for the
Iranians.

Follow the money if you can find it
--------------


10. (C) Economic ties between the two countries remain
marginal. Leading economic thinker M. Chatib Basri told
econoff recently that there was no significant Iranian
investment in Indonesia sufficient to influence GOI behavior.
He also said the small amount of trade and investment
between the two countries has little effect on Indonesia's

JAKARTA 00002549 003 OF 004


foreign policy toward Iran. The GOI's own "direction of
trade" figures support Basri's assessment. Indonesia's most
important trading partners are the industrial countries and
non-industrial Asia, which together accounted for 91 percent
of total Indonesian trade in 2006. In contrast, two-way
trade with Iran in 2006 was just 0.2 percent of Indonesia's
total trade.


11. (C) Indonesia's largest fertilizer company, PT Pupuk
Sriwijaya, is close to finalizing a deal with an Iranian
partner to build a US$600 million fertilizer plant in Iran.
The Indonesian company would own 50 percent of the plant,
although financing details remain under discussion. To
attract the investment, Iran has offered natural gas from the
South Pars field at a quarter of the going rate in Indonesia
(Ref C).

What military relationship?
--------------


12. (S) Another significant gap in Indonesia-Iran relations
is military ties; they are virtually nonexistent. Despite
occasional statements at the ministerial level that both
countries share strategic interests, the Indonesian military
(TNI) has little contact with its Iranian counterpart. In
response to previous demarches, DEPLU assured us that
Indonesia had no military cooperation agreements nor any arms
trade with Iran (Ref D).

DEPLU and the Palace get it, mostly
--------------


13. (C) Key senior interlocutors in the president's office
and at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) have
repeatedly indicated to us that they view the Iran nuclear
issue through the lens of Indonesia's long-standing support
of international nonproliferation and disarmament. When
pressed on Iran Indonesian officials are quick to point out
the alleged U.S. double standard in not calling for
international pressure against Israel's reported nuclear
weapons program. They also refuse to acknowledge the
aggressive nature and destabilizing influence of
Ahmadinejad's regime. That said, Indonesian leaders do not
see the nuclear issue as a bilateral one between Indonesia
and Iran. Indonesian leaders will decide how to vote on any
future UNSCR dealing with Iran based primarily on their
domestic political calculus and on their assessment of
whether that resolution advances Indonesia's nonproliferation
priorities. High level sustained U.S. engagement and P-5
consensus will be essential when the resolution comes forward.


14. (C) Many working-level Indonesian officials, however, are
not on the same page as more senior officials. A German
Embassy officer, who frequently lobbies Indonesia on behalf
of the EU on Iran, told us that Indonesian officials do not
understand the real nature of Iran's nuclear program. For
example, following a recent briefing by visiting ISN
officials on Iran's outstanding issues with the IAEA, DEPLU
officials asked how Iran's nuclear program was any different
from Indonesia's own aspirations for a civilian nuclear
program.

Now the bad news
--------------


15. (C) The Iran-Indonesia relationship is not sufficiently
strong to compel Indonesian support for Iran in the UNSC.
Despite this, it will be difficult to secure Indonesian
support for a future UNSC resolution on Iran as long as Iran
appears to be cooperating with the IAEA. The August 30 IAEA
Director General's report on Iran makes our job more
difficult. Key decision makers at DEPLU and in the
president's office know that they have to justify voting for
any new resolution in terms of Indonesia's support for
international nonproliferation norms. Given the domestic
political storm they weathered following the vote on UNSCR
1747, and the perception that Iran is now cooperating with
the IAEA, the GOI is reluctant to move forward with another
UNSCR on Iran anytime soon. The fact that President
Yudhoyono will face the voters again in 2009 adds to his
caution on this high-profile issue. To have any chance of
success, our approach must give President Yudhoyono political

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cover in the face of those who want to use this issue to
attack him. A P-5 consensus is also essential to securing
Indonesian support and will help Yudhoyono justify a yes-vote
at home.

USG strategy
--------------


16. (C) USG strategy to engage Indonesia on this matter is
on the right track. Mission recommends that we continue to
emphasize the following three priorities:

-Continue consultations at all levels with the GOI on Iran
issues;

-Regularly underscore U.S. support for a peaceful resolution
of the issue in our public statements; and

-Continue to press Indonesia privately, stressing our shared
nonproliferation goals while pointing out the aggressive and
destabilizing nature of the Iranian regime.
HUME