KEY GROUP OF MUSLIM CLERICS TRENDS CONSERVATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002374 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP, EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM PINR ID SUBJECT: KEY GROUP OF MUSLIM CLERICS TRENDS CONSERVATIVE WHILE ADVOCATING NON-VIOLENCE REF: A. A: JAKARTA 0060 ¶B. B: 06 JAKARTA 03159 ¶C. C: 05 JAKARTA 11875 Classified By: POL/C Joseph Legend Novak for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Indonesia's Islamic Clerics' Council (MUI) continues to make highly-publicized and intolerant edicts about "moral" issues, including a recent announcement by a regional council condemning a popular form of traditional music. While rejecting violence, MUI nonetheless categorically rejects liberal Islam. The group remains locked in a turf battle with the Ministry of Religion as to who is the final arbiter regarding Islam in the country. Overall, MUI remains an influential group, though in need of revitalization. End Summary. -------------- Background on MUI -------------- ¶2. (C) MUI was founded in 1974 by the Ministry of Religion to encourage unity among Indonesia's disparate mass-Muslim organizations. In recent years, MUI has adopted a more conservative bent that coincides with its expansion to include representatives from fringe groups like Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) (Ref A) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, in addition to traditional mainstream heavyweights Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Today, MUI includes representatives from 62 separate groups. ¶3. (C) While mainstream NU and Muhammadiyah leaders are always given the highest positions of authority, in reality they have ceded turf to fringe newcomers. MUI's General Secretary, Ichwan Syam, has insisted that moderates within SIPDIS MUI continue to keep hardliners in check, but recently admitted to poloff that Cholil Ridwan, DDII's representative on the Council, was particularly vocal and radical. Many top Muhammadiyah and NU leaders have distanced themselves from the MUI over the past several years. Moreover, contacts say the Muhammadiyah and NU representatives who are still active tend to come from the more conservative wings of those groups. ¶4. (C) MUI's national body is currently holding a series of regional meetings aimed at formalizing national control over the provincial and local MUI branches. Until now, local MUIs have not been under the control of the national MUI, which only gets involved if two local branches issue divergent edicts (fatwas). Syam, a key driver of these coordinating meetings, noted to poloff that meetings have already taken place in South Sulawesi, Yogyakarta, and East Java, and that he will attend another next month in Bali. -------------- Pressing "Moral" Issues -------------- ¶5. (C) MUI, which lacks a mechanism to enforce its fatwas other than moral suasion, continues to push for what it considers to be greater "public morality." As recently as 2005, MUI issued fatwas against liberalism and pluralism (Ref C). More recently, a MUI council in West Java issued a highly-publicized fatwa banning women from performing dangdut (traditional Indonesian singing) on Independence Day. Regarding public legislation, Syam of MUI noted to poloff that his group supports the controversial anti-pornography bill (Ref B),claiming that even the six female members of MUI's national council supported the draft bill. (Note: The draft bill has sparked outrage among women's groups and Indonesia's arts community, who allege its extreme provisions infringe on women's and artistic rights.) ¶6. (C) While defending its conservative stance in the moral sphere, MUI is cognizant of the need to keep some distance between itself and fringe groups with an extremist agenda. When asked about the recent pro-"Caliphate" HTI conference, Syam rejected HTI as naive and insisted that MUI firmly supports Indonesian nationalism and Pancasila (a national creed which respects tolerance and pluralism). Syam also praised MUI's ability to engage Jemaah Islamiya co-founder JAKARTA 00002374 002 OF 002 Abu Bakar Bashir, whom he characterized as advocating violence and misinterpreting Islam. -------------- Defending Turf -------------- ¶7. (C) MUI clearly prides itself as being a sort of "moral compass" for Indonesia, and steadfastly tries to defend what it sees as its turf. A Ministry of Religious Affairs contact, Director General for Islamic Community Guidance Nasruddin Umar, told poloff of a heated battle over the Ministry's initiative to undercut MUI's monopoly on halal certification (a means of ensuring that food is manufactured or prepared in accord with Islamic edicts),a major source of legitimacy for the Council in the eyes of the Indonesian public. Umar, who characterized MUI as little more than an NGO, made it clear that the Ministry of Religion, not MUI, was the ultimate arbiter of Indonesian religious law. MUI, however, does not accept this. -------------- Revitalization Needed -------------- ¶8. (C) Contacts tell us that MUI's influence among the Indonesian public is uneven. Competing as it does for influence on a crowded playing field, MUI is also in need of revitalization, both organizationally, and with respect to membership--many of its leaders are aged in this nation where 30 percent of the population is under the age of 14. MUI seems to be aware of this, though edicts--such as the one banning dangdut (traditional singing)--subject it to some ridicule and probably do not help draw in a younger crowd. HUME