DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002421 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA/I, PM, T, DRL/PHD, ISN/RA, IO/UNP, OBO, H, CA/OCS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM CACS ID SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY ADVISOR DJALAL JAKARTA 00002421 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate August 28 meetings, EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel discussed a range of bilateral issues with Andri Hadi, Director General for Information and Public Diplomacy at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),and with Dino Djalal, advisor to President Yudhoyono. Agreeing that the U.S.-Indonesia relationship was in good shape, they discussed the normalization of military ties; progress on human rights and accountability; possible UNSCR action on Iran's nuclear program; the situation in Papua; the USG travel warning on Indonesia and the status of the Embassy's land purchase. END SUMMARY MILITARY TIES AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS -------------- ¶2. (C) Noting that there were no longer legislative restrictions on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, DG Hadi asked why the USG recently denied export licenses for Indonesian military (TNI) firearm purchases. DAS Marciel explained that Secretary Rice had told Congress that the Administration would move steadily to reestablish normal military ties with Indonesia. We would not rush ahead too fast but neither would we move backwards on our military relationship. Congress was closely examining TNI's progress on human rights and accountability. Moving forward too quickly might provoke backtracking on the progress we had already made. As an example of this incremental movement, the USG had approved the sale of approximately 30 competition pistols for the TNI but decided that it was too soon for a larger sale of nearly 400 pistols. ¶3. (C) Hadi, who until four months ago was DCM at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, stressed that the GOI was committed to addressing USG and Congressional concerns and wanted to show Congress how far Indonesia had come. He noted that some key Congress members and staffers had never visited Indonesia and suggested their understanding was based on obsolete information. He reiterated that Indonesia welcomed Congressional visitors. ACCOUNTABILITY -------------- ¶4. (C) DAS Marciel also stressed the importance of accountability for past human rights violations by TNI and other elements of the Indonesian security services. He noted that recent developments in the Munir trial were a positive sign but cautioned that Indonesia needed to make further progress on this front. The Indonesian Special Forces' (KOPASSUS) feting of Tommy Suharto at a recent shooting competition raised questions about Indonesia's commitment to accountability. DAS Marciel also pointed to the recent appointment of Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, who had been accused of serious human rights violations in East Timor, to a sub-regional military command in Papua. Incidents like these cast doubt on TNI's commitment to accountability. Indonesia should pursue accountability not because the U.S. requested it do so but because it was important for Indonesia's democratic development. DG Hadi agreed both incidents cast Indonesia in a bad light and admitted DEPLU had been caught off guard by the KOPASSUS event with Tommy Suharto. He added that accountability was a sensitive issue within the GOI but that Indonesia was committed to it. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM -------------- ¶5. (C) DAS Marciel asked for the GOI's views on Iran's nuclear program, noting that the UNSC would likely return to the issue in the near future. DG Hadi replied that he could not say how the GOI might vote without seeing the text of a JAKARTA 00002421 002.2 OF 003 proposed resolution. Indonesia remained committed to supporting international nonproliferation norms but faced a complex domestic political environment. Hadi noted 65% of the Indonesian public supported the government's yes vote on UNSCR 1747, according to a survey in the Indonesian media. ¶6. (C) DG Hadi explained that Indonesian support for another resolution would depend on successful lobbying of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR),a key responsibility of his current position. A small number hard-line Islamists in the DPR, such as Abdila Toaha, were implacably opposed to any resolution on ideological grounds. (Note: Other DEPLU contacts have mentioned Toaha as the DPR's most committed supporter of Iran. End Note.) The majority of DPR members had no strong connection with Iran and, unlike the Islamists, might be persuaded to support the GOI's yes vote on the next resolution. He added that many DPR members were eyeing the 2009 general election and would act based on domestic political calculations, not on the substance of any UNSCR. DAS Marciel added that the USG understood Indonesia's domestic concerns and stressed that we would consult closely with Indonesia on any future UNSCR action. ¶7. (C) Presidential advisor Djalal cautioned that it would be difficult for Indonesia to support another UNSCR on Iran as long as Iran appeared to be cooperating with the IAEA. The GOI opposed harsh or punitive language in the resolution and wanted the UNSC process to be "part of the solution." Djalal denied that domestic opposition to Indonesia's support of UNSCR 1747 had given SBY cold feet about supporting another resolution. IRAQ -------------- ¶8. (C) Djalal said that, although a segment of the Indonesian population criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East, President Yudhoyono wanted to play a helpful role on Iraq. Noting SBY would meet Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki on the margins of the UNGA in New York, Djalal asked whether Washington had any specific message SBY should deliver. PAPUA -------------- ¶9. (SBU) DAS Marciel thanked DG Hadi for his help with the successful July visit of Representative Eni Faleomavaega and said he might visit Indonesia again in December. DG Hadi agreed the visit had been a success and Rep. Faleomavaega had left with a deeper understanding of the situation in Indonesia. The key was to build confidence between Rep. Faleomavaega and the GOI. Rep. Faleomavaega had to be confident that the GOI was working hard to improve the lives of the Papuan people, while he GOI needed to be confident that Rep. Faleomavaega did not have a hidden agenda of promoting Papuan independence. While it was not possible for Rep. Faleomavaega to visit Papua during his July trip, DG Hadi said, he would be welcome there in December. TRAVEL WARNING -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Noting that Indonesia had been free from a terrorist attack for over two years and had a number of recent counterterrorism successes, DG Hadi asked whether the USG would consider revising its travel warning. DAS Marciel responded that we had already revised the travel warning this year and were continually reviewing the security situation in Indonesia. He stressed that revision of travel warnings was not a political decision and was based solely on an evaluation of security conditions. EMBASSY LAND JAKARTA 00002421 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶11. (SBU) DAS Marciel asked about the GOI's decision on selling the last of four plots of land which comprise the Embassy compound. (Note: The Embassy compound consists of four parcels of land. The USG owns two outright and the GOI has already decided to sell the third to us. We are awaiting their decision on the final parcel, the purchase of which is required to begin construction of a new Embassy. End Note.) DG Hadi replied that the Finance Ministry was still soliciting the views of GOI entities that had equities in the issue. He did not know when the GOI would make a decision but assured DAS Marciel that DEPLU was pursuing the matter through the GOI's interagency process. ¶12. (U) DAS Marciel approved this message. HUME