Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA2500
2007-09-10 10:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:
PRESSING FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON BURMA IN UNSC
VZCZCXRO2583 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHJA #2500/01 2531005 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 101005Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6162 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0672 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1140 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1342 RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3431 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4182 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0767 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1733
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002500
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS (COPE),IO, IO/UNP
(WICKBERG),DRL/AWH (BUCKLEY),S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC ID BM
SUBJECT: PRESSING FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON BURMA IN UNSC
REF: STATE 123219
JAKARTA 00002500 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002500
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS (COPE),IO, IO/UNP
(WICKBERG),DRL/AWH (BUCKLEY),S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC ID BM
SUBJECT: PRESSING FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON BURMA IN UNSC
REF: STATE 123219
JAKARTA 00002500 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: DCM emphasized reftel points on Burma with
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) Secretary General,
September 7. Pol/C also underlined points at DEPLU office
director level. GOI is committed not to praise in any way
the regime's so-called "National Convention," but did not
explicitly commit to support informal consultations at the
UNSC, nor a near-term visit to Burma by Envoy Gambari.
2. (C) Summary (Con'd): Pol/C also pressed members of the
legislative branch (DPR) and think-tank analysts in order to
stimulate further pressure on the government. We think that
continued engagement with the GOI and other sectors can bring
the situation closer to the top of the GOI's agenda, though
the government's clear proclivity is not to put its head
above the parapet. End Summary.
Making Points with DEPLU
========================
3. (C) In his meeting with Secretary General Imron Cotan,
DEPLU's second-highest ranking official, the DCM expressed
the USG's deep concern about the crackdown, noting the
arrests and beatings that have taken place. The timing of
the crackdown demonstrates the regime's opposition to any
genuine dialogue. The U.S. urges that Indonesia not make any
statement of support for the so-called National Convention.
The GOI should also support efforts for a near-term briefing
re Burma at the UNSC plus a visit to Burma by UN Special
Envoy Ibrahim Gambari as long as he can meet with Aung San
Suu Kyi and other activists.
4. (C) Cotan replied that the GOI would not make any
statement in support of the convention. He listened to the
points regarding informal consultations at the UN and the
possible Gambari visit, but did not commit to anything
specific. Cotan asserted that the GOI and other ASEAN
members have raised the Burmese regime's behavior in ASEAN
meetings (apparently before the latest crackdown),but not
received any reaction from the Burmese representatives
present.
5. (C) Pol/C also emphasized reftel points in his September
10 meeting with Hari Purwanto, DEPLU Director for North
American Affairs. A representative of DEPLU's ASEAN office
was also present. Pol/C noted that Indonesia, as the
region's largest country and a democracy, could play a key
role in pressing the Burmese regime to relent. It was not
enough that the USG or the UK made statements: it was
important that Burma's neighbors take robust diplomatic
action. Indonesia, as a UNSC member at this time and with
its UNSC presidency coming up in November, could help lead
this effort.
6. (C) Purwanto thanked Pol/C for the points, adding that
they would be reviewed very carefully. The GOI, he said,
"cared about the situation in Myanmar," but was still
examining any next steps. It would be a mistake for the
international community to take action if it turned out to be
counter-productive. Pol/C assured Purwanto that the USG
points were well-thought out and represented a constructive
way for the international community to react to the regime's
provocations, which were extremely grave.
Using other Angles
==================
7. (C) In a bid to influence other sectors of Indonesian
society, Pol/C also reached out to Djoko Susilo, an M.P. who
is a member of the DPR's Commission on Foreign Affairs.
Pol/C noted that it would be very helpful if members of the
legislature start publicly discussing the Burmese situation,
pressing for GOI action on the matter. Susilo, the Chair of
the DPR's Caucus on Myanmar, responded that he and his
colleagues were drawing up a petition expressing "deep
concern" about the regime's actions that would be submitted
to President Yudhoyono. Pol/C urged that the petition move
forward soon.
8. (C) Pol/C also spoke with Rizal Mallarangeng, the
JAKARTA 00002500 002.2 OF 002
Executive Director of the Freedom Institute, a local public
policy NGO. Pol/C noted that it would be constructive if
local think-tanks took more of an activist approach by
writing op-eds on the situation and holding meetings about
Southeast Asian responses to the crisis. Mallarangeng took
the points on board, remarking that he would raise the matter
with his brother, Andi, one of President Yudhoyono's
spokesmen.
Further Engagement Key
======================
9. (C) The Indonesian government's clear proclivity--perhaps
because it is waiting for further consultations with its
ASEAN partners--is not to put its head above the parapet on
this matter. Moreover, so far, the crackdown does not seem
to have triggered broad interest among the chattering classes
or the public. That said, we think that continued engagement
with the GOI and other sectors can bring the situation closer
to the top of the agenda. The GOI values the exposure it is
getting as a UNSC member and--as a new democracy that is
shaking off an autocratic past--basically wants to be seen as
doing the right thing re Burma.
HUME
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS (COPE),IO, IO/UNP
(WICKBERG),DRL/AWH (BUCKLEY),S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC ID BM
SUBJECT: PRESSING FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON BURMA IN UNSC
REF: STATE 123219
JAKARTA 00002500 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: DCM emphasized reftel points on Burma with
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) Secretary General,
September 7. Pol/C also underlined points at DEPLU office
director level. GOI is committed not to praise in any way
the regime's so-called "National Convention," but did not
explicitly commit to support informal consultations at the
UNSC, nor a near-term visit to Burma by Envoy Gambari.
2. (C) Summary (Con'd): Pol/C also pressed members of the
legislative branch (DPR) and think-tank analysts in order to
stimulate further pressure on the government. We think that
continued engagement with the GOI and other sectors can bring
the situation closer to the top of the GOI's agenda, though
the government's clear proclivity is not to put its head
above the parapet. End Summary.
Making Points with DEPLU
========================
3. (C) In his meeting with Secretary General Imron Cotan,
DEPLU's second-highest ranking official, the DCM expressed
the USG's deep concern about the crackdown, noting the
arrests and beatings that have taken place. The timing of
the crackdown demonstrates the regime's opposition to any
genuine dialogue. The U.S. urges that Indonesia not make any
statement of support for the so-called National Convention.
The GOI should also support efforts for a near-term briefing
re Burma at the UNSC plus a visit to Burma by UN Special
Envoy Ibrahim Gambari as long as he can meet with Aung San
Suu Kyi and other activists.
4. (C) Cotan replied that the GOI would not make any
statement in support of the convention. He listened to the
points regarding informal consultations at the UN and the
possible Gambari visit, but did not commit to anything
specific. Cotan asserted that the GOI and other ASEAN
members have raised the Burmese regime's behavior in ASEAN
meetings (apparently before the latest crackdown),but not
received any reaction from the Burmese representatives
present.
5. (C) Pol/C also emphasized reftel points in his September
10 meeting with Hari Purwanto, DEPLU Director for North
American Affairs. A representative of DEPLU's ASEAN office
was also present. Pol/C noted that Indonesia, as the
region's largest country and a democracy, could play a key
role in pressing the Burmese regime to relent. It was not
enough that the USG or the UK made statements: it was
important that Burma's neighbors take robust diplomatic
action. Indonesia, as a UNSC member at this time and with
its UNSC presidency coming up in November, could help lead
this effort.
6. (C) Purwanto thanked Pol/C for the points, adding that
they would be reviewed very carefully. The GOI, he said,
"cared about the situation in Myanmar," but was still
examining any next steps. It would be a mistake for the
international community to take action if it turned out to be
counter-productive. Pol/C assured Purwanto that the USG
points were well-thought out and represented a constructive
way for the international community to react to the regime's
provocations, which were extremely grave.
Using other Angles
==================
7. (C) In a bid to influence other sectors of Indonesian
society, Pol/C also reached out to Djoko Susilo, an M.P. who
is a member of the DPR's Commission on Foreign Affairs.
Pol/C noted that it would be very helpful if members of the
legislature start publicly discussing the Burmese situation,
pressing for GOI action on the matter. Susilo, the Chair of
the DPR's Caucus on Myanmar, responded that he and his
colleagues were drawing up a petition expressing "deep
concern" about the regime's actions that would be submitted
to President Yudhoyono. Pol/C urged that the petition move
forward soon.
8. (C) Pol/C also spoke with Rizal Mallarangeng, the
JAKARTA 00002500 002.2 OF 002
Executive Director of the Freedom Institute, a local public
policy NGO. Pol/C noted that it would be constructive if
local think-tanks took more of an activist approach by
writing op-eds on the situation and holding meetings about
Southeast Asian responses to the crisis. Mallarangeng took
the points on board, remarking that he would raise the matter
with his brother, Andi, one of President Yudhoyono's
spokesmen.
Further Engagement Key
======================
9. (C) The Indonesian government's clear proclivity--perhaps
because it is waiting for further consultations with its
ASEAN partners--is not to put its head above the parapet on
this matter. Moreover, so far, the crackdown does not seem
to have triggered broad interest among the chattering classes
or the public. That said, we think that continued engagement
with the GOI and other sectors can bring the situation closer
to the top of the agenda. The GOI values the exposure it is
getting as a UNSC member and--as a new democracy that is
shaking off an autocratic past--basically wants to be seen as
doing the right thing re Burma.
HUME