INDONESIA SEEKING HIGHER PROFILE IN MIDDLE EAST?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000253 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL PTER ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA SEEKING HIGHER PROFILE IN MIDDLE EAST? REF: A. 06 JAKARTA 6802 -- PALESTINIAN FM MAKES LOW-KEY VISIT ¶B. 06 JAKARTA 7009 -- INDONESIAN FM ON VISIT BY PALESTINIAN FM ¶C. GLICK-HEFFERN EMAIL 01/26/07 Classified By: Political Officer Catherine E. Sweet, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. The Foreign Ministry has announced that Hassan Wirajuda plans to meet with exiled Hamas leader Khalid Mish'al in Damascus in February, during his visit to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Wirajuda and President Yudhoyono (SBY) previously received Hamas Foreign Minister Mahmud Al-Zahar in Jakarta; at that time, Al-Zahar flatly rejected the Indonesians' call for the Palestinian Authority to resume peace negotiations with Israel. SBY has also deployed advisers to meet with the Lebanese, Palestinians and, secretly, the Israelis. While the Indonesians are exploring SIPDIS ways (like the Iraq "triple-track" initiative) to play a role in the Middle East, they know their limits and we do not expect any major new Indonesian regional initiatives in the near term. End summary. Indonesian FM Will Meet Hamas' Mish'al in Damascus -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) spokesperson, Kristiarto Legowo, told reporters on January 26 that Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda plans to meet with exiled Hamas leader Khalid Mish'al when Wirajuda visits Damascus in February. According to Legowo, Wirajuda will propose that Hamas leaders travel to Jakarta within the next three months for talks on resolving the intra-Palestinian conflict. Kristiarto said that "we will only convene with Hamas first," and Fatah would be excluded. Wirajuda will reportedly flesh out the details during his meeting with Mish'al, when "they will brainstorm what methods are best to realize our plan," the spokesman said. "The most important thing for Indonesia is how we can encourage efforts to establish a united Palestinian government," added Kristiarto. ¶3. (C) Wirajuda's scheduled meeting with Mish'al will not be his first with a Hamas official. On May 26, 2006, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Foreign Minister Wirajuda received Hamas Foreign Minister Mahmud Al-Zahar in Jakarta, during Al-Zahar's tour of Muslim southeast Asian countries. At the time, the two parties released a joint statement touting Indonesia's support for the Palestinian cause (ref A). Privately, however, Wirajuda was much more negative, telling the Ambassador that Al-Zahar flatly rejected the Indonesians' call for the Palestinian Authority to resume peace negotiations with Israel. According to Wirajuda, Al-Zahar dismissed the Oslo accord and other peacemaking attempts as "not as a peace process, but a process to tear Palestine into pieces" (ref B). Opening Channels for Dialogue with Israel -------------- ¶4. (S) Behind the scenes, SBY has twice deployed his special advisor, T.B. Silalahi, to Israel. According to Ilan Ben-Dov, Israel's Ambassador to Singapore, Silalahi met with Prime Minister Olmert in advance of the UNIFIL deployment. While the Israelis do not expect full diplomatic relations or a ministerial visit, Ben-Dov said, they are interested in opening up a channel with Indonesia and were looking at possible aid programs. ¶5. (S) Given the political sensitivities, SBY has kept Silalahi's travels extremely close hold, even within the government. Ben-Dov reported that when he raised Silalahi's Israel visit with SBY's spokesman, Dino Patti Djalal, the latter indicated he did not want to be involved, preferring that Silalahi have full control of the portfolio. As a Christian without political ambitions, Djalal contended, Silalahi is "safe." When the Israelis reached out to the GOI's Special Envoy for the Middle East, Alwi Shihab, Ben-Dov asserted Silalahi was angered, saying that SBY did not want Shihab to be involved. Focusing on Lebanon -------------- ¶6. (S) On January 26, Silalahi briefed us on the second trip JAKARTA 00000253 002 OF 002 he made to the Middle East at SBY's behest, this time to Israel and Lebanon in late November. Although he was not particularly expansive about the Israeli leg, he did call his meeting with President Olmert "productive." In Lebanon, he called on the president, prime minister and speaker of parliament, all of whom accorded him a level of respect that far exceeded what would have been expected in pure protocol terms, he said. He attributed this to the fact that Indonesia was viewed as an honest broker. Silalahi said his interlocutors stressed that Indonesia could play a productive role in reducing tensions because "it did not have any ulterior motives." ¶7. (S) While in Lebanon, Silalahi visited Indonesia's UNIFIL troops (which include SBY's son),and reported that morale was high. He told us he also inspected Lebanese military facilities, noting that the equipment was "sub-standard." In Silalahi's opinion, Lebanese government forces were simply not trained or equipped well enough to successfully engage Hizballah, which he said was receiving the latest weaponry and sophisticated urban tactical training from Iran. Prospects for Sustained Engagement -------------- ¶8. (S) When we asked whether he thought Indonesia would attempt to play a more active role on the Palestinian issue, Silalahi replied that he did not. According to him, Indonesia had determined that the Roadmap offered the most comprehensive and credible solution to the conflict, and decided that a more active Indonesian effort on the issue would not "add value." Instead, Silalahi had concluded that Indonesia's energies in the region could most usefully be applied towards resolving tensions in Lebanon. ¶9. (S) Silalahi contended that Indonesia has the requisite stature and credibility in Lebanon to serve as a broker in the conflict, and said he received encouragement in Lebanon to pursue such a role. However, he told us that after he returned to Jakarta and made his recommendation to the President, SBY did not embrace it. Instead, SBY argued that Indonesia needed to focus on domestic concerns at present, offering only that he might revisit the issue later. This reply, in Silalahi's opinion, was SBY's Javanese way of saying that he would not pursue the issue any further. PASCOE